Corporate Money in the 2026 Midterms Surges to $650 Million
Key Findings
- Federal corporate political spending in the 2026 midterm elections has reached an unprecedented $646 million – a 40% increase over the 2024 presidential election, the previous record-breaking year, when corporations spent $461 million.
- This means the 2026 total so far is already more than one third (38%) of the $1.7 billion that corporations have spent since the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United v. FEC to allow direct corporate spending in federal elections.
- Cryptocurrency and online betting corporations are leading the surge along with Big Tech and businesses with interests in AI and data center development. Collectively, corporations in these sectors have contributed $344 million toward influencing the 2026 midterms – over half (53%) of the 2026 corporate spending surge.
- Crypto corporations have contributed $206 million;
- Online betting corporations have contributed $76 million; and
- Big Tech and others with interests in AI and data center development have contributed $62 million.
- The biggest beneficiaries of the corporate spending newly reported in the Federal Election Commission’s second quarter data are:
- Win for America, the online betting super PAC, which received an additional $29 million, mostly from DraftKings, FanDuel, and bet365 (bringing its total to $72 million);
- Americans for Prosperity, the group associated with the billionaire Koch brothers, which received $20 million from Koch Inc. (bringing its total to $92 million); and
- MAGA Inc., the Trump-aligned super PAC, which reported $17 million in additional contributions, mostly from the crypto corporation Gemini and tobacco company Reynolds American (bringing its total to $401 million).
Note: Findings are based on Public Citizen analysis of 2010-2024 data obtained from OpenSecrets and 2026 U.S. Federal Election Commission data documenting contributions of $5,000 or more by for-profit corporations to super PACs and hybrid PACs. Not all corporate spending is reported to the Federal Election Commission. The totals likely undercount the true total sum of federal corporate election spending, which Dark Money groups enable corporations to conceal.
Analysis
Months before Election Day, corporations have already collectively spent $646 million to influence federal midterm elections – a 40% increase over the $461 million corporations spent over the entire 2024 election cycle and more than triple the $184.1 million spent by corporations during the previous midterms in 2022.
Over one third of the total $1.7 billion in corporate spending to influence federal elections since the U.S. Supreme Court allowed such spending in 2010 has been made during the current election cycle (see Chart).
Chart: Corporate Political Spending in Federal Elections Since Citizens United

Source: Public Citizen analysis of OpenSecrets.org and FEC data through the second quarter of 2026
Most of the 2026 surge is attributable to technology corporations. Crypto, online betting, and tech corporations pushing AI and data centers contributed $344 million, or more than half (53%) of the corporate contributions disclosed to the FEC. The FEC’s second quarter of 2026 disclosures revealed an additional $129 million in corporate contributions over previous reports.
Table 1: Corporate Sectors and Corporate Supremacist Super PACs
| Corporate Sector | Total Corporate Contributions from Sector | Corporate Super PAC | Contributions to Corporate Super PAC |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cryptocurrency | $206 million | Fairshake | $83 million |
| Online Betting | $76 million | Win for America | $72 million |
| Big Tech / AI | $62 million | Leading the Future | $50 million |
| Total | $344 million | -- | $205 million |
Source: Public Citizen analysis of OpenSecrets.org and FEC data through the second quarter of 2026
An unprecedented aspect of the 2026 midterms is the proliferation of corporate supremacist super PACs, which are structured prioritize the interests of their business backers over either major political party or any candidate (see Public Citizen’s previous report on corporate spending in the 2026 midterms). These super PACs follow the crypto sector’s 2024 playbook of engaging in both Democratic and Republican primaries and to support or attack candidates of either major party in the general election.
Two of the main corporate supremacist super PACs – Fairshake, which prioritizes crypto sector interests, and Leading the Future, which prioritizes AI interests – received relatively few additional contributions in the second quarter of 2026. Leading the Future’s increase from $75.1 million to $75.8 million is attributable to interest income. Fairshake’s increase from $135 million to $137.4 million is attributable mostly to one million-dollar donation from a crypto corporation (Digital Currency Group) and interest income.
However, Win for America – the super PAC prioritizing the interests of online betting corporations – received contributions that increased its size by 70%, from $43 million in the first quarter to $72 million. This increase is attributable to contributions of $14.5 million from DraftKings, $7.5 million from FanDuel, $5.5 million from bet365 (Hillside Shared Services), and $1.5 million from Fanatics Betting and Gaming.
Additional corporate contributions in the second quarter of 2026 mostly favored partisan super PACs.
- Koch Inc., the privately held fossil fuel and manufacturing conglomerate long owned and managed by billionaire brothers Charles Koch and the late David Koch, gave $20 million to Americans for Prosperity, the Koch family’s primary political influence vehicle. Koch GA Inc., a subsidiary of the Koch business empire, gave $1.5 million – $750,000 each to the Congressional Leadership Fund, a self-described “super PAC dedicated to electing Republicans to the House of Representatives,” and the Senate Leadership fund, a super PAC dedicated to “maintaining and growing the Senate Republican Majority.” The Koch subsidiary has given $2.5 million and $2 million, respectively, to each of these super PACs over the 2026 cycle.
- Gemini, the crypto corporation controlled by the billionaire twins Tyler and Cameron Winklevoss, gave $10 million to the Trump-aligned MAGA Inc. super PAC. Additional notable corporate contributions to MAGA Inc. include $5 million from the tobacco company Reynolds American, $1 million from the private prison company GEO Group, and $1 million from Manzanita Management Group, a corporation controlled by WhatsApp co-founder and CEO Jan Koum.
- Cannabis corporations collectively gave $11.5 million to America First Agriculture Action, whose treasurer, Charles Gantt, is also the treasurer of MAGA Inc. Curaleaf, Trulieve, Verano Holdings, and Green Thumb Industries each gave $2.5 million, while Arboretum Bidco gave $1 million and Ascend Wellness gave $500,000.
- Tamarack Aspen., which was disclosed as having given $6.7 million to a “pop up” super PAC only after Campaign Legal Center filed a complaint. The super PAC, Kentucky 4th PAC, spent against Rep. Thomas Massie, an outspoken Republican critic of the Trump administration’s handling of the Epstein files. A subsequent complaint alleges Tamarack Aspen is a corporate shell used to illegally fund the PAC while concealing the true contributors’ identities.
- Polymarket, a controversial prediction markets platform, entered the political fray with contributions via its corporate parent, Blockratize Inc., of a $1 million to the Republican-backing Congressional Leadership Fund and $10,000 to V-PAC, a super PAC, with, in their own words, “one mission only: electing Vivek Ramaswamy,” the tech executive and former DOGE co-chair.
- While there were no additional contributions to Leading the Future, the super PAC set up to intervene in elections for AI interests and to oppose regulations, businesses with an interest in data center development reported a handful of contributions to Republican super PACs. Gaylor Electric, a self-described industry leader in designing and building data centers, gave $300,000 to American Leadership PAC, a super PAC affiliated with Jim Banks (R-Ind.) and which supported Trump-endorsed candidates in Indiana’s Republican primaries. Additionally, Republican Forward – a super PAC registered in Alabama but particularly active in South Dakota races – received $200,000 from Midcontinent Media, which operates data centers, and $100,000 each from Applied Digital Corporation and Muth Electric Inc, both of which are engaged in data center construction.
Table 2: Top 10 Corporate Super PAC Contributors for the Second Quarter of 2026
| Corporation | Contribution Amount | Recipient |
|---|---|---|
| Koch Inc. and subsidiary (Koch GA Inc.) | $20 million | Americans for Prosperity |
| $750,000 | Congressional Leadership Fund PAC | |
| $750,000 | Senate Leadership Fund PAC | |
| DraftKings (DK Crown Holdings Inc.) | $14.5 million | Win for America |
| $250,000 | New Leadership PAC | |
| Gemini Trust Company | $10 million | MAGA Inc. |
| FanDuel Inc. | $7.5 million | Win for America |
| Tamarack Aspen Inc. | $6.7 million | Kentucky 4th PAC |
| bet365 (Hillside Shared Services US LLC) | $5.5 million | Win for America |
| Reynolds American (RAI Services Company) | $5 million | MAGA Inc. |
| $100,000 | More Jobs, Less Government | |
| $100,000 | America One | |
| $50,000 | Leadership in Action | |
| Green Thumb Industries (Vision Management Services LLC) | $2.5 million | America First Agriculture Action |
| $2.5 million | Senate Leadership Fund PAC | |
| Jump Crypto Holdings LLC | $4 million | Jump PAC |
Source: Public Citizen analysis of OpenSecrets.org and FEC data through the second quarter of 2026
Conclusion
The unprecedented surge in corporate spending in the 2026 midterm elections follows the success of the cryptocurrency sector’s super PAC spending in 2024. This escalating spending by more and more corporate sectors threatens to crowd out the voices and interests of actual human voters from the already often out-of-touch electoral discourse.
Corporations want elected officials to prioritize their private profit-maximization over voters and the public interest. The interests of voters are far more diverse and dynamic. Their subordination to policies advanced solely to benefit corporate interests can and should be resisted every step of the way.
Nevertheless, the limits of corporate political spending are coming into focus. The crypto sector’s apparent electoral successes in 2024 led to cozy ties with the Trump administration and a collapse in enforcement against the sector – but has failed so far to translate into passage of crypto’s top legislative priority, the Clarity Act. Big spending by AI corporations in New York races, meanwhile, fueled further backlash against the sector.
Americans across the political spectrum are fed up with big money in politics. Despite the allure of campaign cash, it’s clear that candidates that are willing to defy corporate and big money interests have a strong advantage over those who pander to power.
You might be interested in
Stay Updated on Public Citizen
Follow Public Citizen
Support Our Work
‘Thin Air,’ Real Money: Donald Trump’s Crypto Products Have Left Investors at Least $4.7 Billion Underwater
By Zach Everson
Introduction
“I am not a fan of Bitcoin and other Cryptocurrencies, which are not money, and whose value is highly volatile and based on thin air,” President Donald Trump tweeted in July 2019. “Unregulated Crypto Assets can facilitate unlawful behavior, including drug trade and other illegal activity.”
Seven years later, Trump has become the world’s foremost crypto salesperson, hawking nonfungible tokens, meme coins, governance tokens, stablecoins, and shares in a digital-asset treasury.
“Trump’s crypto schemes have left investors at least an estimated $4.7 billion underwater.”
— Public Citizen analysis
What changed? The president realized there were billions to be made hawking thin air to supporters, supplicants, and speculators.
Trump made at least $1.4 billion off crypto in 2025, according to his latest financial disclosure, released in June 2026. It does not appear that he put any of his own money into these ventures.
The profit Trump reaps from crypto, however, does not come out of thin air. It comes from foreign governments. It comes from pardon seekers, corporate interests, and targets of government investigations. It comes from retirement funds. It comes from MAGA supporters and other Americans, just looking to make some money and following the advice of our billionaire president.
According to Public Citizen’s analysis, Trump’s crypto schemes have left investors at least an estimated $4.7 billion underwater. These losses are largely unrealized and, in the case of his meme coin, reflect wealth transferred to a small group of early buyers rather than money that simply vanished.
Table 1: Estimated losses for investors in Trump’s crypto ventures
| Product | Estimated losses |
|---|---|
| Trump Digital Trading Cards | At least $9.3 million |
| $WLFI governance token | At least $1 billion |
| $TRUMP meme coin | $3.2 billion |
| USD1 stablecoin | $0 |
| Trump Media’s digital-asset treasury | $450 million |
| Total | At least $4.7 billion |
While the White House has said, “Neither the President nor his family have ever engaged, or will ever engage, in conflicts of interest,” make no mistake: Donald Trump still owns and has control over his business interests. Through a series of LLCs, Trump’s stakes in the Trump Digital Trading Cards, $TRUMP meme coin, World Liberty Financial’s $WLFI digital token and USD1 stablecoin, and Trump Media & Technology Group reside completely in his revocable trust, of which he is the sole donor and sole beneficiary, while Donald Trump Jr. is the sole trustee. The Trump Organization itself confirmed in an April 2025 regulatory filing in the United Kingdom that Trump retains control over his businesses while in office.
The U.S. dollar is backed by the legal authority and economic power of the United States government. The Trump family’s crypto products are backed by the word of Donald Trump—a man who admitted to misusing charitable funds, took six companies into bankruptcy, and was convicted of 34 felony counts of falsifying business records.
Here’s how Trump turns thin air into real money—and what it costs the rest of us.
Nonfungible tokens: Trump Digital Trading Cards

At a glance
- Definition: A blockchain-recorded token purportedly representing ownership of a digital asset
- Launched: December 2022
- Series produced: 4
- Total number of cards sold: ~175,000
- Each card’s original sales price: $99
- Total cost of cards initially sold (editions 1, 2, and 4): $12.3 million
- Current aggregate market value of cards (editions 1, 2, and 4): $3 million
- Trump’s haul: At least $7.2 million
- Estimate for what investors lost: $9.3 million
What is a nonfungible token?
A report to Congress by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and U.S. Copyright Office defines a nonfungible token (NFT) as “(i) a unique cryptographic token, (ii) the ownership of which is recorded to a blockchain (or another type of digital distributed ledger system), (iii) that provides the owner rights in or access to one or more assets or entitlements.”
Often, that asset takes the form of digital artwork that can be bought and sold. But while anyone can copy and paste the image (see Figure 1), the blockchain creates a permanent record of who owns the image’s underlying token. What that ownership actually conveys—copyright, reproduction rights, or simply a receipt—can vary and is often unclear, even to buyers, the report states.
Trump entered the NFT market as it was collapsing. The craze seems to have broken into the mainstream in March 2021, when the digital artist Beeple sold an NFT at Christie’s for $69.3 million. By September 2023, the crypto gambling site dappGambl estimated that about 95% of NFT collections—nearly 70,000 of the 73,000 it examined—had a market value of zero, leaving an estimated 23 million people holding worthless tokens. Art NFT trading volume, which peaked near $2.9 billion in 2021, had withered to about $23.8 million by early 2025, per DappRadar, a store for Web3 projects.
What’s the closest real-world equivalent?
Baseball cards. Both can be, and often are, mass produced. With NFTs, the underlying crypto token takes the place of physical possession of the card. Rarity, issuer, and the image on the front are main determinants of price on the secondary market. NFTs are often designed to evoke the look of a sports trading card, too—as Trump’s are, down to the name.
How are NFTs regulated?
No comprehensive federal law specifically regulates NFTs. Under the Trump administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has retreated from NFT enforcement actions begun under the prior administration, closing two investigations within weeks of his returning to office. In the CLARITY Act, the digital-asset legislation Trump and his administration support that is working its way through Congress, Republicans on the Senate Banking Committee have advocated for a clause explicitly stating NFTs are exempt from securities laws unless they involve an investment contract. At a minimum, the bill should ban the president from profiting on NFTs.
A brief history of Trump Digital Trading Cards
In a “MAJOR ANNOUNCEMENT!” on Truth Social in December 2022, just weeks after launching his third presidential campaign, Trump unveiled his NFTs. “These limited edition cards feature amazing ART of my Life & Career!,” he posted. The collection of 45,000 trading cards hit the market at $99 each. The cards—which showed stylized images of Trump, for example, ripping open his shirt to show a superhero outfit, wearing sunglasses and boxing gloves, or donning a duster amidst ducks in a meadow—sold out within about a day, generating roughly $4.5 million in sales. Some of Trump’s clothing in the NFTs appears to have been based on images from small clothing brands, Gizmodo reported, citing reverse image searches.
The cards are issued by NFT INT LLC, a Delaware company that licenses Trump’s name and likeness from CIC Digital LLC, an entity wholly owned by Trump that he created in 2022 to receive license fees from NFT sales. Until returning to the presidency, Trump served as CIC Digital’s manager, president, secretary, and treasurer. According to Bloomberg, the project was proposed to Trump by Bill Zanker, a longtime business associate who co-authored Trump’s 2007 book Think Big and Kick Ass in Business and Life. NFT INT LLC’s underlying ownership, however, is shielded behind a Delaware registered agent.
The partnership went on to release three more series of trading cards, with the latest, called “The America First Collection,” debuting in August 2024, a time Trump was also courting votes from crypto supporters. Despite a global downturn in the NFT market by that time, the sale still reportedly raked in $3.1 million. That series also included a physical aspect: each card featured a piece of fabric from the suit Trump wore in his June 2024 debate with President Joe Biden.
How Trump made out
Trump has reaped at least $7.2 million from the NFTs via licensing fees and royalties on sales on the secondary market, rather than any investment of his own capital, according to financial disclosures Trump is required to file as a candidate or president. The disclosures appear to cover overlapping or unspecified periods rather than clean calendar years, however, making it impossible to calculate accurate totals. So to be conservative, we’ll just use the $7.2 million from his August 2024 disclosure.
Table 2: Trump’s reported income from his NFTs
Disclosure filed Income Value of cash Income from bank account Value of crypto wallet Income from crypto wallet
August 2023 $4,866,832 $500,000 to $1 million $2,060,490 $1 million to $5 million $2,806,341
August 2024 $7,156,385 $500,000 to $1 million $5,000 to $15,000 $1 million to $5 million Less than $200
June 2025 $1,157,490 $1 million to $5 million $2,500 to $5,000 $1 million to $5 million Less than $200
June 2026 Less than $201 Unknown. Trump’s disclosure covering 2025 commingles this entity’s accounts with meme coin proceeds.
How other investors made out
Unlike the other crypto products in this report, the price of NFTs within a single series can vary widely. Factors like rarity (some cards exist as one-of-a-kind editions) and the imagery on the card can cause the prices of NFTs in the same series to have significant price differences.
Consistent with academic research finding that market liquidity and realized trade prices—rather than floor listings, which reflect asking prices unsupported by completed sales—are strong predictors of NFT value, Public Citizen valued each collection at its average sale price over the trailing 30 days. Because individual card values vary with rarity, the collection average is an aggregate measure rather than a price for any specific card. As the analysis measures current value, it relies on recent sales rather than an all-time average, which would be skewed by the elevated prices of the 2021–2023 NFT boom. As no trades could be found over the last 30 days for Series 3, we erred on the conservative side and omitted it from the totals. Overall, investors in the Series 1, 2, and 4 NFTs originally paid $12.3 million to Trump and his business partner; those cards now are worth about $3 million—a decline of $9.3 million, or about 76%.
Some buyers could have made out very well, but that was not the case for most of them. Series 1’s floor (the lowest value at which an NFT in a collection can be purchased) was around $900 in April 2023—around nine times the $99 original price—before collapsing when Trump released an additional series. Early buyers who sold before Series 2 hit the market, especially around the time of his 2023 indictment by the Manhattan district attorney’s office, may have captured substantial profits. Over the past 30 days, however, Series 1 cards have traded at an average of just $44.69, according to CryptoSlam, an industry data aggregator (see table 3). As of August 25, 2026, the 30-day trailing averages for NFTs Series 2 and 4 are $6.91 and $20.42, respectively. Meanwhile, Series 3 (the Mugshot edition) has effectively no secondary market; it recorded no sales in the past 30 days, and fewer than 500 people have ever bought one on the secondary market.
Table 3: Value of Trump NFTs on the secondary market
Series Original sales price Number of cards Total cost of cards initially sold Trailing 30-day average sale price, as of Aug. 25, 2026 Aggregate current value, as of Aug. 25, 2026 Current return (%)
1 $99 45,000 $4.5 million $44.69 $2 million -55%
2 $99 47,000 $4.7 million $6.91 $325,000 -93%
3 (Mugshot edition) $99 50,754 $5 million – - -
4 (America First edition) $99 31,740 $3.1 million $20.42 $648,000 -79%
Totals of editions 1, 2, and 4 123,740 $12.3 million $3 million -76%
Related products
Melania Trump announced her own NFT collection, Melania’s Vision, in December 2021, a year before her husband launched his line. The disclosure President Trump filed in June 2025 said her income was $217,000 from the venture (her NFT income was bundled with other products in the June 2026 disclosure).
Her first NFT up for auction went for the crypto equivalent of about $170,000. But, according to Vice’s analysis, and confirmed by Bloomberg, the money for the winning bid came from the entity that originally put the NFT up for sale. Melania Trump’s office told Bloomberg the transaction had been “facilitated on behalf of a third-party buyer.” (The NFT had attracted only a handful of bids, and the auction took place around the time of a greater crypto crash, causing the dollar value of some bids to drop after they were placed.)
Governance token: $WLFI

At a glance
- Definition: A token granting holders some voting rights in a crypto project
- Launched: September 2024
- Total supply: 100 billion
- Current circulation: 31.8 billion
- All-time high: $0.3313 (Sept. 1, 2025)
- All-time low: $0.0508 (Aug. 9, 2026)
- Currently trading at: $0.05744
- Market cap: $1.83 billion
- Trump’s income from token sales: $557 million
- Value of Trump’s coins: Between $50 million and $905 million
- Estimated losses for investors, realized and unrealized: at least $1 billion
What is a governance token?
A governance token is a digital commodity that conveys to holders certain “rights with respect to the associated functional crypto system,” according to the SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). They typically allow “holders to vote on certain technical or governance matters, such as software upgrades and treasury expenditures.”
What’s the closest real-world equivalent?
Membership in a condo board—but without actually getting to vote on many issues or even own the condo.
How are governance tokens regulated?
No comprehensive federal law specifically regulates governance tokens, and the SEC has not formally classified $WLFI as either a security or a non-security. In March 2026, the SEC and CFTC indicated governance tokens may qualify as digital commodities outside federal securities laws—but only as long as there is no central party. Under the CLARITY Act, governance tokens would qualify as “digital commodities” and fall under CFTC jurisdiction—a lighter-touch regulatory regime than SEC oversight, and one that would benefit issuers like World Liberty Financial.
A brief history of $WLFI
With the mission to “leverage the global reach and recognition of the Trump brand” and Trump’s face splashed across the cover of the venture’s gold paper, World Liberty Financial was “inspired by the vision of Donald J. Trump.” Along with Donald Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Barron Trump, the president’s now-Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, and Witkoff’s sons Zach and Alex, Trump founded the venture, announcing it about two months before the 2024 election.
Trump owns 70% of an LLC that holds both 38.25% of the equity interest in the venture and all rights to its net protocol revenues, other than net proceeds from the sale of $WLFI tokens, for which it is entitled to 75% after some deductions, according to Trump’s latest annual financial disclosure, the fine print on World Liberty Financial’s website, and court filings. That LLC and Trump family members also hold 22.5 billion $WLFI tokens.
At first, the tokens were nontransferable and only available to accredited or foreign investors for $0.015 each. A second round priced tokens at $0.05, and by early July 2025, nearly 2,000 investors had bought in, according to an SEC filing. Later that month, token owners voted to allow limited trading, allowing them to sell 20% of their holdings, though founders—including Trump—remain locked out.
The actual governance function of $WLFI appears to be largely illusory. By World Liberty Financial’s own account, its token holders “are not members of WLF” and the company is “not controlled by $WLFI token holders,” who are only entitled to vote on “certain” protocol matters. World Liberty Financial screens all proposals prior to voting, only opening up those proposals when the outcome does not—in its own judgment—risk violating a law, contract, or terms of the corporation’s contract. The company’s decisions in those matters are final. World Liberty Financial can lengthen or shorten the typical one-week voting period based on its sole discretion. The timeframe for implementing the results of any passed vote is also at its sole discretion, as is adding protocol terms and policies. The company also selects, again, at its sole discretion, the signers of the wallet that administratively controls its governance platform and protocol. A lawsuit filed by crypto billionaire Justin Sun in April 2026 goes further, accusing World Liberty Financial of secretly freezing 3 billion of his tokens from trading, denying him voting rights to protest, and making changes to the protocol unilaterally.
In April 2026, World Liberty Financial pledged $450 million worth of its own $WLFI tokens as collateral to borrow $75 million in stablecoins, including about $65 million of its own USD1, from Dolomite, a lending platform run by one of its own advisers—a circular self-dealing structure that some observers compared to the one that brought down FTX.
In May 2026, World Liberty Financial token holders approved a proposal that created a path to unlocking the founders’ tokens, including Trump’s. If founders elect to unlock their tokens, they could lose up to 10% of them, but after two years, they’d be able to sell the remainder on a three-year vesting schedule. Based on Public Citizen’s analysis of on-chain transactions, it appears Trump and other founders took that step almost immediately. To track the movement, though, begin on September 29, 2024, when a single transaction from World Liberty Financial’s wallet sent one token to each of seven different addresses, likely as a test. On October 10-11, 2024, two more transactions delivered the balance, including 15,749,999,999 tokens to one wallet, and 2,249,999,999 to each of three others. Those four amounts split 22.5 billion tokens exactly 70-10-10-10, matching the disclosed 70% Trump stake in the LLC that holds the tokens, with the remaining 30% held by unnamed family members (divided here in three equal shares). None of the four moved their $WLFI until May 19, 2026, when each one moved its full balance into the vesting contract in the same transaction. Public Citizen could not independently confirm who controls the four wallets.
How Trump made out
According to his financial disclosures, World Liberty Financial took in $57 million in 2024—a period during which the company only existed for three months and Trump was out of office. About $30 million of that revenue was attributable to him. In 2025, with him back in the White House, Trump’s share jumped more than 17 times to $527 million, bringing his total haul from token sales to $557 million through the end of last year.
Trump also reported $65.6 million in income from selling an equity stake in World Liberty Financial in 2025.
He’s sitting on 15.75 billion $WLFI tokens, which he valued as worth more than $50 million. While they are trading at $0.05744—putting the stake’s nominal value near $905 million—that figure is theoretical: his tokens are locked up for now, and $WLFI’s daily trading volume is a fraction of the position, meaning any attempt to sell them at scale would almost certainly cause the price to plummet.
Trump’s stake did not come from any apparent investment of his own funds.
How other investors made out
Not well. On its first day of trading, $WLFI hit $0.3313. That price remains its all-time high, with the coin plummeting and now trading at $0.05744. The accredited and foreign investors who got in on the private sale paid $0.015 or $0.05, meaning they’re up anywhere from 15% to 283%. Almost everyone who bought the tokens on the public market, though, is down—possibly as much as 83%, if they bought at the peak.
Calculating the total amount $WLFI investors have lost is difficult because much of the token was distributed through its private sale and now trades largely on centralized exchanges—venues where losses are real but not visible in on-chain data, leaving the full toll unknowable. Public Citizen estimates $WLFI has cost investors at least $1 billion. That figure reflects roughly $1 billion in unrealized losses at a company called AI Financial Corporation (formerly ALT5 Sigma) at current prices, plus at least $54 million among losing retail buyers on decentralized exchanges—and excludes losses on centralized exchanges, which are real but not measurable from on-chain data and would likely push the total even higher.
AI Financial, a Nasdaq-listed company that remade itself into a World Liberty Financial treasury vehicle, acquired 7.28 billion $WLFI tokens at $0.20 each in August 2025 for a total of about $1.46 billion—a position it valued at just $421 million by the end of June 2026, a paper loss of $1.04 billion. Its $WLFI treasury had been subject to a lock-up provision, with its coins becoming transferable as of August 12, 2026, according to an SEC filing. About a week prior to that date, a wallet Arkham identifies as AI Financial’s moved roughly 1.8 billion tokens to other wallets.
At Public Citizen’s request, two blockchain analytics firms examined trading in $WLFI. Both looked only at decentralized exchanges—a limitation that captures only a fraction of the damage—since it excludes losses on centralized exchanges (such as Binance), where most $WLFI trading occurs, as well as among private-sale investors. Nansen, filtering to include only likely retail wallets, found that of 31,000 wallets that bought $WLFI on Ethereum decentralized exchanges, 25,000—82%—were underwater as of August 3, 2026. Those losing wallets were down $54 million, while winners were up $24 million, for a net loss of $30 million across all retail buyers. The median buyer was down $33. Bubblemaps, counting all addresses that traded $WLFI on decentralized exchanges, found 35,000 traders at a loss for a combined $365 million, against 23,000 traders up a total of $201 million. It counted 24 traders with losses exceeding $1 million, while 29 had profits of more than $1 million.
Putting aside any financial returns, however, some large backers made out quite well. Justin Sun bought $30 million worth of $WLFI tokens through his company, Blue Anthem, in November 2024, and another $15 million in January 2025, while his public statements have put his total investment at $75 million. In March 2026, Trump’s SEC settled the fraud case it had brought against him and his companies during the Biden administration, penalizing one of his firms $10 million and dropping the rest.
And in June 2025, Aqua 1 Foundation, an investment fund describing itself as based in the United Arab Emirates with no discoverable web presence before the deal, announced it had purchased $100 million of $WLFI “to participate in governance of the decentralized finance platform inspired by President Donald J. Trump.” (Reuters later reported the fund was connected to Guren “Bobby” Zhou, a Chinese businessman under investigation in Britain for money laundering. He has denied any wrongdoing.) Five months later, Trump’s Commerce Department allowed a separate UAE entity, G42, to import the equivalent of up to 35,000 advanced Nvidia AI chips that require U.S. government authorization to export.
Figure 3: Price of $WLFI since public trading started

Foreign connections
Before the tokens were unlocked, only accredited or foreign investors could buy them. And 2.8 billion tokens are currently held at Binance, which is barred from serving U.S. customers under the terms of its 2023 settlement with the Treasury Department. Meaning that if the rules are being followed, they are in foreign hands.
World Liberty Financial is also helping the Pakistani government integrate blockchain technology into its financial system. According to a government press release issued in January 2026, World Liberty Financial CEO Zach Witkoff “showed keen interest to engage with Pakistan” and “expressed keen desire to further deepen engagement.”
Related products
In August 2025, the aforementioned AI Financial (then still called ALT5 Sigma) announced plans to raise $1.5 billion and build a treasury of what turned out to be 7.28 billion $WLFI tokens. Since linking up with World Liberty Financial, the company has seen its share price fall 91%, from $7.04 to $0.642.
Beyond the stock price, AI Financial has had a tumultuous run since partnering with World Liberty Financial:
- It suspended and later terminated its CEO—reportedly giving the SEC the wrong date for when it placed him on leave.
- Nasdaq flagged it three times, including as recently as August 2026, as noncompliant for failing to file SEC reports on time.
- It’s at risk of being delisted by Nasdaq for having a stock price below $1.
- It changed its name from ALT5 Sigma to AI Financial Corp.
Under World Liberty Financial’s revenue split, the Trump family LLC was entitled to up to 75% of the net proceeds, of which Trump himself owns 70%—a theoretical maximum of roughly $394 million before any undisclosed deductions. (This sum is not in addition to the aforementioned $WLFI income, but rather is part of it.)
At first Eric Trump was slated to sit on its board of directors; instead he became a board observer. Then his name was removed from the website altogether. Now he’s apparently trying to distance himself from the company altogether—quite the retreat for someone who rang the opening bell at Nasdaq MarketSite in August 2025 to commemorate the deal, saying, “World Liberty and ALT5, we are the tip of the spear…we are really going to rewrite the whole playbook for the financial industry.”
Meme coin: $TRUMP

At a glance
- Definition: A speculative crypto asset driven by internet hype, with no underlying value
- Launched: January 17, 2025, three days before Trump’s inauguration
- Total supply: 1 billion
- Current circulation: 250.9 million
- All-time high: $73.43 (Jan. 19, 2025)
- All-time low: $1.37 (Aug. 13, 2026)
- Currently trading at: $2.22
- Market cap: $557 million
- Trump’s income from fees: $635 million
- Value of Trump’s coins: ~$271 million
- Losses, largely unrealized, of investors who ended up underwater: ~$3.2 billion
What is a meme coin?
In 2025, SEC staff called meme coins “a type of crypto asset inspired by internet memes, characters, current events, or trends for which the promoter seeks to attract an enthusiastic online community to purchase the meme coin and engage in its trading.” Meme coins are typically not backed by any underlying asset, nor do they represent ownership in any business or revenue stream. They often have no functionality, although occasionally they have utility in contests, access to chatrooms or games.
What’s the closest real-world equivalent?
Beanie Babies. Like NFTs, their value is based almost exclusively on hype and popularity. Their manufacturer, Ty Inc., even ran an “Official Club” in the late 1990s where ownership of a specific limited-edition Beanie Baby unlocked access to additional exclusive products. (Although Beanie Babies can be soft and cuddly, which meme coins are not.)
How are meme coins regulated?
No comprehensive federal law specifically regulates meme coins. In a statement made about six weeks after Trump became a meme-coin entrepreneur, SEC staff wrote that “meme coins are akin to collectibles.” In March 2026, the SEC and CFTC issued a final rule formalizing the position, stating “a digital collectible does not constitute any of the financial instruments enumerated in the definition of ‘security.’” The CLARITY Act’s definition of digital commodity excludes collectibles—which, combined with the SEC and CFTC’s guidance, puts meme coins outside the bill’s primary scope.
A brief history of Trump’s meme coin
Trump launched $TRUMP three days before he returned to the White House, by which time he had already announced who he planned to lead the SEC. Trump’s CIC Digital is partners in the venture with Fight Fight Fight LLC, which is also connected to Zanker, Trump’s co-author on Think Big and Kick Ass in Business and Life. The two companies retained ownership of 80% of the coins, which are scheduled to be released over the next three years, according to the coin’s website. The companies also collect revenue from trading activity.
Trump’s meme coin made headlines in May 2025 when the top holders were awarded a dinner with the president at his D.C.-area golf course and a White House tour. (Public Citizen held a rally outside the dinner with Sen. Jeff Merkley, D-Ore., and more than 100 demonstrators.) Trump threw a similar event in April 2026 at Mar-a-Lago.
In late 2025 and mid-2026, two other attempts to encourage utility—and therefore increase the value of Trump’s coins—were introduced: the “play-to-earn” Trump Billionaires Club game, which promises $1 million worth of crypto prizes, and $TRUMP Coin Club, which offers special rewards, discounted merch, and exclusive content and experiences.
How Trump made out
Trump made $635 million in licensing fees from his meme coin in 2025, according to his latest financial disclosure.
In March 2026, Forbes estimated the meme coins Trump is sitting on were worth $393 million. $TRUMP has fallen by about 31% since then, though, so it’s probably worth closer to $271 million now. Trump’s tokens were allocated to his company rather than purchased, and his other income from the meme coin came via licensing fees. Neither required any capital investment from him, meaning his proceeds should be nearly all profit.
How other investors made out
$TRUMP launched on January 17, 2025, when Trump announced it in a Truth Social post around 9 p.m. Eastern. Within about 90 seconds of Trump’s post, a single wallet—funded with roughly $1.1 million about two hours earlier—bought nearly 6 million tokens at around $0.18 each, roughly 6% of the coins then available, according to Bloomberg’s analysis. Over the next two days, as many of Trump’s millions of followers piled in, the price soared to an all-time high of $73.43. The earliest buyers were positioned for extraordinary gains; the far larger waves that bought during and after the surge were left holding tokens now worth a fraction of what they paid. In effect, the coin transferred billions of dollars from a large group of later buyers to a small group of early ones.
Two blockchain analytics firms examined $TRUMP trading at Public Citizen’s request. Nansen, filtering to likely retail wallets, found that of about 1.6 million wallets that bought $TRUMP on Solana decentralized exchanges, roughly 1 million—65%—are underwater, down a combined $3.2 billion. As with $WLFI, most of that is unrealized: only about $400 million was realized in sales at a loss. The gains were overwhelmingly concentrated: the top 1% of winning wallets captured about $2.7 billion—80% of all gains. And the wallets that bought in the coin’s first two days, roughly 45% of retail buyers, took nearly 90% of the gains. The median buyer was down $3.06, and almost 350,000 wallets were down more than $100. Bubblemaps, counting all addresses that traded $TRUMP on decentralized exchanges, found about 1 million losing wallets down $4.5 billion, with 36 traders reaping profits that exceeded $10 million.
Figure 5: Price of Trump’s meme coin since launch

Some investors really made out in ways that transcend a cash return on their investment. The aforementioned Justin Sun bought $100 million in $TRUMP. In March 2026, Trump’s SEC settled the fraud case it had brought against him and his companies during the Biden administration, penalizing one of his firms $10 million and dropping the rest. And while it’s unclear if it actually benefited from the purchase, the CEO of Freight Technologies, a Nasdaq-listed cross-border logistics company, announced his company had earmarked $20 million for buying $TRUMP, saying the purchase was “an effective way to advocate for fair, balanced, and free trade between Mexico and the U.S.” As of May 2025, the company has disclosed roughly $2 million in $TRUMP purchases.
Foreign connections
Bloomberg’s analysis in May 2025 found that 19 of the 25 top $TRUMP holders had registered through foreign exchanges that exclude U.S. customers, and that more than half of the top 220 holders had done the same. A New York Times investigation that traced specific attendees of the May 2025 dinner identified Chinese crypto billionaire Justin Sun as the leaderboard’s top holder, alongside He Tianying, a delegate to a district branch of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which is “an advisory body that seeks to broaden the Communist Party’s influence and solicit support from influential people in Chinese society.”
Related products
Melania Trump launched her own meme coin, $MELANIA, two days after her husband. It’s even underperformed $TRUMP, currently trading at just $0.1037, down 99.2% from the all-time high of $13.05 it hit on its launch day. Her revenue from the venture is not broken out in the president’s financial disclosure but rather appears to be lumped in with the $6 million she made from “NFTs and other collectibles.”
Stablecoin: USD1

At a glance
- Definition: A dollar-pegged crypto asset backed by cash and Treasury reserves
- Launched: March 2025
- Market cap: $4.1 billion
- Rank among stablecoins by market cap: Fourth
- Percent held by overseas interests if rules are being followed: At least 64%
- Trump’s revenue in 2025: $199.2 million
What is a stablecoin?
A stablecoin is a cryptocurrency designed to hold a steady value—usually pegged one-to-one to the U.S. dollar and backed by reserves the issuer promises to redeem on demand, according to a 2022 paper published by the Federal Reserve.
What’s the closest real-world equivalent?
An interest-free loan to the issuer. You hand over a dollar, the issuer invests it in short-term government debt (like Treasury bills), and the issuer pays you back a dollar whenever you ask—keeping the interest it earned on your money.
How are stablecoins regulated?
The GENIUS Act, which Trump signed into law four months after he launched USD1, provides a regulatory framework for stablecoins used for payments: Issuers must hold at least one dollar of reserves for every dollar of stablecoins issued; they are prohibited from paying any interest to holders; and reserves are restricted to cash, bank deposits, Treasury bills, government money market funds, and similar low-risk assets. The act also requires the president, vice president, and other senior executive branch officials to report personal stablecoin holdings exceeding $5,000. But it contains no new prohibitions on officials or their families from issuing or sponsoring a stablecoin, although it does state that existing ethics laws already bar officials from personally issuing a stablecoin while in office.
A brief history of Trump’s stablecoin
Four days before Trump’s inauguration, a company backed by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan—Abu Dhabi’s deputy ruler and the UAE’s national security adviser—purchased a 49% stake in World Liberty Financial, the Wall Street Journal reported. The investment, which was a secret for about a year, didn’t give the Tahnoon-backed firm rights to future WLFI token sales, leaving it “out of what was then [World Liberty Financial’s] only source of revenue,” the Journal reported. The sale of 49% of the businesses routed $187 million to Trump family entities, according to the Journal. (The Constitution states, “no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”)
In March 2025, World Liberty Financial, which had already released the $WLFI governance token, announced plans for a second product: USD1, a stablecoin minted on the Ethereum and Binance Smart Chain blockchains.
In May 2025, World Liberty Financial revealed that MGX’s $2 billion investment in Binance would be settled in the fledgling USD1. MGX is a state-backed Abu Dhabi fund chaired by Sheikh Tahnoon. The move essentially allowed World Liberty Financial—and the Trumps—to make interest off the $2 billion for as long as that USD1 is in circulation. MGX said it chose USD1 stablecoin to settle its investment based on factors such as business suitability, the currency of the backing assets and “compliance history.” USD1 was brand new at the time.
That deal—and assistance from Binance—helped USD1 quickly rank among the top 10 stablecoins by market cap.
Since April 2025, USD1’s custodian, BitGo, has issued monthly attestation reports that purport to disclose its reserve holdings. In an “independent accountants’ examination report” dated July 31, 2026, KPMG found that BitGo’s assertion about the reserves was “fairly stated”—reporting roughly $4.6 billion in USD1 outstanding as of June 30, 2026, against reserves exceeding that by just $177,000, a margin of less than 0.01%. The market cap appears to have dropped, with two crypto trackers, Arkham and CoinGecko, listing it at $4.1 billion as of August 26, 2026.
Figure 7: USD1’s market cap since launch

How Trump made out
Trump reported $197 million in revenue from capital contributions from new partners in the venture. Net operating income from the stablecoin business came to $8.3 million, of which about $2.2 million was attributable to Trump. As mentioned previously, Trump’s stake in World Liberty Financial did not come from any apparent investment of his own funds.
How other investors made out
As planned, the stablecoin has retained its value. So, unlike Trump’s other crypto ventures, buyers of USD1 haven’t suffered major losses.
Tahnoon managed to come out ahead big time on his USD1 transaction. Two weeks after World Liberty Financial announced MGX was using $2 billion of USD1 to invest in Binance, the White House walked back a Biden-era policy and “agreed to allow the U.A.E. access to hundreds of thousands of the world’s most advanced and scarce computer chips,” the New York Times reported.
Trump also pardoned Binance founder, Changpeng “CZ” Zhao, and Trump’s SEC dismissed a lawsuit it had filed against the exchange during Biden’s term. Not only did Binance allow World Liberty Financial to profit off interest from the $2 billion of USD1 that MGX invested in the exchange, but Binance had also helped the stablecoin launch, reportedly offering prizes to generate demand and donating software.
Foreign connections
A firm backed by the UAE’s national security adviser owns 49% of the company that issues USD1. And between its own wallets and its customers’, Binance holds $2.63 billion of the $4.1 billion of USD1 in circulation. Binance is barred from serving U.S. customers under the terms of its 2023 settlement with the Treasury Department. So, if the rules are being followed, at least 64% of USD1 is held by foreign interests. World Liberty Financial appears to be looking to deepen its relationship with Binance, sponsoring promotions that encourage the exchange’s account holders to acquire and hold USD1.
Despite U.S. sanctions and Binance’s earlier pledges, “Iranian entities associated with the regime” have continued to use the exchange as recently as May 2026, according to the Wall Street Journal. (Binance disputes the Journal’s reporting on its sanctions compliance. In March 2026, the exchange sued the paper’s parent, Dow Jones, for defamation over an earlier article on the same subject.)
In August 2026, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency—which is led by a Trump appointee—granted “preliminary conditional approval” to World Liberty Trust Company, a proposed national trust bank. Affiliated with World Liberty Financial, the bank would assume responsibility for issuing USD1. The bank’s investors include a Trump-family entity, DT Marks SC LLC, whose passivity commitment was signed by Eric Trump, and StringZ Holding RSC (DE) LLC, whose manager is listed as Hamad Khlfan Ali Matar Alshamsi. A businessman of that name is vice chairman of Ghitha Holding, a subsidiary of International Holding Company, the Abu Dhabi conglomerate chaired by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
World Liberty Financial is also collaborating with WorldClaw, a Hong Kong-based AI platform that accepts USD1 as payment. A Reuters review found that 43 of the 90 models available through WorldClaw’s website were developed by Alibaba, Baidu, Z.ai and other Chinese technology companies the Trump administration says pose national-security risks.
Digital-asset treasury: Trump Media & Technology Group

At a glance
- Definition: A public company that holds large cryptocurrency positions on its balance sheet
- Launched: Trump Media was formed in February 2021, went public via a merger in March 2024, and announced its crypto treasury on May 27, 2025
- Market cap when crypto treasury announced: $5.7 billion
- Current market cap: $2.6 billion
- All-time high: $175.00 (Oct. 22, 2021)
- All-time low: $6.96 (June 26, 2026)
- Price when crypto treasury was announced: $26.76 (May 27, 2025)
- Currently trading at: $9.31
- Value of Trump’s shares: $1.07 billion
- Company’s paper loss on bitcoin: $450 million
What is a crypto treasury?
No federal or state regulator appears to have formally defined a crypto treasury. Strategy Inc., which pioneered the concept in August 2020 when it was named MicroStrategy, says it “generate[s] value from our bitcoin holdings…[by] developing and issuing novel fixed-income instruments that provide investors varying degrees of economic exposure to bitcoin.” Essentially, crypto treasuries allow investors exposure to digital assets without actually buying any.
What’s the closest real-world equivalent?
A horse-racing syndicate. As one equine law firm describes it, that’s “a group of people who come together to purchase shares in a horse,” who become “co-owners of fractional interests in a racehorse” and share the cost of purchase and ongoing maintenance. Investors don’t directly own the horse; instead, they own pieces of an entity that does, and the value of each piece can rise or fall based on how the racehorse performs.
How are digital-asset treasuries regulated?
The same as other publicly traded companies.
A brief history of Trump Media’s digital-asset treasury
In May 2025, Trump Media, the parent company of the Truth Social platform, sold 55.9 million shares, raising $1.44 billion, and another $1 billion in convertible debt and used the proceeds to eventually buy more than $1 billion worth of bitcoin, approximately $630 million of bitcoin-related securities, and $114 million worth of Cronos, another cryptocurrency. The move essentially transformed it from a media company to a digital-asset treasury with a money-losing media side hustle.
How Trump made out
Trump’s 114.75 million shares were worth $3.07 billion when the company announced it was building a digital-asset treasury. They are currently worth $1.07 billion. Trump’s 41% stake in Trump Media comes from converting his founding interest when a merger took the company public, as well as some “earnout” shares issued at no cost after the stock price reached preset targets, not buying shares on the open market.
How other investors made out
Since trading opened the day the company unveiled its bitcoin strategy on May 27, 2025, Trump Media’s shares are down 65% and its market capitalization has fallen from about $5.7 billion to roughly $2.6 billion—erasing about $3.1 billion in shareholder value. Shares in Trump Media had been on a consistent downward trajectory since it finalized the merger that took it public, so not all of that loss can be attributed to its crypto treasury. But the strategy has not reversed it: as of June 30, 2026, Trump Media held 9,477 bitcoin that cost about $1.006 billion but were worth just $557 million—a paper loss for the company of around $450 million.
Isolating the treasury strategy’s responsibility for that $3.1 billion decline in the value of Trump Media shares is difficult: the company announced the strategy alongside a $2.4 billion capital raise, its stock was already on the decline, and it has made other moves since May 2025 that affected the price. For the purposes of this report, Public Citizen takes the conservative approach and attributes to the strategy only the $450 million paper loss on the bitcoin itself.
Figure 9: DJT’s stock price since announcing its digital-asset treasury strategy

Foreign connections
Trump Media’s digital-asset treasury is intertwined with Crypto.com, a Singapore-headquartered exchange founded in Hong Kong that operates its trading platform through an entity incorporated in the Cayman Islands. Trump Media announced Crypto.com as one of its two initial bitcoin custodians, and Crypto.com developed the blockchain behind the Cronos token, which Trump Media’s treasury also holds. As of August 2025, Crypto.com owned 2.8 million shares of Trump Media.
Related products
Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump are involved with another venture that allows investors exposure to bitcoin without owning it directly: American Bitcoin, which sells its own shares, using the proceeds to buy bitcoin, as well as mining it in its data center. The stock is down around 96% from its 52-week high. But Eric Trump, who has a bigger role with the company than his brother does, has “boosted his personal fortune from an estimated $190 million to $280 million,” Forbes reported in April 2026. In July 2026, American Bitcoin carried out a 1-for-15 reverse stock split, consolidating every 15 shares into one to keep its share price above Nasdaq’s minimum listing threshold of $1 per share.
Conclusion
The five Trump crypto products this report examines—the Trump Digital Trading Cards NFTs, $TRUMP meme coin, $WLFI governance token, USD1 stablecoin, and Trump Media’s digital-asset treasury—are a snapshot of a Trump crypto empire that has expanded sharply since the November 2024 election. Trump’s businesses continue to launch additional crypto products, with even more potentially on the way.
In February 2025—about a month into Trump’s second term—an LLC that manages the president’s trademarks applied with the Patent and Trademark Office to trademark “Trump” for possible use across dozens of crypto and tech-related products. Included are software for managing crypto transactions, a virtual reality game that uses crypto tokens, video memes verified by NFTs, an online marketplace for buying and selling digital goods and cryptocurrencies, and NFT-authenticated digital collectibles “authorized by the 45th and 47th President of the United States of America.” In October 2025, the president’s Patent and Trademark Office issued a notice of allowance for his company’s trademark application.
In October 2025, Trump Media also announced its involvement in a prediction market offered through Crypto.com. Even as the firms wound down part of their deal, the president’s firm is currently slated to promote Crypto.com’s markets to Truth Social users. While the president’s business is looking into expanding its relationship with the crypto exchange, his administration “intervened” to help prediction markets, including Crypto.com, the New York Times reported. Trump’s CFTC went so far as to put two officials who had raised questions about the companies on leave and began investigating them.
Every Trump crypto product, both launched and in the works, deepens the conflict at the heart of Trump’s administration: the president’s policy choices and personal portfolio cannot be separated. The Trump family peddles crypto, profiting from the market the president and his allies in Congress are writing the rules for. As the Senate takes up the CLARITY Act, lawmakers must—at a minimum—establish strong ethics rules barring the president, his family members, and senior administration officials from issuing, owning, sponsoring, promoting, endorsing, or profiteering from any digital assets they regulate. It also should require divesting from any existing crypto ventures. The latest version of the bill is insufficient. When the president engages in these ventures he is soliciting a gift, he is trading government services for personal gain, and he is accepting emoluments. A crypto framework that exempts the most-conflicted issuer in the country isn’t a guardrail. Instead, it signals a green light for massive corruption.
Stay Updated on Public Citizen
Follow Public Citizen
Support Our Work
Canada Deal Collapse Reveals Trump’s Unreasonable, Billionaire-Friendly Trade Agenda
By Melinda St. Louis, Director at Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch
Reports indicate that the recent Canada-U.S. trade negotiations were scuttled due to last-minute outrageous demands made by the Trump administration, which unsurprisingly included the wishlist of the biggest U.S. corporations — not the policies needed to support working people.
This administration has pushed the same imperialist and neo-colonialist agenda in all of its “agreements on reciprocal trade” (ARTs) signed over the past year. Some of Trump’s reported red lines included U.S. veto power over Canada’s sovereign right to sign trade agreements with third countries and a requirement for Canada to impose the same tariffs as the U.S. on other countries.
The attacks on Canada’s sovereignty don’t end there. Alongside other overreaching demands, the Trump administration apparently even wanted Quebec to repeal its laws requiring consumer products to be labelled in French, and that seek to promote French content on online streaming services. Keep in mind that French is spoken by the majority of the population of the province.
These demands are on top of the perpetual call for the deregulation of critical sectors of Canada’s economy.
Canadian negotiators rightly bristled at U.S. demands that they viewed as an infringement on their sovereignty. The sheer audacity of the Trump administration’s demands made headlines, but these are precisely the terms that Trump has already forced other, less powerful countries to agree to.
The U.S.-Argentina ART forced concessions to undermine Argentina’s intellectual property rules that limit Big Pharma’s monopoly power, setting the stage to raise drug prices for patients. El Salvador and Guatemala’s deals restrain them from implementing digital competition, platform accountability, or online safety regulations, among other handouts to Big Tech. Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, is required to eliminate certain halal requirements for food imports. Many of these ARTs also contain provisions that force signatories to align their domestic policies with U.S export controls and tariffs while also allowing the U.S. a veto over trade deals signed with third parties. There are dozens and dozens of similar examples from Trump’s ARTs, and the common thread is the attempt to line the pockets of American CEOs at the expense of consumers and workers everywhere.
We commend, as do several North American labor unions and consumer groups, Canada’s decision to walk away from such outrageous terms. Giving in to Trump’s bullying does not create certainty, as Canada and the European Union learned, as Trump has continued to move the goalposts and threaten more tariffs after ostensibly coming to a deal before.
Trump should pay close attention to the impact of this bullying of U.S. allies— retaliatory tariffs and pushing our allies to move closer to other countries. Canada has the means and resources to resist these attacks, and doing so has united the country. Canada’s resistance demonstrates that countries can push back against Trump’s bullying and sets an example others may be well-advised to follow.
You might be interested in
Stay Updated on Public Citizen
Follow Public Citizen
Support Our Work
Public Citizen Testimony Before OSHA Regarding Ethylene Oxide
By A'Ishah Johnson, MPH, DrPH(c), Public Citizen's Congress Watch
My name is A’Ishah Johnson, the Workers’ Health and Safety Advocate with Public Citizen. Public Citizen is a nonprofit consumer advocacy organization with over one million members and supporters. My work covers a range of worker health and safety issues, including chemical hazards in the workplace, informed by my background in public health and ongoing doctoral studies. Public Citizen has no financial conflicts of interest related to ethylene oxide, respiratory protection, or the issues addressed in this rulemaking.
OSHA proposes to allow employers to replace the full-facepiece respirator currently required with a half-mask when workers are exposed to ethylene oxide, a known carcinogen for which there is no safe level of exposure. It would also remove the clear requirements that currently trigger respirator use. Public Citizen strongly opposes this reduction in worker protections. OSHA has not demonstrated that lowering the standard will adequately protect workers from the serious health risks posed by ethylene oxide.[i]
In April 2024, EPA finalized new limits[ii] on ethylene oxide emissions from sterilization facilities, citing cancer risk to families living near plants such as the one in Willowbrook, Illinois.[iii] In July 2025, the President exempted dozens of those same facilities from that rule for two years.[iv] In March 2026, EPA proposed rescinding the risk-based limits at the center of that rule.[v] Far from undermining the need for stronger protections, recent research has added to the evidence that ethylene oxide poses significant risks to exposed workers.
In May 2025, scientists at NIOSH, a sister agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, published a sixty-two-year mortality study of ethylene oxide sterilization workers.[vi] Women exposed at a cumulative dose equal to ten years at OSHA’s current permissible exposure limit died of breast cancer at more than three times the rate of unexposed workers, a relative risk of 3.15. These findings make OSHA’s decision not to assess risk in this proposal particularly striking.
OSHA makes no finding on risk anywhere in this proposal. The agency states plainly that it is not determining whether significant risk exists and cites Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson for the proposition that no such finding is required.[vii] Tyson held that OSHA need not relitigate a standard’s foundation every time it acts on that standard. It did not hold that OSHA may remove existing protections while offering no evidence that workers will remain adequately protected.
Paragraph (g)(3)(i) currently bars half masks because ethylene oxide is a mutagenic carcinogen with no established safe threshold. OSHA proposes to lift that bar and let a half mask, paired with goggles, substitute for a full facepiece. The numbers do not support that substitution: an air-purifying half mask carries an assigned protection factor of ten, and a full facepiece carries fifty.[viii] Adding goggles does not make a half mask equivalent to a full-facepiece respirator. The proposal simultaneously lowers how rigorously that mask must be verified to fit, from a quantitative fit factor of five hundred down to a subjective taste or smell test.[ix] A respirator that provides less protection, combined with a less rigorous fit-testing method, cannot simply be assumed to provide equivalent protection to workers exposed to a known carcinogen.
OSHA’s own economic analysis estimates that the proposal would save employers approximately $203.75 per affected worker each year, or nearly $189,000 annually across the exposed workforce. At the same time, the agency identifies no evidence that the proposal would improve worker protection in any respect.[x] The proposal not only fails to identify a benefit to worker protection but also removes safeguards that ensure respirators are used when needed.
The proposal also deletes the four paragraphs specifying exactly when a respirator must be worn and replaces them with a cross-reference to the employer’s own judgment.[xi] OSHA focuses on what employers may continue to do. The more important question is what they will no longer be required to do. Specific requirements are harder to ignore, evade, or reinterpret than general ones.
Public Citizen urges OSHA to withdraw these proposed changes and preserve the current respirator requirements. At a time when new evidence continues to raise concerns about the health risks of ethylene oxide exposure, OSHA should be evaluating whether additional protections are warranted, not weakening existing ones.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
[i] Ethylene Oxide, 90 Fed. Reg. 28,307 (proposed July 1, 2025) (Docket No. OSHA-2025-0018; RIN 1218-AD63). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/01/2025-11638/ethylene-oxide
[ii] U.S. EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Ethylene Oxide Emissions Standards for Sterilization Facilities Residual Risk and Technology Review, 89 Fed. Reg. 24,090 (Apr. 5, 2024) (reducing ethylene oxide emissions from commercial sterilizers by more than 90 percent). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/04/05/2024-05905/national-emission-standards-for-hazardous-air-pollutants-ethylene-oxide-emissions-standards-for
[iii] ATSDR, Sterigenics Ethylene Oxide Evaluation, Willowbrook, Illinois (Nov. 13, 2023) (concern for increased lifetime cancer risk for residents within one mile of the facility before it ceased operations in February 2019). https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/pha/sterigenic/Sterigenics-Evaluation-Ethylene-Oxid-FS-508.pdf
[iv] Proclamation 10959, Regulatory Relief for Certain Stationary Sources To Promote American Security With Respect to Sterile Medical Equipment, 90 Fed. Reg. 34,747 (July 23, 2025) (two-year Clean Air Act compliance exemption for facilities named in Annex I). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/23/2025-13924/regulatory-relief-for-certain-stationary-sources-to-promote-american-security-with-respect-to
[v] U.S. EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Ethylene Oxide Emissions Standards for Sterilization Facilities Residual Risk and Technology Review Reconsideration, 91 Fed. Reg. 12,700 (proposed Mar. 17, 2026) (proposing to rescind the risk-based standards adopted in 2024). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/17/2026-05167/national-emission-standards-for-hazardous-air-pollutants-ethylene-oxide-emissions-standards-for
[vi] Kelly-Reif K, Bertke SJ, Stayner L, Steenland K, Exposure to Ethylene Oxide and Relative Rates of Female Breast Cancer Mortality: 62 Years of Follow-Up in a Large US Occupational Cohort, Environmental Health Perspectives 133(5):057013 (May 22, 2025) (relative risk 3.15, 95% CI 1.78-5.60, at cumulative exposure equivalent to ten years at OSHA’s current 1 ppm permissible exposure limit). https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/40168621/
[vii] 90 Fed. Reg. at 28,308 (OSHA stating it is not making a preliminary finding of significant risk for this proposed rule). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/01/2025-11638/ethylene-oxide
[viii] 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(d)(3)(i)(A), Table 1 (assigned protection factors: air-purifying half mask, 10; air-purifying full facepiece, 50). https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.134
[ix] 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(f)(6)-(f)(7) (qualitative fit testing limited to a fit factor of 100 or less; quantitative fit factor of 500 required for tight-fitting full facepieces). https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.134
[x] 90 Fed. Reg. at 28,310 (Economic Analysis) (estimating a difference of $203.75 per employee annually, approximately $189,000 in aggregate annual savings, and asking whether any benefits for worker protection can be anticipated from the change). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/01/2025-11638/ethylene-oxide
[xi] 90 Fed. Reg. at 28,309, 28,311 (proposing to remove paragraphs (g)(1)(i) through (iv) and substitute a cross-reference to 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(a)(2)). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/01/2025-11638/ethylene-oxide
Stay Updated on Public Citizen
Follow Public Citizen
Support Our Work
Public Citizen Testimony Before OSHA Regarding Vinyl Chloride
By A'Ishah Johnson, MPH, DrPH(c), Public Citizen's Congress Watch
My name is A’Ishah Johnson, the Workers’ Health and Safety Advocate with Public Citizen. Public Citizen is a nonprofit consumer advocacy organization with over one million members and supporters. My work covers a range of worker health and safety issues, including chemical hazards in the workplace, informed by my background in public health and ongoing doctoral studies. Public Citizen has no financial conflicts of interest related to vinyl chloride, respiratory protection, or the issues addressed in this rulemaking.
OSHA proposes to eliminate a long-standing respiratory protection training requirement for vinyl chloride workers on the grounds that it is redundant. Public Citizen strongly opposes this proposal because OSHA has failed to demonstrate that the requirement is redundant or that removing the training will leave workers equally protected. In February 2023, five tank cars of vinyl chloride derailed in East Palestine, Ohio. Three days later, responders vented and burned the chemical rather than allowing it to cool. The National Transportation Safety Board later concluded that action was not necessary to prevent an explosion.[i] That incident is not the subject of today’s proposal, but it raises the same fundamental question about the same chemical: What happens when the people responsible for managing vinyl chloride lack complete, substance-specific knowledge of its hazards and controls? When the consequences of misunderstanding a hazard can be catastrophic, the answer should not be less training. Yet that is precisely what OSHA proposes.
Paragraph (j)(1)(iii) requires training on the purpose, proper use, and limitations of respiratory protection for every employee engaged in vinyl chloride or polyvinyl chloride operations. OSHA proposes to eliminate that requirement on the grounds that it duplicates the respiratory protection standard.[ii]
The requirement is not duplicative. Section 1910.134(k) requires training only for employees who are required to wear a respirator.[iii] Paragraph (j)(1) trains every employee in the operation, regardless of what they wear. For workers outside section 1910.134(k), this proposal eliminates training. OSHA’s own Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health deadlocked on consolidating chemical-specific respirator training into the general standard, because members questioned whether generalized training requirements adequately convey the specific hazards associated with individual substances.[iv] If OSHA’s own advisors are sounding the alarm on these rollbacks, the agency has not demonstrated that they are safe or redundant.
The problem is most apparent during emergencies. Under the vinyl chloride standard’s emergency procedures, workers who are not equipped with respiratory protection must evacuate and remain outside the affected area until conditions are safe. Deciding whether to evacuate depends on understanding what a respirator does and does not protect against, precisely what this training teaches and precisely what OSHA proposes to stop requiring for anyone not already wearing one. Workers also cannot rely on their senses to recognize danger. Federal guidance places vinyl chloride’s odor threshold at approximately 3,000 parts per million, roughly 3,000 times the OSHA permissible exposure limit.[v] A worker may be dangerously overexposed long before any odor is detected. Training serves as a substitute for a warning sign the chemical does not provide.
OSHA adopted the vinyl chloride standard in 1974 after determining that workers faced a grave danger from exposure, a threshold even higher than the significant-risk standard OSHA is not attempting to establish here.[vi] Subsequent evidence has only reinforced that concern. A mortality study of polyvinyl chloride polymerization workers found liver cancer mortality nearly three times higher than expected and found angiosarcoma of the liver, the disease most strongly associated with vinyl chloride exposure, at more than thirty times the rate observed among unexposed workers in the highest exposure groups.[vii] The hazards associated with vinyl chloride are substantial; the savings OSHA expects from removing this requirement are not.
OSHA estimates annual savings from eliminating this requirement at just $18,292 for approximately 4,400 workers, or about $4 per worker annually. At the same time, OSHA explicitly asks whether any safety benefit can be anticipated from the proposal and identifies none.[viii] In other words, OSHA proposes to remove a worker-protection requirement adopted in response to well-documented cancer risks in exchange for $4 per worker per year, without identifying any corresponding health or safety benefit.
Public Citizen urges OSHA to withdraw this proposal. If the agency believes some overlap exists, there is a straightforward solution: specify that training provided under section 1910.134(k) satisfies paragraph (j)(1)(iii) for workers already covered by that standard, while preserving the requirement for all other employees. That approach avoids any loss of training while ensuring that all workers remain protected.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
References
[i] NTSB releases illustrated Digest of East Palestine Investigation report. (2024, September 30). Retrieved August 12, 2026, from https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20240930.aspx
[ii] Vinyl chloride. (2025, July 1). Federal Register. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/01/2025-11644/vinyl-chloride
[iii] 1910.134 – Respiratory protection. | Occupational Safety and Health Administration. (n.d.). https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.134
[iv] Robertson, D. L. (2026, May 21). OSHA advisory Committee raises concerns over agency’s respirator standard overhaul. Jenner & Block. https://environblog.jenner.com/2026/05/21/osha-advisory-committee-raises-concerns-over-agencys-respirator-standard-overhaul/
[v] Vinyl Chloride | Medical Management Guidelines | Toxic Substance Portal | ATSDR. (n.d.). https://wwwn.cdc.gov/TSP/MMG/MMGDetails.aspx?mmgid=278&toxid=51
[vi] The New York Times. (1974, October 2). Safety rules issued for vinyl chloride. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1974/10/02/archives/safety-rules-issued-for-vinyl-chloride.html
[vii] A. Mundt, K., D. Dell, L., Crawford, L., & E. Gallagher, A. (2017, May 10). Quantitative estimated exposure to vinyl chloride and risk of angiosarcoma of the liver and hepatocellular cancer in the US industry-wide vinyl chloride cohort: mortality update through 2013. National Library of Medicine. Retrieved August 12, 2026, from https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5629943/
[viii] Vinyl chloride. (2025b, July 1). Federal Register. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/01/2025-11644/vinyl-chloride
Stay Updated on Public Citizen
Follow Public Citizen
Support Our Work
Public Citizen Comments Regarding Minor New Source Review Program Air Permitting Public Participation Requirements for State Implementation Plans
VIA ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPA Docket Center
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2025-1212
Mail Code 28221T
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20460
RE: Minor New Source Review Program Air Permitting Public Participation Requirements for State Implementation Plans (Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2025-1212)
Public Citizen is a nonprofit consumer advocacy organization with over one million members and supporters that champions public interest in the halls of power. On behalf of its members and supporters in Texas, Public Citizen and its partners, Air Alliance Houston, City of Dallas Environmental Commission, Sunrise Movement Dallas, Texans for Responsible Aggregate Mining and Texas Campaign for the Environment, appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed rulemaking “Proposal”.
Public Citizen and its partners oppose the Proposal, which would eliminate long-standing minimum federal public participation requirements for minor air pollution sources and instead grant State and local air pollution agencies the discretion to significantly reduce or eliminate public participation in minor source air pollution permitting. As explained in these comments, this Proposal is based on inadequately supported and unreasonable assertions, and EPA has failed to make the underlying data used as the basis for these assertions publicly available.
I. EPA Fails to Acknowledge and Adequately Consider the Reliance Interests of the Public, Who Would be Significantly Harmed by EPA’s Rule Change
In its proposed rule, the EPA asserts that because the final rule does not require States to amend existing State Implementation Plans (SIPs) with respect to minor New Source Review (NSR) public participation, but rather allows States to amend their SIPs, that the “EPA does not believe that this change impacts legitimate reliance interests on the part of States, regulated parties, or the general public.” [1]
The public holds profound reliance interests in EPA air permitting processes. Public participation is a foundational cornerstone of the federal Clean Air Act (CAA). The Act explicitly grants the public in every state the right to receive notice and to submit formal feedback that State and local air pollution agencies are legally obligated to consider before issuing permits.[2]
The EPA promulgated the public participation requirements set forth in 40 CFR 51.161 in June 1973, shortly after the Environmental Protection Agency itself was established in 1970.[3] For many decades under these rules, the public has maintained the practical expectation that the EPA would require public notice and the opportunity to participate in permitting decisions – for both minor and major sources of air pollution.
40 CFR 51.161(a) establishes the basic requirement that State and local air agencies must provide an “opportunity for public comment on information submitted by owners and operators” on the new construction or modification of any stationary source. “The legally enforceable procedures in §51.160 must also require the State or local agency to provide opportunity for public comment on information submitted by owners and operators. The public information must include the agency’s analysis of the effect of construction or modification on ambient air quality, including the agency’s proposed approval or disapproval.” [4]
40 CFR 51.161(b) provides an “opportunity for public comment” consisting of three required elements: (1) “Availability for public inspection in at least one location in the area affected of the information submitted by the owner or operator and of the State or local agency’s analysis of the effect on air quality. This requirement may be met by making these materials available at a physical location or on a public Web site identified by the State or local agency,” (2) “A 30-day period for submittal of public comment; and (3) “A notice by prominent advertisement in the area affected of the location of the source information and analysis specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.” [5]
An “opportunity for public comment,” i.e., public notice, typically contains basic information about the draft permit or other preconstruction authorization, such as the permit number, the name and physical address of the facility, and the name and contact information of a person from whom interested persons may obtain additional information on the draft authorization.[6]
These components of public participation are essential safeguards that allow residents to raise site-specific concerns, identify potential permit deficiencies, and provide local knowledge that may not otherwise be considered.
EPA states in its Proposal that it does not believe that minor source public participation is generally “necessary to assure that the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are achieved” in the context of developing a program for the “regulation of” minor source construction and modification.[7]
This contradicts EPA’s own website on Air Quality Public Participation, which states: “Public participation is viewed as integral to effective air quality management. Citizens have greater access to information and are demanding to be more involved at early stages of the policy development process. Citizens can use that information to influence governmental entities or the industry directly. Educating the public and ensuring their participation in the air quality management process is a critical aspect of governmental responsibility. Air quality has a tremendous impact on sensitive populations. These populations need to understand how they are affected, how they can minimize these impacts, and how they can influence decision makers for the benefit of all society.” [8]
These long-standing public participation rules and EPA’s current guidance for air quality public participation have created the public expectation that local air quality will not be degraded without community awareness or input. The public has a justified expectation of continuous, transparent opportunities to receive notices and to review, provide comments and legally challenge air permits that impact local health, property values and environmental quality under current federal standards. The EPA’s allowance of the elimination of public participation by States would cause significant harm to public health and to the environment, a direct contradiction of EPA’s stated mission.
Whether states are allowed or required to amend SIPs by the EPA’s rule, the harm to the public by undoing these established expectations would be directly caused by the EPA’s abandonment of its federal oversight role.
II. EPA’s Rule Proposal is Flawed
A. EPA’s Proposal is Based on Inadequately Supported and Unreasonable Assertions Made with Information it Fails to Disclose to the Public
The EPA primarily relies on a Minor New Source Review Public Participation Early Outreach Workgroup Outcome to justify the Proposal. Public Citizen employs former EPA staffers who inquired of current EPA staff about the Minor NSR Public Participation Early Outreach Workgroup “Workgroup”. EPA staff told Public Citizen that this Workgroup did not reach any consensus supporting the elimination of public participation for minor NSR sources, and that EPA staff who participated in the Workgroup, which ceased its work three years prior, were surprised to learn that their work was being used as the basis for this rulemaking.
The Proposal summarizes vague statements EPA asserts were made during meetings between State and local pollution control staff and EPA’s Workgroup, but EPA fails to attribute any statements to the agency or staff who made them. The Rationale significantly generalizes purported Workgroup outcomes, saying “many air agencies,” “many state governments,” and “most” or “some air agencies” to assert its claims.[9]
As of the date of the submission of these comments, the EPA has failed to produce records requested in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by Environmental Defense Fund and Southern Environmental Law Center on July 16, 2026, requesting:
All records in EPA’s possession, custody or control related to the Agency’s “minor new source review public participation early outreach,” referenced by EPA in its rulemaking proposal, Minor New Source Review Program Air Permitting Public Participation Requirements for State Implementation Plans, 91 Fed. Reg. 41,591, 41,600 (July 7, 2026), Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OAR–2025–1212.
Such records include, but are not limited to:
- EPA’s decision to initiate, design, or conduct the early-outreach process;
- the objectives, scope, participants, schedule, format, and methodology of the outreach;
- EPA’s identification, selection, or invitation of outreach participants;
- communications between EPA and prospective or actual participants concerning the outreach;
- agendas, invitations, presentations, questionnaires, interview protocols, discussion guides, participant lists, meeting notes, summaries, recordings, transcripts, and materials provided to or received from participants;
- comments, recommendations, concerns, data, examples, or other information provided or received through the outreach;
- EPA’s compilation, characterization, analysis, evaluation, or consideration of information obtained through the outreach;
- internal or external communications discussing the outreach or its results;
- EPA’s consideration or use of the outreach and its results in developing the proposed rule published at 91 Fed. Reg. 41,591; and
- decisions regarding whether records relating to the outreach would be included in Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OAR–2025–1212 or otherwise made publicly available.
EPA responded to the FOIA request with its own request for an extension, which the requestors agreed to on the condition that EPA also extended the public comment period. EPA neither produced the response nor extended the public comment period. Without this disclosure, EPA cannot transparently support any asserted Workgroup outcomes, on which this Proposal is primarily based.
Furthermore, the opinions of a handful of state or local agency employees, who EPA described in its Proposal as “surprised” to learn that the public participation rules in 40 CFR 51.161 exist, are the very last resource the EPA should rely on to inform a rulemaking that would eliminate the fundamental rights of 349 million Americans.
B. EPA Falsely Asserts that Public Participation Overwhelms the Public with Inconsequential Information About Minimal-Impact Pollution and that Social Media is Sufficient Public Participation
EPA states its support for the idea, which it claims – without proof or attribution – originated in the meetings with state and local pollution control agencies held by the Workgroup, that public participation, “overwhelms the public with inconsequential information about minimal-impact pollution which could discourage public participation in the overall NSR decision-making process instead of promoting it.” [10] The assertion that the public is too stupid to effectively participate in permitting is not only false, it is also deeply offensive to the communities the EPA is tasked with protecting.
The EPA’s assertion that minor sources are inconsequential is a dangerous oversimplification that ignores reality. Minor sources have major, cumulative impacts on local air quality and public health outcomes. Each minor source can emit up to 99.99 tons per year of any criteria pollutants and are allowed to be located in close proximity to other major and minor sources, without any consideration or assessment of the cumulative impact of pollution from existing sources.[11]
Far from being ‘inconsequential,’ minor sources include substantial facilities, including the fossil-fuel burning power plants collocated with AI data centers, many of which in Texas are major sources of air pollution, claiming synthetic minor status or piecemealing authorizations with sham permits to exploit a regulatory loophole and avoid triggering public participation requirements.[12] Minor sources also include concrete batch plants, rock crushers, chemical manufacturing facilities and many other uses incompatible with communities.
EPA also included in its Workgroup observations the assertion that the public participation afforded to communities through minor NSR rules is “redundant with public participation opportunities and public awareness provided through other venues, such as zoning, watch groups, and social media”.[13]
We strongly disagree and contend that social media affords the public no meaningful public participation or public notice comparable to that of the federal Clean Air Act. The assertion that they are in any way redundant or similar is absurd, false and demonstrative of the EPA’s poor attempt to translate thoughtless, baseless statements into codified national rules that will harm the health of millions.
C. EPA Incorrectly Asserts Discretion to Attain the NAAQS
The CAA requires EPA to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards for criteria pollutants that are considered harmful to public health and the environment.[14] The CAA also mandates that states submit State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to the EPA to demonstrate how each state will reach, maintain and enforce clean air standards for major pollutants.[15]
If a state fails to implement an acceptable SIP, the EPA is legally required to implement a Federal Implementation Plan and can also apply federal sanctions, such as withholding federal highway funds or imposing stricter emissions offsets from industrial pollution sources.[16]
The NAAQS were set to ensure public health is protected, yet in the Proposal, the EPA asserts its discretionary authority to modify federal rules in a way that would blatantly disregard public health outcomes. EPA’s Proposal seeks to eliminate the most appropriate and impactful opportunity for the public to disclose public health harms caused by the EPA’s failure to enforce attainment of the NAAQS and the potential public health harms caused by the further degradation of air quality during the process to consider permitting of additional sources of pollution.
The EPA’s Proposal states, “the EPA is proposing to recognize in regulation that State and local air quality regulatory authorities determine…whether, when, and to what extent public participation in minor NSR programs is necessary to assure the National Ambient Air Quality Standards are achieved,” (emphasis added). The EPA also states in its rule proposal: “The Clean Air Act… delegates discretionary authority to EPA to determine whether an agency’s minor source programs…are sufficient to assure maintenance and attainment of the NAAQS” (emphasis added). [17]
However, according to the agency’s own data, the EPA fails to assure attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS in 30 of 50 states and in the District of Columbia.[18] EPA fails to demonstrate how it has any discretion to eliminate any requirements of any air permitting programs in any areas where EPA fails to assure that State or local air agency programs are sufficient for NAAQS attainment.
EPA has no discretion as to whether it must assure attainment of the NAAQS – it is mandated by the Clean Air Act. EPA should preclude states and local agencies from modifying their air quality programs in any way, except to strengthen pollution rules and achieve compliance with the established air quality standards.
D. EPA Fails to Comply with Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental Health and Safety Risks
In its Proposal, the EPA says Executive Order 13045, Protection of Children From Environmental Health and Safety Risks, applies only to those regulatory actions that concern environmental health or safety risks. EPA asserts that this action does not concern human health and that the EPA’s Policy on Children’s Health also does not apply to this action, despite the clear implications that limiting public participation would have on public health.[19]
We find it both sad and ironic that we need to explain to the Environmental Protection Agency how pollution works. We contend that this proposal to eliminate public participation especially harms children. Children are more susceptible to pollution because they breathe more air relative to their body weight and their developing bodies absorb higher doses of pollution. They spend more time outdoors and are more physically active.[20]
Executive Order 13045 was issued by President Clinton in 1997.[21] When promulgating a rule of this description, EPA must evaluate the effects of the planned regulation on children and explain why the regulation is preferable to potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives. Children are disproportionately impacted by even minor source pollution because it is authorized closest to where they live, next to their schools and near their places of worship. EPA’s Proposal seeks to hide the fact that these minor pollution sources would exist and preclude the guardians of children from taking any actions to protect them from those harms.
More information about how pollution affects children’s environmental health can be found by visiting the EPA’s own website on Children’s Environmental Health Facts, which links childhood exposure to pollution to asthma, cancer and neurodevelopmental disorders using data from EPA’s America’s Children and the Environment (ACE) and provides information about the economic impacts of childhood health concerns.[22] ACE provides national trends on children’s environmental health, built on data collected by the federal government, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Health Interview Survey, National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, and the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program. The economic impact data is from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s Medical Expenditure Panel Survey.[23]
E. EPA Claims State Agencies Face Budgetary Limitations and that Eliminating Public Participation Will Somehow Ease Those Burdens
A report by the Environmental Integrity Project, titled State of Decline, found that more than half of states (27) cut their environmental agency budgets over the last 15 years. Seven states, including Texas, reduced their pollution control funding by at least a third from 2010 through 2024, when adjusted for inflation. The steepest cuts were led by Mississippi’s decision to slash its environmental agency by 71 percent, South Dakota’s 61 percent cut, and Connecticut’s 51 percent reduction.[24]
These cuts have a significant impact on the effectiveness of these agencies, yet EPA attempts to push additional costs to States, claiming they can take on more responsibility for environmental oversight. Ultimately, communities pay for these cuts with their health.
In its Proposal, the EPA argues eliminating public participation will somehow ease State budgetary burdens. State agencies have the authority to design their own air permitting programs and fee structures. If funding is insufficient for public participation, the solution is very simple. The expense of permitting is the applicants’ cost to bear – not the taxpayers’.
Instead of working to dismantle federal oversight, the EPA should secure adequate federal resources to help states maintain and improve public engagement infrastructures.
F. EPA Proposes to Delegate Authority to the TCEQ, a State Agency Unwilling to Regulate Pollution or Protect Public Health
In Texas, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) has delegated authority from the EPA to implement Clean Air Act programs and the State Implementation Plan. Under this rule, TCEQ would receive discretionary authority to eliminate public participation for minor NSR permitting.
Public Citizen requested and was granted a nation-wide public hearing by the EPA on this rulemaking, which took place on July 22, 2026.[25] Of the more than 100 registered speakers, nearly half were from Texas or spoke about the failures of the TCEQ to sufficiently regulate pollution, protect public health and allow meaningful public participation in agency decision-making.[26]
In 2023, the TCEQ was labeled a “Reluctant Regulator” by the Texas Sunset Advisory Commission, which found that “TCEQ’s policies and processes lack full transparency and opportunities for meaningful public input, generating distrust and confusion among members of the public,” among numerous other issues.[27] The Texas legislature mandated the TCEQ to improve its public participation processes.[28]
In January 2026, as mandated by the TCEQ Sunset Bill (SB 1397) signed into law in 2023, the TCEQ adopted a rulemaking ostensibly aimed at improving public participation. Despite the bill’s clear intent, the TCEQ’s final rule fell short of the reforms lawmakers and the state’s Sunset Advisory Commission envisioned. The TCEQ received more than 50 comments from community and environmental advocates asking the agency to align the rule with the Sunset Advisory Commission’s recommendations, increase transparency and make participation less confusing. The agency rejected each of those 50 comments.[29] Instead, the TCEQ modified this rule proposal after it was presented to the public, based on more than 30 comments from corporate interest groups.[30]
As a result of the TCEQ’s reluctant regulatory approach, Texans already face significant barriers to meaningful participation in the permitting process. EPA’s further reduction of these opportunities would weaken transparency, accountability, and achievement of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards in Texas, where approximately 15 to 18 million people – representing well over half of the total population of Texas – live in designated federal ozone non-attainment areas.[31]
In 2025, the TCEQ reportedly met 112% of its annual performance goals to issue air quality permits, issuing 7,855 authorizations.[32] But the TCEQ’s performance of its core functions – to perform investigations and to enforce permits and environmental rules – was mediocre.
A report by Public Citizen’s TCEQ Watchdog Campaign using the TCEQ’s own publicly available data shows that in fiscal year 2025, the TCEQ continued a downward trend, conducting the fewest on-site investigations the agency has reported in eight years, including years when the COVID-19 pandemic made in-person investigations challenging. The number of 2025 investigations was 3,600 fewer than in 2024 and 5,200 fewer than in 2023.[33]
Table 1: TCEQ On-Site Investigations by Fiscal Year

Despite foregoing several thousand investigations in 2025, the agency’s response to reported environmental concerns remained significantly delayed. TCEQ received 9,200 complaints. Of those, investigators responded to just 300 (3%) within one day. The agency took up to two weeks to investigate nearly 900 of the complaints (10%), and the remaining 5,000 (54%) took 14-30+ days to initiate an investigation. The agency closed more than 2,700 complaints (30%) without ever investigating them.[34]
Table 2: 2025 TCEQ Complaint Response Times

TCEQ issued just 1,170 enforcement actions in 2025. The agency’s Annual Enforcement Report states that it aims to issue just 1,000 administrative orders each year and reports that it “consistently meets” that goal.[35] But there are 830,000 regulated entities in Texas, according to TCEQ’s most recent Legislative Appropriation Request.[36] This means that only 0.14% of all polluters in Texas received any formal enforcement action.
In 2025, the TCEQ struggled to process its extensive backlog of enforcement cases. The TCEQ started the year with a backlog of 1,432 cases and resolved only 39. At that rate, the backlog will take 35 years to resolve, not including any new enforcement cases. The problem is almost entirely of the agency’s own making – a failed enforcement policy among many that continue to erode public confidence in the agency.[37]
The TCEQ’s failures translate to poor outcomes for clean air and clean water in Texas. The TCEQ has a key performance measure to determine the “Percent of Texans living where the air meets federal air quality standards.” The TCEQ’s target was just 43%. It achieved 42% of that goal.[38] In 2021, the agency’s target for that goal was 100%.[39] Over the past decade, the agency has not achieved greater than 45% of this goal for clean air.[40] So instead of continuing to work toward actions that would help the agency meet that goal for Texans, TCEQ simply lowered the bar for itself.
Similarly, in 2025, TCEQ failed to meet another key performance measure regarding the “Percent of stationary and mobile source pollution reductions in ozone non-attainment areas.” Instead, air pollution increased.[41]
The TCEQ issued approximately 760 water quality permits last year.[42] That was approximately 90% of its target for that goal. TCEQ has a key performance measure to determine the “Percent of Texas classified surface waters meeting or exceeding water quality standards”. TCEQ almost met its unimpressive target of 54%.[43] TCEQ failed to meet its goal to reduce pollution from permitted wastewater facilities discharging to waters of the state. Instead, wastewater pollution increased.[44]
The TCEQ’s leadership expressed little interest in concerns that the agency’s enforcement resources are insufficient, approving a new Legislative Appropriations Request for FY 2028-2029 that failed to increase agency funding for enforcement to account for the significant increase in the number of regulated entities across the state or to improve the agency’s poor performance across its enforcement activities.[45]
Texans don’t trust the TCEQ to protect the environment, to protect public health or to protect their right to be heard. And despite laws mandating agency reforms of public participation, communities continue to fight the TCEQ for meaningful opportunities to participate.
For these reasons, we believe that the TCEQ’s discretion is an inadequate substitute for the enforceable federal protections presently afforded to the public by the Clean Air Act.
III. Conclusion
EPA’s Proposal fails to acknowledge or consider the legitimate reliance interests of the public, contains inadequately supported assertions purportedly based on information EPA fails to disclose to the public, and contains baseless and offensive statements EPA fails to support with any factual information. EPA asserts its discretionary authority to modify federal rules in a way that blatantly disregards public health outcomes, despite EPA’s clear mandate in the CAA that EPA assure maintenance and attainment of the NAAQs for the protection of public health.
By restricting community participation to favor polluting industries, the rule abandons the EPA’s core mandate, threatens public health and undermines environmental protections. In a press release posted to EPA’s website several days prior to the rule’s publication in the Federal Register, EPA stated that this rule’s intent is to “speed up permitting” and to “support American economic development and energy dominance.” [46]
EPA mischaracterizes necessary public oversight as an obstacle to economic growth. Rather than seeing public participation as a necessary tool to strengthen the permitting process, EPA has framed it as a hindrance to industry’s ability to profit more and faster.
This Proposal is nothing more than a shameless surrender to polluters, intended to fast-track permits for industry by silencing community voices at the expense of clean air and public health.
The EPA should withdraw this proposal.
Kathryn Guerra
TCEQ Campaign Director | Public Citizen
[email protected]
309 E. 11th Street, Ste. 2, Austin, TX 78701
www.citizen.org/texas
Jennifer M. Hadayia, MPA
Executive Director
Air Alliance Houston
2520 Caroline St. #100, Houston, TX 77004
airalliancehouston.org
Cliff Kaplan
Secretary
Texans for Responsible Aggregate Mining (TRAM)
PO Box 90293, Austin, TX 78709
tramtexas.org
Tracy Wallace
Vice Chair
City of Dallas Environmental Commission
1500 Marilla St, Room 7A North
Dallas, TX 75218
dallasclimateaction.com
Jeffrey Jacoby
Co-Executive Director
Texas Campaign for the Environment
8627 North MoPac Expy, Ste 250
Austin, TX 78759
texasenvironment.org
Liz Mendoza
Dallas Co-Coordinator
Sunrise Movement Dallas
hubs.sunrisemovement.org/dallas
[1] See https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/07/2026-13667/minor-new-source-review-program-air-permitting-public-participation-requirements-for-state
[2] See https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1996-10-08/html/96-25469.htm
[3] See https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-40/chapter-I/subchapter-C/part-51/subpart-I/section-51.161
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] See https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/07/2026-13667/minor-new-source-review-program-air-permitting-public-participation-requirements-for-state
[8] See https://www.epa.gov/air-quality-management-process/managing-air-quality-public-participation
[9] See https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2025-1212-0006
[10] See https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/07/2026-13667/minor-new-source-review-program-air-permitting-public-participation-requirements-for-state
[11] See https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-40/chapter-I/subchapter-C/part-70/section-70.2
[12] See https://environmentalintegrity.org/news/environmental-groups-take-legal-action-against-illegal-data-center-and-power-plant-projects-in-san-antonio/
[13] See https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OAR-2025-1212-0006
[14] See https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2013-title42/html/USCODE-2013-title42-chap85-subchapI-partA-sec7410.htm
[15] Ibid.
[16] See https://www.epa.gov/air-quality-implementation-plans/basic-information-about-air-quality-fips
[17] See https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/07/2026-13667/minor-new-source-review-program-air-permitting-public-participation-requirements-for-state
[18] See https://www.epa.gov/green-book
[19] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/07/2026-13667/minor-new-source-review-program-air-permitting-public-participation-requirements-for-state
[20] See https://www.epa.gov/children/childrens-unique-vulnerabilities-environmental-hazards
[21] See https://www.epa.gov/children/executive-order-13045-protection-children-environmental-health-risks-and-safety-risks
[22] See https://www.epa.gov/children/childrens-environmental-health-facts
[23] Ibid.
[24] See https://environmentalintegrity.org/reports/state-of-decline
[25] See https://www.youtube.com/live/FbRcm9ScsVc
[26] See https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2026-07/pre-registered-speaker-list-in-approximate-order.pdf
[27] See https://www.sunset.texas.gov/public/uploads/2023-08/Texas%20Commission%20on%20Environmental%20Quality%20Staff%20Report%20with%20Final%20Results_6-26-23.pdf
[28] See https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/88R/billtext/pdf/SB01397F.pdf#navpanes=0
[29] See https://www.tceq.texas.gov/downloads/agency/decisions/agendas/backup/2023/2023-1506-rula.pdf
[30] See https://www.citizen.org/news/tceq-adopts-public-participation-rulemaking-while-rejecting-all-of-the-publics-participation/
[31] See https://www.sierraclub.org/texas/blog/2023/11/more-half-texans-live-areas-unsafe-ozone-levels-which-rise-temperatures
[32] See https://www.tceq.texas.gov/downloads/agency/administrative/legislatively-mandated-reports/sfr-55-25-annual-report-on-performance-measures-fy25.pdf
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] See https://www.tceq.texas.gov/downloads/agency/decisions/work-sessions/backup/2026/2026-0529-mis.pdf
[37] https://www.citizen.org/news/tceq-2025-a-year-in-review-of-the-reluctant-regulator; https://www.tceq.texas.gov/downloads/compliance/enforcement/actions-reports/aer/fy2025/2025-enforcement-report.pdf
[38] https://www.tceq.texas.gov/downloads/agency/administrative/legislatively-mandated-reports/sfr-55-25-annual-report-on-performance-measures-fy25.pdf
[39] See https://wayback.archive-it.org/414/20250908000018/https://www.tceq.texas.gov/downloads/agency/administrative/legislatively-mandated-reports/sfr-55-21-annual-report-on-performance-measures-fy21.pdf
[40] See https://www.tceq.texas.gov/agency/administrative/quarterly-reports-on-key-performance-measures
[41] See https://www.tceq.texas.gov/downloads/agency/administrative/legislatively-mandated-reports/sfr-55-25-annual-report-on-performance-measures-fy25.pdf
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] See https://www.tceq.texas.gov/downloads/agency/decisions/work-sessions/backup/2026/2026-0529-mis.pdf
[46] See https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-streamline-state-and-local-permitting-process-minor-sources
Stay Updated on Public Citizen
Follow Public Citizen
Support Our Work
Four Reasons Trump’s Drug Pricing Claims Are Bogus
The consumer pricing index’s measure of prescription drug pricing (CPI-Rx) fell by 3.1 percent over the 12 months ending in July, the steepest annual decline since March 1963, according to the Trump White House, which was quick to take credit for this change, citing the president’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) drug pricing policies. Not so fast.
This analysis will detail four reasons not to buy Trump’s latest drug price boast:
I. Unpublished Methods: The White House has not published the methods they used for their bold claims around Trump’s drug pricing records, so their work cannot be independently verified. The first Trump administration cherrypicked data to make CPI-Rx trends look more favorable to them.
II. Unimplemented Policies: Trump’s MFN drug pricing policies are mostly unimplemented and therefore haven’t contributed to changes in the CPI-Rx.
III. Inappropriate Metric: The CPI-Rx is an informative but flawed measure of drug pricing and affordability trends and doesn’t do a good job of capturing what Trump claims to have done: lowering Americans’ spending on high-priced brand drugs. The CPI-Rx doesn’t capture the costliest medicines used in the U.S., separate out price trends in the high-priced brand drug space from those of cheap generic medicines, or adequately account for the ever-rising launch prices of new medicine. CPI-Rx also doesn’t capture drug pricing changes effectuated through manufacturer rebates.
IV. Stolen Valor: To the extent that the trends the White House points out are an accurate portrayal of the data, the CPI-Rx’s decline is more likely due to drug pricing achievements of other Presidents and factors largely outside of Trump’s control.
I. Trump’s claims of record breaking may be misleading.
It is not entirely clear the trends the Trump administration flags are accurate portrayals of the CPI-Rx data.
The administration did not publish the methods they used for their analyses so that their work can be independently verified. For example, because the CPI-Rx is indexed to 1982, the administration would have had to recalculate the index in earlier years to make proper comparisons dating back to the 1960s, and we don’t have information on how this was accomplished. We also don’t know where they started the time cut offs for presidential administrations in their graph comparing Trump’s supposed achievements to other presidents. Team Trump has a history of misleading Americans using CPI-Rx data by for example picking arbitrary baselines that make their achievements look better. Their lofty claims were disproven in the past.
II. Most of President Trump’s MFN programs haven’t taken effect.
Unimplemented, half-baked polices cannot lower drug prices particularly when the drug companies that struck deals with Trump to lower prices have been raising them. In January 2026, the 16 companies that had entered MFN deals with Trump at that time, raised the prices of 272 of their drugs. A Senate investigation found that companies that signed MFN deals with the Trump administration launched new prescription drugs since Trump became president at an average price of $353,000 per year.
Trump’s MFN policy can be broken down into three buckets:
- A handful of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services pilot projects.
- The pharma industry’s backroom promises to launch new drugs at MFN price points for all Americans.
- TrumpRx, a consumer-facing website that offers cash pay prices on some medicines.
Here’s a rundown of what those buckets include and a status update on their limited or nonexistent achievements:
- CMS pilot projects
Trump’s CMS pilot projects include GENEROUS, a voluntary Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) pilot to test MFN-based rebate levels for prescription drugs in Medicaid; GLOBE and GUARD, mandatory CMMI pilots to test MFN-based rebate levels for some drugs in Medicare Parts B and D respectively; and the CMS BALANCE and Bridge demonstrations to test expanded access and increased rebates for GLP-1 obesity medicines in Medicaid and Medicare. Notably, these programs do not reset the exorbitantly high price points pharma companies charge Americans outside these pilots for drugs. Instead, they change the amount the government will receive in rebates on purchasers of the drugs in certain circumstances. The drug industry itself has not indicated they expect a major negative impact from these programs.
GENEROUS: CMS has not announced any state participants in the program, and it is not clear whether any state will participate. The deadlines for states to apply and enter into participation agreements for the model were pushed back from July 31, 2026, and August 31, 2026, to Sept. 10, 2026, and Sept. 30, 2026, respectively. Moreover, there is still no public record of which drugs are included in GENEROUS or the discounts achieved by the government on these products.
GLOBE and GUARD: The final rules for GLOBE and GUARD have not been issued. The proposed rules envisioned GLOBE starting Oct. 1, 2026, and GUARD starting Jan. 1, 2027, thus no drug pricing changes have taken place in the United States under these programs. It has also been reported that the 17 major drug companies who entered into secret MFN agreements with the White House are exempt from GLOBE and GUARD. If this is true, the impact of such demonstrations would be extremely limited. Excluding all companies that agreed to MFN deals from GLOBE and GUARD would reduce the potential savings from those pilots by 71%, Thomas Hwang, director of the Cancer Innovation and Regulation Initiative at Harvard Medical School, predicts.
BALANCE/Bridge: Only 1 state has said it submitted a request for application by the July 31, 2026 deadline to participate in BALANCE, which would provide state Medicaid programs access to GLP-1 obesity treatments from Eli Lilly and Novo Nordisk at a cost of $245 per member per month if the states agree to new coverage criteria. Indiana still must take the next step of entering into a state agreement with CMS for the program. State agreements must be executed by Jan. 1, 2027. In Medicare, the BALANCE demonstration project was deferred for at least a year as not enough Part D plans agreed to participate in the program. The 18-month Bridge program commenced in its place in July, is expected to cost the government tens of billions. It is too early for Bridge scripts to show up in the CPI-Rx, but the lower price points the Trump administration negotiated for Bridge wouldn’t be reflected in the CPI-Rx regardless as pharmacies are reimbursed at the wholesale acquisition cost of the drug.
- Manufacturers commitment to launch new drugs at MFN price points
The 17 manufacturers who struck MFN deals with the Trump White House have supposedly committed to tie the prices of new drugs they launch in the U.S. to those in other high-income countries, but we don’t know which of these companies’ drugs this commitment applies to. There also has been no public explanation as to how the administration would effectuate or enforce this plan in the complex and fragmented U.S. health system and the White House has failed to respond to media questions about whether this policy impacted some recent drug launches. Evidence points to drug companies taking steps to game this promise to Trump by, for example, launching drugs first in the U.S. and delaying drug launches abroad so that it can keep U.S. price points high. Meanwhile, the Trump administration and drug companies are working in tandem to pressure other counties to increase their reimbursement rates for medicines, which would make the U.S. MFN price points higher.
- TrumpRx
TrumpRx is the only part of President Trump’s MFN program that is fully underway and the results have been lackluster. That’s in part because most Americans have health insurance and will do better purchasing drugs through their insurance plans. TrumpRx may also cause consumers to overpay on brand drugs, as many of the medicines on the site have cheaper generic competitors available at lower price points. To the extent TrumpRx has had an impact, demand has largely been concentrated in the GLP-1 space, according to July financial filings by GoodRx, a key integration partner for the drug manufacturers offering discounts on the sites. GoodRx also noted that utilization of TrumpRx has not had a material impact on its business, meaning even use of the site for GLP-1s is likely relatively low. While TrumpRx likely gets a bit of credit for getting the cash prices of GLP-1s lower, the manufacturers of the drugs had been steadily lowering the prices before Trump intervened due to competitive pressure from multiple brand name products, compounded alternatives, and a cash-pay marketplace.
III. The Limits Of the CPI-Rx
The consumer drug pricing index is an imperfect way to measure prescription drug pricing trends. It is most useful when attention is carefully given to what it does and does not reflect and is considered in conjunction with other measures of prescription drug price changes. For example, many economists argue the Producer Price Index (PPI) for prescription drugs, which tracks the first price received by a drug manufacturer and reflects a wider range of drugs used in the U.S., is a better measure of drug companies’ price setting behavior. The PPI grew in July.
- CPI-Rx’s sample is a black box and it doesn’t break down trends by therapeutic area, the key metric that matters to patients.
The CPI-Rx measures price changes of drugs purchased at retail, mail order or internet pharmacies through a sampling process. The probability that a drug enters a particular outlet’s sample of prescriptions is a function of both the relative frequency with which it is prescribed and its relative cost per prescription. The Bureau of Labor and Statistics does not publish the products included in its sample, making it hard to definitively pinpoint what is causing shifts in the index. The BLS also does not break down trends by therapeutic areas. Pricing trends by therapeutic areas are more relevant to patients as what matters most to people is affordability in connection to the illness(s) they have. A cheap blood pressure medicine, for example, does a diabetic needing high-cost insulin no good and widespread availability of cheap generics doesn’t help a patient who has a disease with no generic options.
- A declining CPI-Rx does not equal declining patient out-of-pocket costs.
The CPI-Rx reflects the total reimbursement to the retailer from both the patient and all eligible payers, like their commercial or government provided health insurance, so it is not a direct measure of the portion of a drug’s cost paid for directly by a patient (nor the drug company’s list price or what the drug company makes off the sale). Thus, for example, if payers are shifting more of a drug’s cost to consumers, a declining CPI-Rx may not fully reflect the current burden being felt by patients. In 2025, consumer out-of-pocket costs rose for people in commercially insured health plans, Medicaid and for those who paid cash. Medicare beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket costs declined.
- The CPI-Rx doesn’t measure the costs of most high-priced specialty drugs
The CPI-Rx does not include drugs administered and billed by a hospital or physicians’ offices and is unlikely to include drugs purchased at specialty pharmacies. This means the CPI-Rx likely vastly under samples the prices of some of the costliest medicines used in the United States – specialty drugs that often experience the largest year-over-year price growth. In 2021, specialty medicines represented 55% of U.S. drug spending. Health economists have estimated that the under sampling of specialty pharmaceuticals is underestimating the price growth of the CPI-Rx by almost 75 basis points annually.
- CPI-Rx captures changes in both the brand and generic drug space; big shifts often reflect a pricey brand drug becoming subject to generic competition.
The CPI reflects price changes in both brand and generic drugs. When brand drugs lose patent protection and become subject to generic competition, the price often falls sharply and this can have a large impact on lowering the CPI-Rx. Many popular brand drugs lost patent protection in 2025 and the industry is expected to face a $300 billion patent cliff by 2030. Trump cannot take credit for the genericization of branded drugs occurring during his presidency, as he is not responsible for the policies put in place to encourage genericization nor the timing of recent brand drugs’ loss of exclusivity. Generic drugs are typically inexpensive and not the target of Trump’s MFN agenda, therefore a drug pricing metric that focuses on brand drugs alone would be needed to weigh the success of Trump’s policies.
- The CPI-Rx does not adequately capture the pharma industry’s practice of regularly raising new drug launch prices each year.
Finally, the CPI-Rx does not adequately reflect the trend of higher and higher launch prices of new drugs over time. When a new drug comes on the market and is first incorporated into the CPI-Rx sample, BLS does not include any estimate of that drug’s price change in its first time interval as there is no previous price for it. The BLS must wait until a successive price can be observed and at that point it is only measuring the postlaunch fluctuation in price. Thus, if a new higher-priced cancer medicine enters the market and later lowers its price postlaunch, the inflation index would go down even if the U.S. health system is paying more for this new drug compared to older marketed drugs available to treat the same cancer.
IV. Medicare Drug Price Negotiation and What Else May Actually Be Impacting CPI-RX
Policies initiated under other Presidents and other factors outside Trump’s control are more likely to be causing a decline in the CPI-Rx.
In addition to the genericization of expensive branded drugs explained above, other factors that likely contributed to recent declines in the CPI-Rx originated prior to Trump’s current term. Most notably, 2026 was the first year for which drugs with Medicare negotiated prices under the Biden-era Inflation Reduction Act came into effect. The negotiated prices are reflected in pharmacy counter transactions so their price changes would be picked up by the CPI-Rx if they are in the sample captured. The Inflation Reduction Act’s rebate penalties for drug companies that raise prices faster than inflation may also have kept list price growth for some products in check, impacting the CPI-Rx.
A regulatory change that went into effect in 2024 that impacts pharmacy reimbursement may also be pushing the CPI-Rx down. This policy change required post-sale payments known as pharmacy direct and indirect renumeration or DIR to be reflected in prices at the point of sale and requires that the initial reimbursement at the point of sale must be the lowest possible amount a pharmacy could receive for the drug.
Medicaid policy changes have also impacted the prices of some medicines. Starting on Jan. 1, 2024, the 2021 American Rescue Plan signed into law by President Biden, lifted the cap on the total amount of rebates Medicaid could collect from manufacturers due to price hikes. Drug manufacturers that had taken large price hikes subsequently took some steep list price reductions to avoid owing increased rebates from the cap being lifted.
You might be interested in
Stay Updated on Public Citizen
Follow Public Citizen
Support Our Work
Public Citizen Testimony to the Texas House Committee on State Affairs for Interim Hearing on Data Centers
To: Chairman Ken King and the Members of the House Committee on State Affairs
CC: Rep. Ana Hernandez, Rep. Rafael Anchía, Rep. Drew Darby, Rep. Yvonne Davis, Rep. Charlie Geren, Rep. Ryan Guillen, Rep. Lacey Hull, Rep. John W. McQueeney, Rep. Will Metcalf, Rep. Dade Phelan, Rep. Richard Peña Raymond, Rep. John T. Smithee, Rep. Senfronia Thompson, Rep. Chris Turner
Via hand delivery and by email.
From: Adrian Shelley, Public Citizen, [email protected], 512-477-1155
Re: Data Centers – invited testimony by Public Citizen
Dear Chairman King and Members of the Committee:
Public Citizen appreciates the invitation to provide testimony to this committee on the subject of data centers. Our mission is to be the voice of the people in the halls of power. We have one million members and supporters across the United States and 30,000 in Texas.
Summary of our testimony:
We support the following changes to the current approach:
- An immediate moratorium on new data centers and a special session to address issues of public concern.
- Steps to ensure that data centers and collocated power plants get the right air permits and do so through robust public participation.
- Eliminate policies that incentivize building gas plants to power data centers and minimize the use of backup generators.
- End the state sales and use tax exemption for qualifying data centers.
- End or limit data centers’ use of local tax breaks such as JETI and local development agreements.
- Grant counties more authority to regulate data centers so that they don’t have to use local development agreements or other financial incentives as leverage.
I. There is no “moratorium” on data centers in Texas, and action is still needed to protect communities.
Governor Abbott has released many statements in recent weeks in response to the overwhelming public opposition to data centers in Texas. Although we appreciate that the Governor’s statements are a response to public sentiment, we disagree that anything he has said or done amounts to real change.
ERCOT’s pause of “Batch Zero” will slow down some projects. But it doesn’t apply outside of ERCOT or to facilities that are smaller than 75 MW. It also doesn’t address collocated gas-fired power plants, particularly those that will be behind the meter. Perversely, the Batch Zero pause could incentivize the construction of behind-the-meter plants.
Only Governor Abbott can call a special session to begin addressing the problems caused by data centers in communities across Texas. And a true moratorium would immediately suspend each of the following:
- All construction of data centers across Texas.
- Land acquisition and zoning changes.
- Environmental permitting for data centers and collocated power plants.
- The state sales and use tax exemption and local tax breaks and incentives including Chapter 312, Chapters 380 and 381, and JETI (for collocated power plants).
- All interconnections of facilities in ERCOT and the other grids that serve Texas.
II. The legislature must ensure that data center companies are not skirting Clean Air Act major source permitting requirements.
Public Citizen’s research on data center air permits raises serious concerns that they are not getting the correct air permits. Some facilities are likely getting minor source air permits for facilities that are or will become major sources of air pollution. This is a concern because minor source permits include fewer pollution controls, fewer monitoring and compliance measures, and no requirement to offset pollution in nonattainment areas.
Minor source permits also limit opportunities for public participation. Major source permits offer an opportunity for a public meeting and a contested case hearing. Many elected officials across Texas are concerned that data centers are locating in their communities without sufficient public input. This is one reason why. This problem will be worsened by a current EPA rule proposal to further limit public notice and comment opportunities in minor source permitting.1
There are at least two ways that data centers are under-permitting themselves. First, they are taking a phased approach in which they permit only part of their facility under a minor source permit. This is a problem because a minor source permit allows construction with no public notice.
Take a recent example: the Vantage data center proposed at 14720 Omicron Dr. in San Antonio had a public hearing scheduled for last Monday, August 17.2 Last week, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) postponed that public hearing and another for Fermi Equipment Holdco in the Panhandle, which was scheduled for August 24.3 The TCEQ stated that these public meetings were postponed “due to high public interest.” But if public interest is high, shouldn’t the agency opt for more public meetings, not fewer? We understand that the process is delayed while the public meetings are on hold, but it is burdensome for community members to accommodate cancellations and moving opportunities.
The governor announced last week that Vantage, among others, would comply with his new standards for data centers.4 But there are two significant reasons why Vantage is still falling short of the Governor’s directives. First, the company—which is building two data centers in San Antonio—already got minor source air permits for a portion of their backup generators. Minor source permits do not come with public notice or public participation opportunities. Vantage permitted a portion of its planned backup generators on minor source permits, then applied for more permits later, once the facility was already being built. The first opportunity for public engagement (May 28 for the other Vantage facility at 5207 Rogers Road) came after the facility was built and operating. That’s not an authentic public process.
Second, Vantage seems to have contrived its air pollution emission calculations to stay under major source thresholds.5 The company chose an arbitrary number for its hours of operating its backup generators that is well below the EPA’s guidance on backup generators. When it doubled the size of its generator fleet, it halved that arbitrary number in a move that seemed calculated to stay under the threshold. It offered no justification for this.
Third, Vantage is treating its collocated gas plant as a completely separate facility. Nowhere in its discussion of the data center permits does Vantage mention the collocated gas plants owned by VoltaGrid. Vantage has asked the TCEQ to treat its on-site power plants as completely different sources of air pollution. The TCEQ has done so. This seems to be intended to frustrate public participation. At the May 28 public meeting on Vantage at 5207 Rogers Rd—a facility that was already built and operating on minor source permits before any public notice occurred—comments about the collocated power plant were “outside the scope” of the public meeting.
We believe, based on criteria in state law,6 that data centers and collocated power plants should be considered as a single source for air permitting purposes. If this is not already clear in state law, the legislature should make it so.
III. Texas cannot meet air pollution and climate goals while building gas plants and diesel generators to power data centers.
Winding down the burning of fossil fuels is essential to meeting public health and climate goals in Texas. An estimated 17,000 Texans die every year just from particulate matter pollution from burning fossil fuels.7 Texas also has many regions in nonattainment for various National Ambient Air Quality Standards, including ozone, with local economic consequences reaching billions of dollars.8 Half of the children in Texas breathe unsafe air.9
Texas is ground zero for new and expanded gas plant proposals to fuel data centers. The largest air pollution permit in history was recently approved by the TCEQ for a 7.65 GW gas plant.10 Another permit for 5 GW of gas was approved for Fermi America in the Panhandle, with TCEQ denying all contested case hearing requests, even though 300 people submitted comments.11
According to a recent report by the Environmental Integrity Project (EIP), there are at least 39 gas plants proposed in Texas to power data centers.12 The vast majority of new gas plant proposals across the United States are in Texas, as this graph from a New York Times story on the EIP report shows:13

The amount of pollution that will be emitted by the 39 gas plants EIP is tracking is frightening. If built, all of these plants would emit:
- 14,991 tons of fine particulate matter, which causes heart attacks, strokes, and death.
- 21,932 tons of nitrogen oxide, which causes lung damage and will prevent Texas from meeting ozone pollution standards.
- 308 million tons of greenhouse gases, which will worsen global climate change and the extreme weather events Texas faces because of it. 14
As this map from the EIP report shows, these plants are spread across Texas:15

Texas lawmakers should seriously consider whether this is the future they want for Texas. The ERCOT grid has shown that a mix of energy generation sources is the best option for clean, inexpensive, reliable power. Data center developers are not motivated by anything other than an immediate need for continuous power. If Texas relies on the “bring your own power” approach to addressing the strain on our grid from data centers, then virtually all of them will build their own gas plants. These plants will have devastating consequences for public health and the climate.
Texas leaders should not sacrifice public health for the needs of a single industry. If data centers cannot be powered by the increasingly clean mix of energy found on the Texas grid, they shouldn’t be allowed to invest in fossil fuels at the expense of our air and our health.
We encourage lawmakers not to pass laws that encourage or incentivize building gas plants to power data centers. We also caution that the large number of backup diesel generators being installed at data centers across Texas should not be viewed as a grid resource. Diesel generators are a dirty, inefficient way to produce power and they should only be used in emergencies. We encourage the legislature to pass a law that prohibits the use of diesel generators at data centers for anything other than actual loss of power.
IV. The legislature should eliminate the state sales and use tax exemption for data centers.
The state sales and use tax exemption cost Texas taxpayers $1.1 billion in 2025.16 It is estimated to cost $3.2 billion during the 2026-2027 biennium. By 20230, it is expected to cost $1.7533 billion every year, although that number is probably low because it is based on a January 2025 report from the Comptroller that likely does not account for the explosive growth of proposed data centers since then.
It’s not true that the United States is in a data center or artificial intelligence “war” with China.17 The U.S. has around 5,000 data centers. China has about 500. Furthermore, AI investment from U.S. tech companies has outspent China for years, with the U.S. spend 4 or 5 five times more in recent years.18
The sales and use tax exemption was passed in 2013 (HB 1223 (83R)) at a time when lawmakers felt we needed to attract data centers to Texas.
This worked. It worked so well that we now have more data centers trying to locate in Texas than we can possibly accommodate. In fact, the Dallas-Fort Worth area is considered to be the largest market for data centers in the world.19
Texas is already home to at least 334 data centers, with at least another 248 planned.20 More than 160 data centers take advantage of the state sales and use tax exemption.21 The exemption is applied to certain equipment purchased to build and operate a data center, as well as the energy used in the data center. Long term, for an individual facility, the energy tax break may prove to cost more, as data centers have a continuous demand for lots of energy.
Data center water and energy demand is unrealistic and unsustainable.
All of these energy-hungry projects have led to growth projections for demand on the ERCOT grid that are completely unrealistic and unsustainable. The current large load projection in ERCOT is 438,595 megawatts, around 90% of which are data centers. This is 4.8 times ERCOT’s demand record (set last Wednesday) of 91,308 MW. Even the recently approved “Batch Zero” is reckoning with some 100 GW of projects.
The water demand from data centers is also unsustainable. Water demand from data centers in 2025 exceeded 25 billion gallons.22 Although it is true that many new data centers are planning to use closed loop cooling that will reduce water use, many do not. And new closed loop system require more energy, which is also water hungry if it comes from fossil fuels. A data center powered by a gas plant is using perhaps two-thirds of its water for energy production.
The United States is currently experiencing a bubble in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) and data center industries. No one believes that 400+ gigawatts of data centers will be built in Texas. But the question of how to “separate the wheat from the chaff” is currently taxing the resources of ERCOT, the PUC, and local governments across Texas. Eventually, when the bubble pops, Texans will foot the bill for abandoned projects and facilities.
Industry leaders are not optimistic about the future. According to a recent survey of data center company executives, two out of three shared a negative outlook on the industry’s future.23
Data centers are not significant employers.
The exemption is found at Tax Code Sec. 151.359 and 151.3595. The size requirements for qualifying data centers and qualifying large data centers demonstrate that data centers are not big employers. The requirements are, for a “qualifying data center”:
- single-occupant facility,
- at least 100,000 square feet,
- 20 qualifying jobs, and
- $200 million in investment over a five-year period.
For a “qualifying large data center”:
- single-occupant facility,
- at least 250,000 square feet,
- with at least 20 megawatts of transmission capacity,
- 40 qualifying jobs, and
- $500 million in investment over a five-year period.
Forty jobs for a “large” data center with half a billion dollars of investment is not that significant.
V. The legislature should also eliminate or limit data centers’ use of local tax abatements and financial incentives.
Public Citizen opposes tax cuts for wealthy corporations. Many big tech companies pushing data centers on Texas communities are among the largest companies in history. In addition to ending the state sales and use tax exemption, we also suggest ending local tax breaks and financial incentives.
Right now, local governments rely on local development agreements to gain leverage over projects in their jurisdiction. We recommend the legislature give counties additional authority to regulate data center developments so that they won’t be forced into Chapter 381 agreements. Counties should have authority to regulate such local issues as:
- Distance between data centers and certain land uses including homes, schools, places of worship, licensed day-care centers, hospitals, or medical facilities.
- Restrictions on the use of potable water, storm water, and wastewater.
- Limiting the use of polluting diesel engines for backup power.
- Noise level at the fenceline, including sounds with a frequency below 20Hz (infrasound).
- Requirement to post a bond or other financial assurance sufficient to decommission the facility, return the land to its original state, and/or repair road damage.
We have identified thirty-one counties that have passed resolutions asking for more authority from the legislature: Anderson, Andrews, Angelina, Austin, Bell, Bosque, Brazoria, Caldwell, Cameron, Clay, Cooke, Delta, Ellis, Fannin, Fayette, Grayson, Hays, Henderson, Hill, Hood, Hudspeth, Hunt, Johnson, Karnes, Lampasas, Lubbock, Morris, Parker, Polk, Somervell, Tom Green, Wise. Appendix A attached to these comments is a list with more information and links to these resolutions.
Chapters 380 and 381: Local Development Agreements
Local development agreements are tax breaks or incentives offered by cities and counties. Counties do not generally have authority to regulate development. A Chapter 381 agreement is a county’s only option to gain leverage over a proposed project.
Public Citizen has spent several months visiting communities impacted by data centers. We have spoken at rallies, town halls, and county commission meetings. Some of the county commissions we have visited include Johnson, Hood, Medina, and Somervell. We have heard the same thing repeated by county leadership: they don’t want to give away their tax base, but otherwise they have no authority. A data center can do anything it wants when locating in the county. A 381 agreement is the only leverage the county leadership has to ask for terms beneficial to the community.
Section VI of this testimony (below) includes a deeper look at Chapter 380 and 381 agreements. A list of thirty-three agreements we found for data centers is attached as appendix B.
The Jobs, Energy, Technology and Innovation Act (JETI)
The Jobs, Energy, Technology and Innovation Act (JETI) was passed by the 88th legislature (HB 5, 88R) to replace the former “Chapter 313” program for property tax abatements from school districts. Chapter 313 applications were no longer processed after December 31, 2022. Some Chapter 313 projects do not even begin until 2043 and can continue for ten years, so some Chapter 313 tax breaks will be in place for another three decades.
JETI was effective on September 1, 2023. As of January 2026, there are 15 active JETI projects. At least two of these projects are likely for data centers:
- J0021 in Brazoria County is for Stone Creek Peaker LLC, a 200 MW natural gas simple cycle power plant that will likely have “a commercial offtake contract that is yet to be put in place.”24
- J0022 in Reeves County is for Energy Forge One LLC, a 2 GW gas power plant proposed to power data centers.25
Chapter 312: The Property Redevelopment and Tax Abatement Act
Tax Code Chapter 312 allows local taxing entities—cities and counties—to offer property tax abatements for up to 10 years. Chapter 312 agreements are available in the Local Development Agreement Database.26 At least two data centers with Chapter 312 abatements are listed in the database:
- Crusoe Energy System, LLC in Wilbarger County
- Compass Datacenters DFW LLC in Allen City
The Texas Enterprise Fund
A few data centers have also received Texas Enterprise Fund (TEF) money. Applications to the TEF are decided upon by unanimous agreement of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Speaker of the House.27 There are at least three data centers that have received Texas Enterprise Funds:28
- A Hewlett-Packard data center in Austin or Houston received a $3 million award in FY 2006-2007. This project has been completed.
- QTC Management, Inc. in San Antonio has received $308,750 as of July 2023 on a TEF award of $558,250.
- Digital Realty Trust, L.P. in Dallas has received $1,060,000 as of August 2024 on a $2,000,000 award.
VI. Public Citizen research on Chapter 380 and 381 agreements shows that counties need more authority to secure beneficial terms for their communities.
Public Citizen staff combed through the Comptroller’s database of around 4,100 local development agreements29 and identified 33 for data centers—20 of them for cities and 13 for counties. This research led us to conclude that counties need more authority to negotiate with data center developers to secure terms that meaningfully address concerns raised by community members.
This testimony concludes with a deeper look at 380/381 agreements. A list of all of the agreements we found is attached.
Each local development agreement can cost taxpayers tens of millions of dollars, or more. A typical data center might reach a valuation of $200 million in five years, 30 with a steady increase in value of $40 million per year. If this data center has a ten-year, 100% tax break in a jurisdiction with a 2% tax rate, then that tax break would cost $32 million in 10 years.
Do data centers provide more than $32 million in value to their communities?
Going back to the tax code, a data center of this size might have 20 jobs. The local jurisdiction—and its taxpayers—are paying $1.6 million for each of those jobs. A typical minimum salary for a qualifying job is $67,000 (see below). The taxpayers are paying twenty-four times the salary of that job. That doesn’t seem like a good deal.
Another conclusion we reached in our research of local development agreements is that they tend not to include terms that would benefit community members. When you talk to people in communities, you hear concerns about water availability first, then energy prices and grid security, then local impacts such as noise, light pollution, and road disruption. But these issues aren’t typically addressed in local development agreements. The agreements include terms about employment, infrastructure spending, and payments in lieu of taxes. They don’t tend to address problems of concern to neighbors. This reinforces our belief that counties should be given authority to regulate issues that do matter to communities.
This testimony concludes with a few examples of terms we noticed in local development agreements. A more thorough list is attached. Here are a few things we noted in our research:
- The largest agreement is between SSDC1, LLC and the City of Sulphur Springs, which contemplates a total value of $18.7 billion by the time the agreement concludes.
- A minimum salary of $67,000 for qualifying jobs is common.
- Many agreements require the use of local contractors and vendors when commercially reasonable.
- Some agreements waive local fees such as permit fees, impact fees, and inspection fees.
- Some cities require an investment in wastewater infrastructure that is eventually repaid by the city, which then stakes custody of the infrastructure. The City of Lancaster has such an agreement for a $1.5 million investment in 5,000 feet of sewer lines designed with stubs that allow other buildings or houses to connect in the future.
- The City of Temple has an agreement for 13,000 feet of wastewater main and associated infrastructure, with the reimbursement paid with 4% interest. Temple also agreed to sell 350,000 gallons of water per day and notify the developer if it were not available.
- The City of Garland has two very different agreements entered into between 2015 and 2024.31 The 2015 agreement includes a fixed rate for electricity ($0.048/kWh through 2017) in exchange for the city providing estimates of its usage and maintaining a “lagging power factor” of 0.97. The city agreed to build a substation at its own expense. The agreement also included a $1.5 million “Fiber Optic Incentive” in its 2015 agreement but not its 2024 agreement. The city also moved from waiving fees up to $550,000 to offering a $500,000 fee rebate once certain targets were met.
- The City of Lancaster offered to add 10% to the abatement if the company, called Sl DFW02A, LLC or “Stack,” moved its regional headquarters to Lancaster, or 15% if the company moved its global headquarters.
- The City of Sulphur Springs offered a land grant of an old landfill property and disclaimed any responsibility for hazardous material or environmental conditions.
- An agreement in Fort Worth included a requirement to spend $50,000,000 on construction costs with Fort Worth companies.
- Sometimes one company enters into similar agreements with a city and its county at the same time.
- Lancium with Fort Stockton and Pecos County on Sept. 7, 2021.
- Wurldwide LLC with City and County of El Paso in December 2023.
- Wiwynn technology with City of Socorro and County of El Paso in May/June 2025.
Stay Updated on Public Citizen
Follow Public Citizen
Support Our Work
Public Citizen Comments to Congress on Lowering Drug Prices
In Response to Sen. Wyden and Colleagues' RFI
Dear Ranking Member Wyden and colleagues,
Thank you for your initiative exploring policy options to lower prices and improve prescription drug affordability for people in the United States.
Public Citizen is a consumer advocacy organization with more than 1,000,000 members and supporters and a fifty-year history protecting the public’s interest before federal agencies, Congress, and the courts. The Access to Medicines program advocates for access to prescription drugs in the United States and internationally. As such, we and our members have a strong interest in improving affordable and stable access to vital medications for U.S. patients.
We urge you to build on the Inflation Reduction Act with policies to save hundreds of billions of dollars in prescription drug costs and make sure all Americans have access to the medicines they need. By ensuring pharmaceutical corporations charge no more for prescriptions in the United States than they do in Europe or Canada and capping out-of-pocket costs, we can end pharma rip-offs and treatment rationing.
Big Pharma’s monopolistic price gouging is worse now than at any time in American history. It has become intolerable and unsustainable, with four-in-ten Americans rationing medicines they need because they are too expensive.[i] Annual drug spending now exceeds half a trillion dollars and is projected to reach more than $800 billion in 2034.[ii]
Congressional Democrats and the Biden-Harris Administration made the first major progress in a generation by empowering Medicare to negotiate the prices for some older medicines with high annual spending, establishing penalties for price spikes, and putting in place protections in Medicare Part D from excessive out-of-pocket costs. Already the negotiation program is saving patients and taxpayers billions of dollars annually[iii] and out-of-pocket limits are helping to lower cost-related nonadherence,[iv] but according to the Congressional Budget Office, in part due to the combination of 1) Medicare price negotiations and inflation rebates having less impact and 2) the Part D redesign and out-of-pocket cap costing significantly more than anticipated, Medicare drug spending will be even greater than what was anticipated before the Inflation Reduction Act was passed.[v] The scale of our drug pricing crisis demands bold solutions.
Senators and members of Congress should advance three policies into law to provide all Americans access to medicines at fair, affordable prices:
- Negotiate the prices on all brand name prescription drugs;
- Limit negotiated prices based on what drug companies charge in other high-income countries; and
- Extend the benefits of negotiations, price spike protections and improved out-of-pocket caps to the private market.
The comments below will first focus on policies surrounding these three proposals as well as reply to other issues presented in the request for information (RFI), including reforms to the drug supply chain and support for biomedical innovation.
Negotiating Prices on All Branded Drugs
Exemptions from negotiations—expanded by congressional Republicans’ and President Trump’s Big Ugly Bill—inappropriately exclude drugs on which Medicare and patients spend tens of billions of dollars annually, while drug corporations are spiking drug launch prices to new heights year after year. Drug companies argue that exemptions and delays from negotiation are necessary to allow a return on investment, but in reality, independent research and development cost estimates are significantly lower than industry-cited estimates that use opaque data sets.[vi] Even at lower negotiated prices paid in other countries, pharmaceuticals remain extremely lucrative due to low marginal costs of production.[vii]
The negative impacts of negotiation exemptions and delays are profound. Negotiation delay periods mean that patients and taxpayers are forced to pay higher, unnegotiated prices for nearly a decade or longer before the government is allowed to step in and negotiate. Of the drugs selected for the current round of price negotiations, Medicare already spent more than $70 billion from 2012 through 2023 yet negotiated prices will be unavailable until 2028.[viii] Meanwhile, the median launch price charged by pharmaceutical companies for a new drug in the United States jumped from $2,115 in 2008 to $180,007 in 2021, a 20 percent annual inflation rate.[ix] In 2025, the median price was $216,000 (an artificially low number due to the mix of drugs approved last year).[x]
Moreover, long negotiation delays mean that even when drugs otherwise qualify for negotiation, they may still never have a negotiated price as generic or biosimilar competition may come on the market before or during the negotiation period. One drug selected this year in the third round of the program, Xeljanz / Xeljanz XR, will never have a negotiated price in place due to generics entering the market, despite the time and government resources spent on negotiation.[xi] Under current policy, Medicare is unable to select an alternative product to negotiate in its place, foregoing potential savings. In other cases, Medicare and its beneficiaries may only benefit from one year of a lower negotiated price before a drug is deselected from the program, as will be the case with three of the 10 drugs selected in the first round of the program, Entresto, Stelara, and Xarelto.[xii]
The orphan drug exemption should also be eliminated entirely. Proponents of the exemption argue it is needed to preserve innovation for rare disease treatments, but the United States already provides robust support for research and development of treatments for rare diseases, and this loophole is shielding from negotiations expensive drugs on which Medicare spends billions of dollars annually. To support and provide incentive for rare disease treatments, currently the FDA grants prescription drug companies developing products to prevent, diagnose or treat a rare disease or condition with orphan drug designations, which qualifies the product sponsors with tax credits covering up to 25% of eligible clinical trial expenses, an exemption from user fees, and the potential to receive seven years of marketing exclusivity for orphan indications after approval.[xiii] Analysts found that of the $2.1 trillion Medicare Part B and D spent on drugs from 2012 through 2021, $77 billion was spent on sole orphan drugs, $108 billion on drugs with multiple orphan indications, and $75 billion on drugs first approved with an orphan indication and subsequently approved for a non-orphan indication.[xiv] Another recently published analysis found that drugs delayed or exempted from negotiation through the orphan exemption and the One Big Beautiful Bill Act are at no economic disadvantage relative to drugs that do not qualify for the orphan exemption and delay.[xv]
Other high-income countries with long-established frameworks and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs negotiate the prices of brand name drugs soon after approval, with most negotiating the prices of all newly approved brand-name drugs without exclusions.[xvi] No delay periods or orphan drug exemptions were envisaged in the legislative antecedent to the Inflation Reduction Act, the Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, which all House Democrats voted to pass in the 116th Congress.[xvii]
We urge policymakers to pass reforms to remove exemptions and require Medicare to negotiate prices of all brand name drugs at launch and increase the number of currently approved drugs it negotiates to at least 50 per year until all currently approved, costly medicines have negotiated prices in place. Additionally, once a negotiated price is established for a medicine, it should remain in place. This is necessary for program integrity to ensure drug companies cannot evade negotiated prices on new forms of a drug when an older version of the same drug faces generic competition.
A large majority of voters across the political spectrum want Medicare to negotiate lower prices on all the drugs it currently buys.[xviii] Doing so would rapidly produce tens of billions of dollars in savings while reducing out-of-pocket costs for patients.[xix]
Limiting Negotiated Prices Based on International Prices
The United States pays 3-4 times more for prescription drugs than other rich countries.[xx] Even for products that have undergone Medicare negotiation, prices charged by prescription drug companies in the United States remain significantly higher than those in other large, high-income countries,[xxi] and negotiations are lowering prices less than initially projected.[xxii] Pharmaceutical spending now accounts for nearly 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) of the entire U.S. economy, compared to around 1.2% of GDP for non-US Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, driven in large part by higher U.S. prices.[xxiii]
Public Citizen supports incorporating an international reference price-based ceiling into the Medicare drug price negotiation program. Limiting negotiated prices based on the prices paid in other countries is the most direct and surefire way to ensure that U.S. prices are no longer wildly out of step with prices paid in peer nations. We encourage policymakers to incorporate several key features into an international reference price-based ceiling or other policy, to promote fairness and help prevent negative externalities in countries resulting from pharma attempts at gaming:
- Limit reference countries to those with the largest gross domestic products, per capita incomes at least 50% of the United States, and large pharmaceutical markets.
- Calculate the ceiling based on the median price or a volume-weighted average of prices across reference countries.
- Adjust ex-U.S. prices by a ratio of reference country per capita income to U.S. per capita income when calculating the ceiling.
- Empower the Secretary to make a good faith effort at estimating confidential discounts when that information is not available through manufacturer submissions or other public data, a practice that is utilized in other countries that incorporate international pricing information for pharmaceutical reimbursement. For example, in Germany officials use their own estimate if manufacturer submitted information on confidential discounts is not credible and France “mobilizes intelligence” to estimate secret discounts in other countries.[xxiv] If the Secretary is unable to estimate confidential discounts on a product, it could also be empowered to apply an estimate based on product class and indication.
Americans across partisan and demographic groups overwhelmingly support (by an 86% – 8% margin) allowing Medicare to negotiate all of the drugs it purchases paying no more than what drugs sell for in other wealthy countries.[xxv] By establishing a ceiling for Medicare price negotiations based on prices in other high-income countries, policymakers can finally deliver Americans fair prices and produce tens of billions of dollars in annual savings.[xxvi]
Extending Negotiated Prices, Price Spike Protections, and Improved Out-of-Pocket Limits Beyond Medicare
More than 200 million American obtain their health insurance coverage through private plans.[xxvii] People who get their insurance through their employer or the Affordable Care Act marketplace do not directly benefit from Medicare price negotiations or price spike protections and remain potentially exposed to significantly higher out-of-pocket costs.[xxviii]
Of the $400 billion in drug expenditures covered by insurance in 2024, more than 40% was through private insurance.[xxix] Private insurance drug prices are even higher than those realized by Medicare and other government health programs,[xxx] and thus potentially even greater savings to Americans could be produced through extending access to prices established through Medicare price negotiations to people with private insurance. Researchers estimate that if prices realized in other high-income countries were available across the U.S. market, it would save close to $200 billion annually.[xxxi] Like an international price-based ceiling, the House-passed Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act included a mechanism to offer Medicare-negotiated prices to people who get insurance through their employer or the Affordable Care Act.
The impact of Medicare rebate protections against price spikes is currently uncertain, as commercial sales are excluded from rebate calculations.[xxxii] By including commercial sales in Medicare inflation rebate calculations, as well as Part B drug units sold through Medicare Advantage, policymakers can ensure that these price spike protections have their intended impact in Medicare while shielding people with private health insurance coverage from drug companies’ price increases. Additionally, we urge rebasing penalties to the date a product first enters the market; unjustified price increases that occurred before a certain date are no less inappropriate than those that occurred in recent years.
The most direct way patients are financially impacted by exorbitant prescription drug prices is through their out-of-pocket costs as copays or coinsurance. Within Medicare, lowering the annual OOP cap would ensure that millions more seniors and people with disabilities are provided with relief from high drug costs. Additionally, expanding eligibility to the low-income subsidy will help seniors and people with disabilities most vulnerable to high drug costs get the medicines they need. The Improving Medicare Act includes measures to expand eligibility for additional support to beneficiaries with incomes up to 200% of the Federal Poverty Line. While we also support policies to cap cost-sharing for particular types of drugs, like the insulin cap that was included in the Inflation Reduction Act, we recognize policymakers likely will be forced to make tradeoffs between those measures and lowering annual out-of-pocket caps or improving subsidies for low-income beneficiaries. Given these choices, we urge greater out-of-pocket relief that does not preference patients with one disease or condition over another who also face high out-of-pocket costs, so we urge prioritization of lowering the annual out-of-pocket cap and expanding low-income subsidy eligibility over product-specific caps. Ideally, policymakers should pursue an out-of-pocket cap that is not limited to Part D and protects patients from catastrophic health care costs across traditional Medicare.
Beyond Medicare, more than half of Americans who have self-purchased or employer-sponsored insurance report worrying about affording prescription drugs—an even greater share than those with Medicare.[xxxiii] By extending the annual and other out-of-pocket cap established for Medicare to private insurance, millions of Americans will directly experience financial relief while tens of millions more are given peace of mind that drug costs will not bring financial ruin.
Reforming the Drug Supply Chain
While drug corporations abuse their monopoly power to set extraordinarily high prices, harmful business practices of Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) also drive-up pharmaceutical costs.
PBMs were created to manage health plan formularies and to negotiate lower prices – effectively, to serve as a countervailing power to Big Pharma. However, they have evolved to become adjuncts of health insurers and function as their own economic interest, manipulating markets, raising costs and imposing devastating harm on independent pharmacies, betraying their original price-lowering mission. The three largest PBMs, CVS Caremark, Express Scripts and OptumRx are now each integrated with a major health insurer. The top three PBMs manage nearly 80 percent of all prescriptions filled in the United States, and the largest 6 account for more than 90 percent.[xxxiv]
Consolidation and vertical integration allow PBMs to boost revenues at the expense of patients and health plans through tactics like pocketing portions of high rebates and discounts from manufacturers, and “spread pricing” wherein PBMs charge a plan more for a drug than they reimburse to a dispensing pharmacy.[xxxv] An FTC investigation found that PBMs boost revenues by steering patients towards their affiliated pharmacies and, at times, even excluding lower-cost generic or biosimilar competitors from formularies and preferring expensive branded drugs with high rebates.[xxxvi] PBM preference for affiliated pharmacies has had a crushing impact on independent and community pharmacies that promote competition, serve low-population areas and strengthen community.[xxxvii] PBMs also generate billions of dollars in revenues by marking up drugs higher than their acquisition costs at their affiliated specialty pharmacies while costs for patients and employers and other health care plan sponsors increase.[xxxviii]
Policymakers have begun to address some abusive practices of PBMs, but significant reform is still needed. Investigations from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) led to cases against the three largest PBMs, alleging that they drove up insulin costs for patients by creating a perverse incentive system that favored high-list price, high-rebate insulin over alternatives.[xxxix] In February, the FTC and ExpressScripts reached a settlement requiring ExpressScripts to adopt a number of reforms, including no longer preferring drugs with higher list prices over identical drugs with lower list prices, offering plans with out-of-pocket costs based on net prices, and delinking list prices from compensation in its standard plan.[xl] FTC reached a second settlement in July with Caremark Rx.[xli] The 2026 Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA) required that for Medicare Part D, PBMs pass through all rebates to plan sponsors and for compensation to be provided based on a flat dollar amount, and not as a percentage of the price of a drug.[xlii] The CAA also required transparency measures between PBMs and plan sponsors in the private market, requiring disclosure of spread pricing, acquisition costs, rebates, and other information to help plan sponsors better evaluate their pharmacy benefits and costs, as well as by requiring full pass through of rebates in employer sponsored health plans.[xliii]
While these reforms will provide relief for patients, ultimately more fundamental reforms that address the underlying sources of power that facilitate the PBM abuses at the expense of patients – consolidation and vertical integration – will be needed. Through the Patients Before Monopolies Act,[xliv] Sens. Warren and Hawley have proposed to prohibit joint ownership of PBMs and pharmacies, and through the Break Up Big Medicine Act,[xlv] the senators have proposed to prohibit any parent company from owning a medical provider or management services organization and a PBM or insurer. Other pharmaceutical policy experts have proposed a public PBM model,[xlvi] built on the long history of the Department of Veterans Affairs successfully managing its own formulary through its Pharmacy Benefits Management Services.[xlvii]
Interim reforms can also help address a multitude of abuses presented by the PBM business model. Public Citizen urges policymakers to consider:
- Require Part D plans to include biosimilars with lower net prices on a formulary tier with costsharing terms more favorable to the patient than the tier on which its reference product is placed, to promote biosimilar competition and lower costs.
- Consider prohibiting PBM rebate arrangements that include any contingencies based on blocking or providing less favorable coverage to generics or biosimilars.
- Require patient coinsurance and costsharing to be calculated based on net price, so patients aren’t harmed by PBM’s preferring high-list price, high-rebate medicines. We agree that ideally such a policy should apply to the broadest array of drugs possible so more patients benefit from lower cost-sharing.
- Reimburse generic medicines in Medicare Part D on a cost-plus basis.
- Prohibit PBMs from owning private label drugs; at a minimum prohibit PBM-owned private labels unless they satisfy a cost-plus pricing standard.
- End the perverse incentive-inducing practice of reimbursing physician offices for Part B drugs based on sales price and instead move to a flat add-on payment.
- Calculate Part B reimbursement using a blended average sales price (ASP) that includes a biologic product and all biosimilars that reference it, to promote biosimilar competition.[xlviii]
Supporting Biomedical Innovation
Exploiting government-granted monopolies to charge captive payers and patients unfathomable prices is central to Big Pharma’s business model. Prescription drug corporations aggressively exploit legal loopholes to strengthen and lengthen their patent monopolies. When drug corporations engage in legal tricks to strengthen and lengthen monopolies, it exposes our health system and patients to higher costs, limits access, and weakens incentives for companies to make true therapeutic advancements. Ultimately, this leads to increased health spending and poorer health outcomes for American patients.
In the short term, policymakers must rein in the worst of pharma’s patent monopoly abuses that cost taxpayers and patients billions of dollars by preventing access to lower-cost alternatives through reforms including the ETHIC Act, the Drug Competition Enhancement Act, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, and the Stop STALLING Act.
Over the medium- and long-term, policymakers should advance alternative research and development systems that delink[xlix] the financing of biomedical innovation from the end prices charged to patients and health systems, through prize funds, more upstream grant funding, and a greater public role in later stage development.
Patent Abuses Cost Billions
Patent evergreening occurs when drug corporations make trivial or obvious modifications to medications in order to lengthen exclusivity on brand name medicines. Public Citizen analysis of the first 10 drugs selected for the Medicare drug price negotiation program found that four of the 10 drugs subject to negotiation would likely have faced competition before negotiated prices went into effect were it not for evergreening tactics and patent abuses.[l] Pharmaceutical company tactics to extend their monopolies on these drugs included obtaining patents for minor or obvious variations including on (1) standard processes for screening compounds across the drug industry and (2) previously known information publicly available or disclosed in prior patents.[li] In other cases, companies used recently acquired patents that had nothing to do with producing a branded drug to block competing products and patented methods of screening patients to ensure the drug’s safety and efficacy.[lii]
As a result, Medicare lost between $4.9 and $5.4 billion in savings that should have accrued from access to competing, lower-cost treatments.[liii] These lost savings are nearly as much as what Medicare was projected to save from negotiated prices going into effect on all of the selected drugs in the first year of the program ($6 billion).[liv] Evergreening practices were prevalent across the drugs selected for price negotiation in the first year of the program. Nine out of 10 drugs subject to negotiation show evidence of manufacturers engaging in blatant anticompetitive uses of patents to fend off generic or biosimilar competitors or evergreening abuses representing minor modifications or tweaks that unfairly lengthen monopoly protection on the drugs.[lv] Patent protection on the branded drugs could extend well into the 2030s and possibly 2040.[lvi]
Patent Thicketing
Drug companies build patent thickets by filing numerous patent applications with small changes that build on a previously filed parent patent. These continuation patents are obvious variants of previously issued patents. Drug firms even admit that these are obvious variants. However, companies can use a procedural tool, called a ‘terminal disclaimer’ to prevent the patent office from rejecting these applications as obvious variations of previously patented inventions. The disclaimers shorten the protection period of the continuation patent to that of the parent patent. Though these weak patents may not extend the patent life for the product, when companies secure multiple patents with interlocking claims covering the same invention, it becomes more difficult and costly for generics and biosimilars manufacturers to mount legal challenges and bring competition to market. While challenging a small number of patents may be manageable, requiring generic entrants to confront seven or eight patents imposes a substantially greater litigation burden.
For example, experts in pharmaceutical patent law and policy with Harvard Medical School’s Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL) noted that the patent thicket surrounding mega-blockbuster Humira, held by AbbVie, “consist[ed] of 105 patents connected by 436 terminal disclaimers.”[lvii] The Humira patent thicket “helped AbbVie reach settlement agreements that delayed biosimilar market entry in the U.S. by five years compared to entry in Europe.”[lviii] Were ETHIC in place, AbbVie would have only been able “to sue potential competitors to prevent market entry with a maximum of 24 patents instead of 105,”[lix] potentially decreasing the cost of entry for Humira biosimilars.
The ETHIC Act would help combat this monopoly abuse by allowing branded drug companies to assert only one patent per family of patents linked by terminal disclaimers in litigation. This would make it less onerous and costly for generics and biosimilars firms to challenge originator patents and bring price-lowering competition to market.
Product Hopping
Product hopping occurs when a drug corporation introduces a follow-on product with no significant therapeutic benefit over its predecessor and makes efforts to switch patients onto the new product to prevent potential generic or biosimilar competitors from gaining market share. This effectively prolongs monopoly pricing and profits for the drug corporation engaging in the abuse. Product hops of just five drugs have been estimated to cost the United States $4.7 billion annually.[lx]
As proposed through the Drug Competition Enhancement Act, enacting a prohibition on product hopping and empowering the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce this prohibition would stop drug corporations from taking advantage of these unfair monopoly extensions.
Pay-for-Delay Reverse Patent Settlements
Pay-for-delay deals, also known as reverse payment settlements, occur when a brand-name drug corporation provides something of value to a generic or biosimilar manufacturer in exchange for that manufacturer delaying the launch of a competing product. In 2013, the Supreme Court took a small step forward. Through the Actavis decision, the Supreme Court decided that while not presumptively illegal, pay-for-delay deals could be contested under antitrust principles,[lxi] but many types of pay-for-delay arrangements have persisted. Pay-for-delay deals post-Actavis decision are estimated to cost taxpayers and patients from $6.2 to $37.1 billion dollars per year.[lxii]
As proposed through the Preserving Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, making pay-for-delay reverse patent settlement deals presumptively anticompetitive and providing the FTC sufficient resources for aggressive enforcement would help put an end to this practice.
Citizen Petition Abuse
Citizen petition abuse occurs when a brand drug corporation formally raises with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) safety concerns of a generic drug application to delay the launch of competition, and thereby inappropriately prolong the monopoly period for a brand-name drug. Drug corporations that file spurious petitions[lxiii] raise drug prices for consumers and taxpayers and hamper the FDA with the burden of reviewing sham filings.
As proposed through the Stop STALLING Act, empowering the FDA to dismiss sham petitions filed with the primary purpose of delaying competition and the FTC to pursue suits against such petitioners would support more timely generic competition and lower prices for patients and consumers.
Beyond these proposals, Congress should pass legislation that goes further to combat common pharmaceutical company monopoly abuses, including through reforming patent law so a secondary patent claiming a method of use for an indication which has already been disclosed or claimed in a primary patent relating to a product is obvious and, therefore, unpatentable,[lxiv] and preventing the pharmaceutical industry from unfairly extending exclusivity on drugs through crystalline/polymorph patents.[lxv]
Thank you for your commitment to ending prescription drug company profiteering and making medicines affordable for Americans.
Stay Updated on Public Citizen
Follow Public Citizen
Support Our Work
22 Groups’ Comments to Congress on Policies to Lower Drug Prices
In Response to Sen. Wyden and Colleagues' RFI
Dear Ranking Member Wyden and colleagues,
Thank you for your initiative exploring policy options to lower prices and improve prescription drug affordability for people in the United States. Our groups, representing patients, workers, health care providers, people of faith, seniors and consumers urge you to build on the Inflation Reduction Act with policies to save hundreds of billions of dollars in prescription drug costs and make sure all Americans have access to the medicines they need. By ensuring pharmaceutical corporations charge no more for prescriptions in the United States than they do in Europe or Canada and capping out-of-pocket costs, we can end pharma rip-offs and treatment rationing.
Big Pharma’s monopolistic price gouging is worse now than at any time in American history. It has become intolerable and unsustainable, with four-in-ten Americans rationing medicines they need because they are too expensive.[i] Annual drug spending now exceeds half a trillion dollars and is projected to reach more than $800 billion in 2034.[ii]
Congressional Democrats and the Biden-Harris Administration made the first major progress in a generation by empowering Medicare to negotiate the prices for some older medicines with high annual spending, establishing penalties for price spikes, and putting in place protections in Medicare Part D from excessive out-of-pocket costs. Already the negotiation program is saving patients and taxpayers billions of dollars annually[iii] and out-of-pocket limits are helping to lower cost-related nonadherence,[iv] but according to the Congressional Budget Office, in part due to the combination of 1) Medicare price negotiations and inflation rebates having less impact and 2) the Part D redesign and out-of-pocket cap costing significantly more than anticipated, Medicare drug spending will be even greater than what was anticipated before the Inflation Reduction Act was passed.[v] The scale of our drug pricing crisis demands bold solutions.
Senators and members of Congress should advance three policies into law to provide all Americans access to medicines at fair, affordable prices:
- Negotiate the prices on all brand name prescription drugs;
- Limit negotiated prices based on what drug companies charge in other high-income countries; and
- Extend the benefits of negotiations, price spike protections and out-of-pocket caps to the private market.
Negotiating Prices on All Branded Drugs
Exemptions from negotiations—expanded by congressional Republicans’ and President Trump’s Big Ugly Bill—inappropriately exclude from negotiation drugs on which Medicare and patients spend tens of billions of dollars annually, while drug corporations are spiking drug launch prices to new heights year after year. Drug companies argue that delays from negotiation are necessary to allow a return on investment, but in reality independent research and development cost estimates are significantly lower than industry-cited estimates that use opaque data sets.[vi] Even at lower negotiated prices paid in other countries, pharmaceuticals remain extremely lucrative due to low marginal costs of production.[vii]
The negative impacts of negotiation exemptions and delays are profound. Negotiation delay periods mean that patients and taxpayers are forced to pay higher, unnegotiated prices for nearly a decade or longer before the government is allowed to step in and negotiate. Of the drugs selected for the current round of price negotiations, Medicare already spent more than $70 billion from 2012 through 2023 yet negotiated prices will be unavailable until 2028.[viii] Meanwhile, the median launch price charged by pharmaceutical companies for a new drug in the United States jumped from $2,115 in 2008 to $180,007 in 2021, a 20 percent annual inflation rate.[ix] In 2025, the median price was $216,000 (an artificially low number due to the mix of drugs approved last year).[x]
Conversely, other high-income countries with long-established frameworks and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs negotiate the prices of brand name drugs soon after approval, with most negotiating the prices of all newly approved brand-name drugs without exclusions.[xi] No delay periods were envisaged in the legislative antecedent to the Inflation Reduction Act, the Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, which all House Democrats voted to pass in the 116th Congress.[xii]
A large majority of voters across the political spectrum want Medicare to negotiate lower prices on all the drugs it currently buys.[xiii] Doing so would rapidly produce tens of billions of dollars in savings while reducing out-of-pocket costs for patients.[xiv]
Limiting Negotiated Prices Based on International Prices
The United States pays 3-4 times more for prescription drugs than other rich countries.[xv] Even for products that have undergone Medicare negotiation, prices charged by prescription drug companies in the United States remain significantly higher than those in other large, high-income countries,[xvi] and negotiations are lowering prices less than initially projected.[xvii] Pharmaceutical spending now accounts for nearly 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) of the entire U.S. economy, compared to around 1.2% of GDP for non-U.S. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, driven in large part by higher U.S. prices.[xviii]
Americans across partisan and demographic groups overwhelmingly support (by an 86% – 8% margin) allowing Medicare to negotiate all of the drugs it purchases paying no more than what drugs sell for in other wealthy countries.[xix] By establishing a ceiling for Medicare price negotiations based on prices in other high-income countries, policymakers can finally deliver Americans fair prices and produce tens of billions of dollars in annual savings.[xx]
Extending Negotiated Prices, Price Spike Protections, and Out-of-Pocket Limits Beyond Medicare
More than 200 million American obtain their health insurance coverage through private plans.[xxi] People who get their insurance through their employer or the Affordable Care Act marketplace do not directly benefit from Medicare price negotiations or price spike protections and remain exposed to unlimited out-of-pocket costs.
Of the $400 billion in drug expenditures covered by insurance in 2024, more than 40% was through private insurance.[xxii] Private insurance drug prices are even higher than those realized by Medicare and other government health programs,[xxiii] and thus potentially even greater savings to Americans could be produced through extending access to prices established through Medicare price negotiations to people with private insurance. Researchers estimate that if prices realized in other high-income countries were available across the U.S. market, it would save close to $200 billion annually.[xxiv] Like an international price-based ceiling, the House-passed Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act included a mechanism to offer Medicare-negotiated prices to people who get insurance through their employer or the Affordable Care Act.
The impact of Medicare rebate protections against price spikes is currently uncertain, as commercial sales are excluded from rebate calculations.[xxv] By including commercial sales in Medicare inflation rebate calculations, policymakers can ensure that these price spike protections have their intended impact in Medicare while shielding people with private health insurance coverage from drug companies’ price increases.
The most direct way patients are financially impacted by exorbitant prescription drug prices is through their out-of-pocket costs as copays or coinsurance. Within Medicare, lowering the annual OOP cap would ensure that millions more seniors and people with disabilities are provided with relief from high drug costs. Beyond Medicare, more than half of Americans who have self-purchased or employer-sponsored insurance report worrying about affording prescription drugs—an even greater share than those with Medicare.[xxvi] By extending the annual out-of-pocket cap established for Medicare to private insurance, millions of Americans will directly experience financial relief while tens of millions more are given peace of mind that drug costs will not bring financial ruin.
Thank you for your commitment to ending prescription drug company profiteering and making medicines affordable for Americans.
Sincerely,
AFT: Education, Healthcare, Public Services
Americans for Democratic Action, SoCal
Beta Cell Action
Center for Medicare Advocacy
Congregation of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, U.S. Region
Consumer Action
Doctors for America
Health Global Access Project
National Advocacy Center of the Sisters of the Good Shepherd
National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare
NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice
People’s Action Institute
Physicians for a National Health Program
Popular Democracy
Progressive Democrats of America
Public Citizen
Salud y Farmacos
Social Security Works
T1International
UnidosUS
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines
Voices of Health Care Action