Stopping Rollovers
The Dual-Wheel Solution for 15-Passenger Vans

Public Citizen
With
C.Tab Turner

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I. Introduction: The Hazards of 15-Passenger Vans

An internet advertisement for the Chevy Express 15-passenger van excitedly exclaims: “Bring on the crowds — [the] Express Passenger Van offers seating for 15 passengers and extra room for cargo on 3500 Extended Wheelplate models.” Another ad, for Dodge’s Ram Van Passenger Wagon proudly boasts that Dodge’s van is a “people-moving power house” that “seats 15 happy campers.”

Fifteen-passenger vans are routinely marketed by the automotive industry to schools, colleges and universities, church groups, airport ground transportation services, day care services, organizations for the elderly or disabled people and other entities. Yet the groups would not be enthusiastic customers for these vehicles if they were aware that government research, stability test and real-world crash statistics show that 15-passenger vans are exceedingly dangerous vehicles. For these vans, in fact, the more is not the merrier, and bringing on the crowds is a terrible idea. The vehicles are particularly susceptible to potentially deadly rollover crashes when loaded with as few as five people, which is just one-third of the vehicle’s seating capacity, and just get more dangerous as they are loaded with passengers.

Fifteen-passenger vans are routinely used to transport groups of vulnerable passengers such as children and the elderly on field trips, to conventions, on church outings, and to athletic events. Yet church leaders, school officials and others may be totally unaware that the vans have special handling needs and are top-heavy and tippy, with a high risk of rolling over in an emergency maneuver. Despite the hazards posed by driving these vehicles, automakers are not legally required to honor many basic safety protections that would protect passengers when a crash occurs, including crucial safeguards that apply to other passenger-carrying vehicles, such as school buses, sports utility vehicles and smaller vans. Manufacturers’ ads also fail to warn potential customers that the more “happy campers,” luggage and equipment that are loaded into these vehicles, the more dangerous they become. The result of the combination of these three tragic omissions is that 15-passenger vans strike out when it comes to safety.

Ford and General Motors are the current manufacturers of 15-passenger vans. DaimlerChrysler discontinued production of its versions of the vans in June 2002, a decision which may very well have been prompted by the safety risks, and the liability, posed by the vans. But that still leaves many of these vans on the road manufactured by all three of the automakers. In total, according to experts at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), there were about 500,000 15-passenger vans on the road as of July 2001. Between 1990 and 2000, 864 occupants of these vans died in crashes, 424 of them in single-vehicle rollover crashes, producing a vehicle death rate that is far higher than it should be given the relatively small number of these vehicles that are on the road, as well as an extraordinarily high death rate in rollover crashes.
The 15-passenger van is a slapped-together hybrid vehicle, meaning that it combines features of several vehicle types. Originally designed as vans to carry cargo, manufacturers sought ways to inexpensively convert these vehicles for use in carrying passengers without properly re-designing them to handle well on the road or to protect the large numbers of people they are able to transport. Beginning in the early 1970s with the Dodge Maxi Wagon, and in response to an emerging market for these vehicles, the manufacturers cut costs that would have been incurred for a newly designed van to carry passengers safely and for re-tooling factories, by merely making minor modifications to the large cargo vans already coming off the line.

In an economical, but cut-rate, solution, they simply extended the cargo van’s length by a foot and one-half beyond the vehicle’s rear axle and installed seating capacity to accommodate 15 occupants. This choice means that up to four passengers are seated beyond the rear axle in the rearmost and longest seating area in the van. In addition to lacking important structural safety protections, this extension of the rear of the vehicle to carry occupants and luggage is a major contributor to the instability of the vehicle, creating a “fishtail” effect and other handling difficulties in emergency maneuvers.

In recent years, high-profile rollover crashes of 15-passenger vans have killed or injured many riders in crashes particularly notable for the high numbers of people hurt and the concentration and close association of those affected. A number of such crashes involved college sports teams and church groups, and finally caught the attention of the U.S. Department of Transportation’s highway safety
agency, NHTSA. After conducting an inquiry into the problem, NHTSA issued a Consumer Advisory and Research Note in April 2001, and reissued another Consumer Advisory a year later in April 2002. In its consumer warnings, NHTSA highlighted the riskiness of the vans. The National Transportation Safety Board also issued a safety report on November 1, 2002, with recommendations to address the safety hazards of the vans in letters directed to General Motors, Ford and NHTSA. A few insurers of churches and schools are no longer selling policies to insure these vehicles and are raising the rates for existing policyholders.

After years of neglect, the issue has finally begun to receive the attention that it deserves. NHTSA’s warnings increased press attention and public scrutiny of these gruesome crashes. The forces now coalescing around the issue are a textbook study of the attention needed before the manufacturers will consider safety to be of paramount value and make needed changes or recall dangerous vehicles. Events contributing to the now-growing clamor to address this issue include the following:

* Growing concerns among insurers and the establishment of higher rates or discontinued coverage, particularly among companies insuring churches and schools;
* A precipitous drop in sales as word of the problems has spread;
* DaimlerChrysler’s decision to discontinue manufacturing these vans;
* The recent investigation by the NTSB, and the publication of two consumer alerts by NHTSA;
* Legislation to prohibit post-secondary school use of 15-passenger vans, H.R. 3296, was introduced in Congress by Rep. Mark Udall (D.-CO);
* Increasing public pressure to re-design the vehicles;
* Increasingly frequent litigation on behalf of injured consumers against manufacturers for the deadly design of these vehicles.

Omissions and Special Exemptions in Federal Safeguards Pertaining to 15-Passenger Vans Produce Tragic Results

Fifteen-passenger vans exist in regulatory limbo as loophole vehicles under federal law. Because they are designed to carry over 10 passengers, they are classified as buses, yet they need not meet the more stringent crash protection standards required of large and small school buses. Adding insult to injury, the vehicles also do not have to meet certain protective federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to smaller vans, sport utility vehicle (SUVs) and passenger cars. They are also essentially orphaned by the ongoing work at the nation’s highway safety agency. They are not included in NHTSA’s New Car Assessment Program, which conducts crash tests of vehicles and publishes the results, nor are they a subject of the agency’s research and pending new rule on a rollover risk testing program.

There are also important loopholes in the laws governing 15-passenger vans that pose a unique threat to the safety of children. If a new “bus” is sold or leased to significantly transport school children
either to or from school, the bus must comply with all federal school bus safety standards, which are
designed to provide occupants with a higher level of safety than regular bus standards. Because 15-
passenger vans do not meet key federal motor vehicle safety crash standards (FMVSS) for school
buses, the law prohibits the sale or lease of new 15-passenger vans for significant use in primary and
secondary school-related transport. Although both NHTSA and the NTSB recommend that states
require that all school children be transported in buses meeting the FMVSS requirements for school
buses, neither agency has the jurisdiction to issue such a regulation. Under current law, however, pupil
transportation is regulated by the states. Therefore, neither federal body can prohibit schools from
buying or leasing used 15-passenger vans. In addition, the federal prohibition does not apply to the
transport of college students, and colleges and universities use 15-passenger vans regularly, particularly
for sports teams.

In addition to these serious safety deficiencies in vehicle performance rules outlined above,
drivers of 15-passenger vans do not need a special commercial driver’s license to operate the vans. In
the absence of such a requirement, many 15-passenger vans are driven by individuals without any
significant experience driving such a large vehicle. This is extremely problematic. As described above,
due to manufacturer shortcuts, 15-passenger vans have a high center of gravity and poorly designed
rear seating area that extends beyond the axle of the vehicle, making them difficult to maneuver. Yet
despite the complex handling characteristics of these vans, drivers of these vehicles do not typically
receive any specialized training or screening.

These factors result in a lower price tag for 15-passenger vans than for small school buses, and,
accompanied by the convenience of avoiding a special certification for drivers, are the central reason
that 15-passenger vans appeal to college sports teams, volunteer organizations and groups whose
members serve as the driver for a particular occasion. Most owners and users may only now be
learning of the dangerous rollover propensity of the vans and the near-total lack of crash protection
provided for occupants in a crash.

While two federal government safety agencies have now raised serious questions about the
safety of 15-passenger vans, manufacturers continue to try to deny the problem and deflect the blame
onto drivers of the vans by claiming that that the vans are safe “if used properly.” Carolyn Brown, a
spokeswoman for Ford, recently recognized that the handling of these vans can be difficult, yet also
blithely said that, “If [a 15-passenger-van] is not overloaded and if it is driven properly, it is a very safe
vehicle.” And in a briefing for NHTSA officials after issuance of the agency’s Research Note on April
2001, Ford also made blanket assertions that the vans were safe, or, at least “appropriate”: “Ford 15-
passenger E-series vans were designed to accommodate a full occupant load and, when loaded,
possess appropriate steering, handling, and stability characteristics.”

Summary of the Fix: Short-Term Partial Remedies and Long-Term Solutions

Both NHTSA and the NTSB have issued recommendations to enhance the safety of the 15-
passenger vans already on the road. NHTSA’s recommendations focus on improving driver skills,
decreasing driving speed, increasing the use of safety belts, checking for properly inflated tires,
exercising care not to put any load on the roof, and carefully loading seats in front of the rear axle if there are fewer than 15 passengers. Despite its emphasis on driving skills, NHTSA failed to recommend that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, which has jurisdiction over this area, require a commercial driver’s license to operate the vans. The agency also indicated that it is considering requiring that the vehicles bear a “warning label about rollover and seat belt use.” This is a poor response, to say the least. Warning labels are of questionable value in affecting consumer behavior, yet are excellent tools for the manufacturers in litigation to shift the blame for crashes onto drivers.

The NTSB recommends that NHTSA include 15-passenger vans in its pending plan for a dynamic rollover testing program and test these vehicles in crash tests as part of the agency’s New Car Assessment Program, which publishes results by make and model for consumers. The NTSB further requested that NHTSA, in conjunction with the manufacturers, test and evaluate technological handling systems, particularly electronic stability control systems, that have potential to assist drivers in maintaining control of these rollover-prone vans.

We support all of the recommendations made by NHTSA and the NTSB as obvious and necessary short-term responses to a public safety emergency, and we particularly commend the NTSB for recommending that 15-passengers vans be brought into NHTSA’s work on rollovers. But asking drivers to exercise caution, as NHTSA does, is far from enough — these vans must also be altered to be far easier to control and less prone to roll over than they are today. No driver, no matter how skilled, can safely deal with emergency avoidance maneuvers, such as off-road re-entry maneuvers on the highway where drivers have inadvertently entered the shoulder of the highway and must rejoin traffic, or cope with situations such as tire failures at freeway speeds, without these vans becoming uncontrollable and rolling over.

For that reason, a fix for the vehicles now on the highway is essential. After considerable testing, we have developed recommendations for a concrete and relatively simple change to the vehicle that would directly address the poor handling characteristics of 15-passenger vans, providing vast improvements in rollover prevention for vehicles now in use.

In this report, we explain that installation of two rear wheels (“dual wheels”) on each side of a 15-passenger van has been shown in rigorous testing to improve the handling characteristics of the vans, reduce the risk of rollover and create a more stable vehicle. As documented by this report, the concept of using dual rear wheels on vehicles the size of 15-passenger vans to improve traction, improve stability and improve load-carrying capability is not new or unique and has been considered internally by the manufacturers for years. Below is an image of an Oldsmobile 2 and a half ton pick-up truck from 1937 that was equipped with duals rear wheels.
Retrofitting existing 15-passenger vans with these dual rear wheels is a feasible option that would help improve rollover resistance, which is the most glaring safety deficit afflicting the vans. Safety of the vans would still be compromised by the lack of crash protection for occupants, but reducing the risk of rollover is a definite step in the right direction for preventing more deaths and injuries.

We make our recommendation to improve rollover resistance with the important caveat that we believe these vehicles are badly in need of a comprehensive safety-related re-design, in which they can evolve from a slightly modified cargo vehicle to one truly capable of safely transporting people. Substantial improvements in crash protection design, from the roof structure to the interior, are long overdue. If these vans are going to continue to play a significant role in transporting consumers in the future, then we recommend that the manufacturers completely redesign them so that they remain controllable and stable under all foreseeable operating conditions, and that manufacturers equip them with adequate crash protection for passengers that exceed all of the appropriate federal minimum safety standards.

Due to the high occupancy of these vehicles, it is an abomination that the manufacturers have consistently taken advantage of the regulatory loopholes to market and profit from these dangerous designs since the 1970s. Given that manufacturers know that poorly designed vans expose large numbers of consumers to the risk of serious and often fatal injuries at one time, it is our belief that manufacturers have a heightened duty to act with safety in mind, especially given that the vehicles are frequently occupied by our children, our parents and the elderly. An image from a recent crash of a 15-passenger van is below.
A few examples of the tragic consequences of automaker neglect of the safety of these vehicles are provided below.

* On August 3, 2000, a 1995 Ford E-350 15-passenger van owned by the Mississippi County Economic Opportunity Commission was transporting employees on I-55 near Osceola, Arkansas, when a Bridgestone Dueler tire tread peeled apart, causing the driver to lose control. The van rolled over, killing one occupant and injuring the others.14

* On May 9, 1999, while driving to Disney World to celebrate their daughter Maria’s tenth birthday, the right rear tire of the Jimenez family’s rented 1999 Ford Econoline E-350 van blew out. The tire failure caused the van to spin out of control and roll over. Ten-year-old Maria suffered a catastrophic brain injury and is currently in a persistent vegetative state.15

* On May 8, 2001, 12 members of the First Assembly of God women’s group were driving a church-owned Dodge Ram 3500 extended van on a shopping excursion to a Gainesville, Texas, outlet mall. Sixty-two-year-old Dorothy Griffin lost control of the van when one of the tires suddenly suffered a tread separation. The van uncontrollably swerved into the median and rolled several times. The crash took the lives of four women and injured six others.16

* On February 10, 2002, nine members of the Prairie View A&M track and field team were traveling in a Ford E-350 15-passenger van when the driver was forced to make an emergency maneuver. The van rolled over 3 ½ times. Five of the students were killed, including the seat-belted driver.17

* Four Memphis youths died on April 4, 2002, when the driver of a day care van lost control of the vehicle and ran into a highway overpass.18
* In June of 2002, while driving a Ford E-350 15-passenger van loaded with Oregon firefighters to battle the Hayman wildfire in Colorado, Megan Helm lost control of the van, made a steering maneuver, and the van rolled over four times. Five of the 11 firefighters were killed and the others were injured.19

* On July 14, 2002, Leroy Robinson was a passenger with 12 members of his church congregation from Philadelphia in a Dodge 15-passenger van on a church trip when a motor home with a vehicle in tow clipped the van. The van swerved and overturned numerous times killing four church members ages 14, 32, 38 and 40, and injuring several others.20

* On July 25, 2001, Shirley Hines was transporting 10 members of Emmanuel Baptist Church in a 1989 Ford E-350 van on I-20 in Louisiana when the right rear tire suddenly suffered a tread separation. The tire failure caused the vehicle to begin swerving violently. Ms. Hines lost control and the van rolled over. The rollover crash claimed the lives of 2 passengers and injured the others.21

To understand how this threat to the public arose, we next examine the history and development of the market for 15-passenger vans.

II. Defining the Scope of the Problem with 15-Passenger Vans

The current fleet of 15-passenger vans is made up of the following vehicles:22

- Chevrolet Express 3500
- GMC Savana G3500
- GMC Rally/Vandura G3500
- Dodge Ram Van/Wagon B3500
- Dodge Ram Wagon B350
- Ford Econoline E350
- Ford Club Wagon E35023

During the decade from 1990 to 2000, 15-passenger vans were involved in 1,281 fatal crashes and killed 864 van occupants, 654 occupants of other vehicles and 200 bystanders. 268 single-vehicle rollover crashes resulted in 424 fatalities to van occupants. NHTSA reports that 80 percent of the fatally injured people in 15-passenger vans were not wearing safety belts.24 This compares to 50 percent for all fatal crashes.

NHTSA has found that the number of occupants in a 15-passenger van has a large effect on the frequency of rollover in fatal crashes. In fatal single-vehicle crashes, cars with 10 or more occupants rolled over 85 percent of the time, compared to 38 percent of the time in those vans with fewer than 10 occupants and 28 percent of the time for those vehicles with fewer than five.25
There is no question that 15-passenger vans are over-involved in single-vehicle rollover crashes compared to other passenger vehicles. From 1991 to 2000, 33 percent of passenger vehicles involved in single-vehicle, fatal accidents experienced a rollover, compared to 52 percent for 15-passenger vans involved in such crashes. A shocking 81 percent of all 15-passenger van occupant fatalities occurred in single-vehicle rollover crashes.26

In its first analytical work focused on 15-passenger vans, NHTSA looked specifically at single-vehicle rollover crashes to ascertain whether these vans, when loaded with passengers, “are unusually susceptible to rollover.” Although NHTSA found that 15-passenger vans have a rollover rate comparable to other light trucks and vans when the number of occupants in the van is not considered, they also determined that the rollover rate triples when the vans are loaded with 10 or more occupants, in comparison to the rollover rate when the vans have fewer than 10 occupants. The following chart taken from the NHTSA research note demonstrates the findings:

### Number of Rollover Crashes and Rollover Ratios by Occupancy Level of 15-Passenger Vans in Single-Vehicle Crashes27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupancy Level</th>
<th>All Single Vehicle Crashes</th>
<th>All Rollovers</th>
<th>Rollover Ratio</th>
<th>Combined Rollover Ratios 1 to 9 and 10 or more occupants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fewer than 5</td>
<td>1,815</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>12.30%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 9</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20.80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – 15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29.10%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As NHTSA’s Research Note reveals, loading the van with occupants and cargo causes the center of the vehicle’s gravity to shift rearward and upward, increasing the likelihood that the vehicle will be difficult to control in emergency situations and more prone to roll over once a loss of control occurs.

In its research, the agency reviewed the available real-world crash data, measured the static stability factor28 of a typical 15-passenger van, a 7-passenger van and a minivan, and analyzed the handling characteristics of both loaded and unloaded typical vans, using state-of-the-art computer simulation programs designed to model vehicle performance. The agency examined the rollover issue by looking at the vehicle in its static, or resting, condition and by conducting tests of the vehicle’s dynamic behavior on the road.

NHTSA found that the static measurements of the typical 15-passenger vans – the static stability factor – became worse as the vehicle moved from an unloaded to a loaded condition, increasing the risk of rollover by an amazingly high 40 percent! In lay terms, the higher the center of gravity became with the increase in loading, the more susceptible the vehicle was to rolling over.

In order to analyze the dynamic handling behavior of the typical 15-passenger van, the agency conducted computer simulation work using values typical of these vans. The simulated van was
evaluated using a slowly increasing steer maneuver designed to evaluate the understeer characteristics of vehicles, and a simulated 30-mph reverse steer maneuver in which the steering wheel is first turned hard to the right and then turned hard to the left.

In summary, the agency concluded that the simulated 15-passenger van demonstrated dangerous oversteer characteristics when fully loaded in the slowing increasing steer maneuver. The agency stated that “these examples show that the simulated GVW [gross vehicle weight, or fully loaded] 15-passenger van exhibits both lateral and roll instabilities under extreme maneuvers.” The tendency of the center of gravity of the vehicle to move up and rearward with loading was found to directly contribute to the directional instability, while the roll instability resulted from the fact that the loaded van tended to spin sideways, which when combined with the high center of gravity, created a significant risk that the vehicle would roll over.

The effect of increased loading on the handling and stability characteristics of vehicles is not a new concept. In 1979, for instance, the Highway Safety Research Institute at the University of Michigan analyzed the problems encountered in calculating the potential for rollover inherent to military vehicles during maneuvers performed on paved, level surfaces. One important conclusion from this research was the discovery that occupant loading had an adverse safety impact on the handling and stability characteristics of the vehicles.

In 1992, NHTSA examined the effect of vehicle loading and variation in vehicles on the static stability factor and tilt table performance of a variety of passenger vehicles. The agency determined that both static stability factor and tilt table performance were adversely affected as passengers were loaded into the vehicles. Additional research work carried out between 1992 and 2001 consistently reached the same conclusion about the risks associated with occupant loading of light trucks and vans.

Ford Motor Company had a uniquely negative experience with the issue of the increased instability that resulted from the loading of occupants and luggage in vans designed to carry people. Like 15-passenger vans, some designs of minivans have proved insufficient to protect passengers when subject to high loading conditions. In late 1992, Value Rent-A-Car Company in Florida, a company owned at the time by Mitsubishi, suffered a rash of rollover accidents involving the Ford Aerostar minivan that it was renting to vacationers in southern Florida. The problem involved a loss of control resulting in rollover crashes when the vehicle was loaded with a full complement of occupants and luggage. As the problem for Value worsened, the company sent a letter to Ford that included the following request:

This letter is to inform you that Value has experienced a number of accidents involving rollover incidents in the Ford Aerostar vans. We are interested in knowing if you have any information regarding any problems or increased incidents of rollovers for the Ford Aerostar vans. We would appreciate your providing us with any relevant information regarding these concerns, including the vehicles compliance with safety standards. In addition, please provide us with any information you have
which may be helpful to our renters in handling this vehicle other than the information provided in the owners manual....

The problem was significant to Value because of the high number of people occupying the vans, the high number of crashes that were occurring when the vehicle was loaded with occupants, and the seriousness of the rollover accidents. Value hired an independent vehicle design expert to assist it with the problem, who determined that the Aerostar was designed defectively and therefore was unsafe.

Ford responded to Value’s letter by suggesting that Value “not put things like this in writing.” Ford suggested a meeting in Detroit to discuss the matter further. At the meeting in Detroit, Ford presented Value representatives with “data” indicating that the Aerostar possibly had a higher center of gravity compared to other similar vans, and argued that the van was “safe” if “used properly.” Ford offered to “inspect” the vans involved in crashes and provide Value with a “vehicle handbook.”

Unswayed by Ford’s presentation, the Value representatives pressed Ford to recall the vehicles and to fix the problem. According to an employee of Value, the following was Ford’s response to Value’s demand that the Aerostar be recalled and fixed:

Q. And during the course of this conversation about recalling the Aerostar minivan, Mr. Cline, tell us what Mr. Mavis told you.
A. Mr. Mavis said they would not recall the minivan, it would be cheaper to pay the claims involving the Aerostar.

Unable to get Ford to act to protect consumers, Value created its own warning sticker for the van. The label, placed on the center of the steering wheel by Value, specifically warned users about the rollover danger associated with the van when loaded with a full complement of occupants and luggage.

Insurance companies have also joined the growing list of those concerned about the safety of 15-passenger vans. GuideOne, an insurer that specializes in insuring churches, church groups and schools, and the Colorado School District Self-Insurer Pool, have both stopped selling new policies for 15-passenger vans and are raising rates on existing policies. Jan Beckstrom, the Chief Operating Officer of GuideOne, has called 15-passenger vans “inherently dangerous” and expressed concern about the impact of crashes on “the health and vitality of the ministries and people involved.” The company has begun urging owners of these vehicles to replace them with safer modes of transportation, such as small buses.

III. Loopholes in Federal Safety Standards Afflicting 15-Passenger Vans

Under the existing regulatory scheme, a 15-passenger van is classified as a “bus” because vans are defined as a passenger vehicle that can carry over 10 passengers, and because the gross vehicle weight of these vehicles is approximately 9,500 lbs. In essence, the 15-passenger vehicle is a loophole vehicle under federal safety rules.
Although most consumers think of a bus as a large intercity or transit bus, current federal safety rules have three categories of buses. Although often used like a school bus, the vans do not have to comply with the extra strength requirements for school buses under the existing regulatory scheme. Below is a list of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs) that do not apply to 15-passenger vans and yet do apply to, and significantly enhance the safety of, small school buses (vehicles that are the closest in size to 15-passenger vans). A fuller description of applicable and inapplicable standards is contained in Appendix B.

The following is a synopsis of current bus categories (including two industry categories, motor coach and specialty bus), summarizing how they “stack up” in terms of federal crash protection requirements:

Required Crash Protection Attributes for Various Bus Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Bus</th>
<th>Crashworthiness(^45) (Joint Strength and Roof Rollover)</th>
<th>High Backed Padded Seats(^46)</th>
<th>Minimum Seat Spacing(^47)</th>
<th>Seat Belts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large school bus</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVWR &gt; 10,000 lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small school bus</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVWR = 10,000 lbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor coach</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialty bus</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-passenger van</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^45\)Federal Standard
\(^46\)Industry Standard

In addition to the federal bus safety rules listed above, 15-passenger vans are exempt from a number of federal safety standards that apply to multipurpose passenger vehicles that are similar in weight, such as vans and larger SUVs. Fifteen-passenger vans do not have to comply with a number of key crash protection safety standards that protect the occupants of automobiles and multipurpose passenger vehicles:

* FMVSS 201: **Occupant Protection in Interior Impact** (15-passenger vans exempted from upper interior head protection). This standard specifies requirements to afford impact protection for occupants.

* FMVSS 202: **Head Restraints** (15-passenger vans exempted from placing head restraints in rear seating positions). This standard specifies requirements for head restraints to reduce the frequency and severity of neck injury in rear-end and other collisions.

* FMVSS 206: **Door Locks and Door Retention Components**. This standard specifies requirements for side door locks and side door retention components including latches, hinges
and other supporting means, to minimize the likelihood of occupants being thrown from the vehicle as a result of impact.  

* FMVSS 214: **Side Impact Protection** (15-passenger vans exempted from dynamic test). This standard specifies performance requirements for protection of occupants in side impact crashes. Its purpose is to reduce the risk to vehicle occupants in side impact crashes by specifying vehicle crashworthiness requirements in terms of accelerations measured on anthropomorphic dummies in test crashes, by specifying strength requirements for side doors, and by other means.  

* FMVSS 216: **Roof Crush Resistance**. This standard establishes strength requirements for the passenger compartment roof. Its purpose is to reduce the crushing of the roof into the passenger compartment in rollover accidents.  

* 49 CFR 575.105: **Rollover Warning Label**. This section requires manufacturers of utility vehicles to alert the drivers of those vehicles that they have a higher possibility of rollover than other vehicle types and to advise them of steps that can be taken to reduce the possibility of rollover and/or to reduce the likelihood of injury in a rollover.  

However, 15-passenger vans are required to have safety belts installed, as are automobiles, multipurpose passenger vehicles and small school buses. Larger school buses and motor coaches are not subject to this requirement.  

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, 15-passenger vans have largely escaped federal regulatory standards for occupant protection. Many, if not all, of these standards are woefully out-of-date and inadequate, such as the roof crush standards (FMVSS 216 applies in the same area to multipurpose vehicles and FMVSS 220 applies to school buses). Yet even these minimal standards do not apply to 15-passenger vans. The tragic record of fatal crashes shows that the auto industry has taken full advantage of the loopholes and has completely failed to act on its own to protect occupants.  

The problem of inadequate crash protection for consumers is compounded by the lack of any meaningful rollover prevention safety standard. Given the multiplicity of loopholes in rules that should be protecting occupants of the vans, the lack of any meaningful rollover resistance safety standard, and the auto industry’s predictable failure to act to fix the hazards, it is no surprise that these vans continue to be prone to roll over and that consumers are unreasonably exposed to catastrophic injuries when the vehicles do roll.  

IV. **NHTSA’s and the NTSB’s Safety Recommendations Are Inadequate To Solve the Problem**  

In its April 2001 public warning accompanying its Research Note, NHTSA outlined a number of recommendations that it stated would reduce the risk of rollover injuries in 15-passenger vans. NHTSA’s recommendations highlighted the importance of the following steps:
* Drivers should be well-rested and apply safe speeds for weather and road conditions;
* Drivers should be cautious on curved rural roads and safe speeds to avoid running off the road;
* If wheels drop off the highway, drivers should gradually reduce speed and steer back onto the highway;
* Check for properly inflated and treaded tires;
* Use safety belts, with driver enforcing belt-wearing policy;
* Passengers should sit in seats in front of rear axle when not full;
* More than 15 passengers should never be allowed in a 15-passenger van;
* To be aware that vans require more space and reliance on side-view mirrors;
* To be aware that vans do not respond well to abrupt steering maneuvers;
* To be aware that vans require additional braking time.

Although we agree that drivers of all types of vehicles should consider NHTSA’s list of “safe driving habits” as good advice, these general expressions of safety ignore the very real design problems associated with these vehicles. As the real world evidence demonstrates, consumers can unfortunately follow each of these “safe driving habits” and still end up in a catastrophic rollover crash while driving or riding in a 15-passenger van.

NHTSA’s recommendations ignore or downplay the following factors affecting the safety of 15-passenger vans:

* The vans are difficult to control in emergencies;
* The vehicles, by design, are unstable;
* The vehicles lack adequate crash protection for occupants;
* Safety loopholes exist in the regulatory scheme, thus exempting them from many of the requirements;
* The auto industry has taken advantage of these loopholes and ignored safety;
* The lack of NHTSA research, testing and consumer information on the vans.

The NTSB, by comparison, in its letters to manufacturers and to NHTSA on November 1, 2002, urges NHTSA to conduct research, and testing and to include the vans as a part of the agency’s consumer information program. The NTSB also asked NHTSA to test other technological systems, particularly electronic stability control systems, which are designed to help avoid loss of directional control.

Although both NHTSA and the NTSB have identified a problem, neither agency has investigated the reasons why the companies made these horribly unsafe vehicles, how much the manufacturers knew about their dangers, or why consumers are not adequately warned of the hazards. Most importantly, neither agency has asked the most relevant question from a consumer’s standpoint: that is, how we can fix these vehicles. This report is a kick-start for that work. We urge both the safety agencies and the auto industry to take immediate action to protect the public in this matter.
V. Manufacturer Knowledge of the Hazards of 15-Passenger Vans

The three manufacturers of 15-passenger vans that are currently on the highways, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, have known for years about the dangers associated with the vans when loaded at or near the total weight that the vehicle is designed to carry. They have each been sued for deficiencies in the design of the vehicles, and all three are keenly aware of the propensity of 15-passenger vans to roll over. Yet none of these companies have redesigned the vans to prevent rollover and none of them have taken steps to design the vans to reduce injuries from rollover crashes.

The full-size Dodge Ram Wagon passenger van, which was made by Chrysler until recently, is among the oldest vehicles in the 15-passenger van category, having hit showrooms initially in time for the 1971 model year. In June 2002, Chrysler discontinued production of its full-size van. The Dodge Ram Wagon was originally offered on two different wheelbases, a 109.6-inch version, a 127-inch version, as well as a “Maxi” version that added a 26-inch body extension to a long wheelbase truck for 15-passenger seating.

Chrysler, as with other manufacturers, has long recognized the need to design vehicles such as a 15-passenger van so that it slides, rather than rolls over, when a loss of control occurs, at least on paved road surfaces. 58 Chrysler used a battery of dynamic tests to evaluate vehicle dynamics. According to the Chrysler test engineer working on the van, despite the battery of tests available to Chrysler, the company’s 15-passenger van was not tested in the Consumers Union evasive maneuver, nor was it tested in the step steer test maneuver, the single lane change test, or the tire blow-out test. 59 In fact, Chrysler’s engineer asserted that he never ran any test designed to measure the overturning resistance of the 15-passenger van. 60

A November 1, 2002, letter to the National Transportation Safety Board from David Perry, an attorney from Corpus Christi, Texas, highlights a loading problem that causes the body of the Chrysler van to move with respect to the suspension and the tires, resulting in added stress on the tires. Mr. Perry explained that:

The excessive loading on the rear axle is related to the unusually short wheelbase of the vehicle compared to comparable vehicles. Not only is the rear axle substantially overloaded, the overload is concentrated on the left rear tire, due to the positioning of the seating package which biases weight distribution to the left of the centerline of the vehicle. Overloading the left rear tire is likely to have resulted in accelerated oxidation of the tire, and resulted in shortening the fatigue life of the tire.

The Ford E-series van was overhauled in the early 1970’s, under a program called the “Nantucket” program. 61 The vehicle was changed from a unibody frame to a body on frame design. 62 The van was introduced in 1975 and the extended length version of the van – the 15-passenger version – was introduced in 1979. 63 The extended length version added 18-inch in the rear, but kept the same wheelbase. 64
The original E-350 van was a commercial vehicle designed for hauling cargo, not people. The gross vehicle weight was designed to be approximately 9,000 lbs. A “school bus” option was originally created with the vehicle that carried a gross vehicle weight rating of 9,600 lbs. and was equipped with dual rear wheels. The design goal for the vehicle included the general Ford guideline that the vehicle have a sufficient margin of safety between the capability of the vehicle and the capability of the customer in situations that were “typical” in the real world.

Ford recognized the feasibility of using dual rear wheels on the 15-passenger van as early as 1972. See Appendix C. The dual rear wheels provided extra load capacity, better traction and improved handling characteristics. Below is one example of a model with dual rear wheels and the text of Ford advertising about the availability of the wheels.

Dual Rear Wheels (DRW) are available with either the 4x2 or 4x4 drive system. Dual rear wheels help increase rear traction, towing stability and provide increased rear axle weight ratings. The Front Suspension on F-250 4x2 models is an independent Twin I-Beam design. The optional Heavy Service Suspension Package includes Heavy service front springs, auxiliary rear springs (SRW) and steering damper. Super Duty F-250 Pickups (and Pickup Box Delete models) feature a Ladder-type Frame with rear kickup that is wider than the Super Duty Chassis Cab frame.

Although Ford created internal rollover resistance design standards in the mid- to late-1980’s, the company’s internal standards were drafted so as to exclude vehicles that weighed over 8,500 lbs – such as the 15-passenger van -- from having to be tested for, among other things, rollover resistance. Ford’s exclusion of vehicles like the E-350 from stability requirements ran contrary to Ford’s representation to NHTSA in 1973 that the cut-off for rollover resistance evaluation was 10,000 lbs.
Although Ford’s original internal safety design guideline for rollover included static stability factor (defined as the ratio of track width to center of gravity height), it was removed from the final version of the company guideline. The minimum static stability factor established by the guideline was to be 2.10, a figure that the E-350 could clearly not meet. Ford realized early on that static stability factor was a first-order indicator of a vehicle’s rollover propensity.

As a result of the exclusion of the E-350 from rollover resistance evaluations, the only dynamic testing required was “subjective” testing, which included testing the vehicle using an acceptability rating scale of 1 to 10. In litigation, Ford has conceded that the vehicle was not tested in limit maneuvers like the J-turn test, which involves a rapid steering turn. Furthermore, stickers warning about the elevated risk of rollover were not placed on the vans as they were with SUVs. Ford has also asserted that even the “subjective” test result documents purporting to show the ratings provided by the Ford engineers “can’t be found.”

General Motors, which recently settled a 15-passenger van rollover case with Birmingham attorney Ben Hogan, insisted as a condition of the settlement that all of the documents made a part of discovery be returned to the company and maintained under a gag order to avoid any public evaluation of the safety performance of its 15-passenger van.

In short, the Detroit manufacturers have known for years about the design deficiencies in these vehicles, which cause them to roll over, and have tried through settlement gag orders, and closed door meetings with government officials to contain the issue, but the real safety problem has never been addressed.

VI. Tests of 15-Passenger Vans With Single and Dual Wheels Reveal An On-Road Solution

In order to evaluate the dynamic handling characteristics of typical 15-passenger vans, three separate series of tests were conducted. One series of tests were conducted using a General Motors version of the van. The second series of testing included a Ford E-350 version. The third series of tests included the Dodge 15-passenger van. All three series of tests were conducted using vehicles as originally sold and a vehicle modified to include dual rear wheels.

The tests of the 1992 GM Rally STX Van were conducted in New Jersey in November and December of 2000 using a steering controller and included a combination of maneuvers designed to test the limit performance of the vehicle with and without dual rear wheels, while loaded with 10 passengers. Although the GM van demonstrated a dangerous oversteer condition at various loading conditions, the vehicle, with its longer wheelbase, also proved to be more stable from a rollover standpoint than the Ford or Chrysler versions. The vehicle, as modified to include dual rear wheels, performed better than the original vehicle and did not demonstrate either an oversteer condition or a tendency toward rollover in severe turning maneuvers. See Appendix D.

The Ford E-350 testing was conducted in Arizona and consisted of three phases. Phase I
included various loading conditions and the use of load range C tires. Phase II included the same loading conditions as in Phase I, but included the use of load range E tires. The final phase of testing included testing of an E-350 van modified so that it was equipped with dual rear wheels, load range D tires, and with various loading conditions representative of the vehicle’s gross weight capacity.

In summary, the Arizona testing of the E-350 demonstrated that the van, by design, has a natural tendency to “oversteer” during J-Turn maneuvers in virtually all loading conditions. “Oversteer” has been described as follows:

Oversteer is a cornering condition where the front of the vehicle turns more sharply than the driver intends during a turn while the rear of the vehicle skids around. For example, if a vehicle is in a turn and an oversteering condition exists, the driver may have the impression that the rear end of the vehicle is swinging out. A vehicle with an oversteer condition is increasingly difficult to control as speed increases.79

It is well recognized within the auto industry that oversteer characteristics are dangerous. Some experts have even characterized “oversteer” as constituting a “defect” under the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act.80 The oversteering condition, which is precisely the same condition noticed by NHTSA in its Research Note on 15-passenger vans, results in the vehicle having a very high tendency to move sideways, beginning to spin, in emergency situations.

In contrast, the modified E-350 van – the one equipped with dual rear wheels – behaved appropriately during the same testing and did not demonstrate a dangerous oversteering condition. The modified version remained stable under all test conditions and demonstrated a clear improvement in the overall safety in severe maneuvers. See Appendix C.

Tests, conducted under the direction of David Perry, an attorney from Corpus Christi, Texas, on the Dodge (Chrysler-manufactured) van included a series of J-Turn maneuvers along with the Consumers Union short course maneuvers at various loading configurations and speeds. The production Dodge van demonstrated a dangerous oversteering condition as well as a tendency to roll over in severe maneuvers. The modified Dodge van (dual rear wheel version), albeit better, also demonstrated two-wheel lift even with the addition of the dual rear wheels. The Dodge van is designed with a very soft suspension, thus allowing for excessive body lean in turning maneuvers. Future testing of the dual rear version will include an evaluation of modified stiffness characteristics designed to evaluate the ability to correct the dangerous two-wheel lift tendency of the vehicle as modified.

As previously indicated, NHTSA’s Research Note concluded that the “typical” 15-passenger van has a tendency to oversteer with loading and demonstrates a definite rollover tendency due to the shift in the center of gravity up and back with loading. Although Ford Motor Company criticized NHTSA for relying upon a computer simulation to evaluate the handling and stability characteristics of the “typical” 15-passenger van, the actual vehicle testing referenced above proves that NHTSA’s
analysis of the dangerous tendencies of the vehicles is accurate.

The testing also illustrated the feasibility of using dual rear wheels to help reduce both the risk of dangerous oversteer in the vans as well as the strong tendency of the unmodified vans to roll over under severe conditions on flat, level surfaces. Given that dual rear wheels are readily available, routinely used with certain models of pickup trucks manufactured by all three of the companies, and have demonstrated a clear improvement in performance, the manufacturers should make this technology available immediately. The cost of the addition of dual rear wheels is estimated to be in the range of $135.00 per vehicle.

An image of a modified van with dual rear wheels is below.

![](image)

VII. Recommendations: First Fix the Vehicle, And Then Fix the Regulatory and Oversight Regime

The recommendations by NHTSA and the NTSB do not adequately address the real source of the problem with 15-passenger vans. In its warnings, NHTSA focused on driver education, belt usage, and instructions about loading when the van is not full, many of which precautions may reflect unrealistic expectations about the motoring public. The NTSB suggested that NHTSA conduct testing to evaluate the vehicles and suggested that manufacturers and NHTSA consider various devices such as electronic stability control systems to assist drivers in maintaining control of the vehicle.

But the inherent design flaws in these vans cannot adequately be addressed by simply making safe driving recommendations to consumers. The problem with these vehicles most frequently occurs in emergency situations and must be addressed from a design standpoint or more consumers will die unnecessarily. Our policy recommendations address solutions for both existing vehicles on the highway
and the future design and manufacture of 15-passenger vans.

A. A Fix Is Needed for the 15-Passenger Vans on the Highway Now

1. Manufacturers should retrofit all existing 15-passenger vans with, at a minimum, dual rear wheels. Dual rear wheels will decrease the likelihood of dangerous oversteer characteristics and will decrease the risk of rollover in emergency maneuvers. Dual rear wheels are a technologically and economically feasible alternative because the manufacturers currently make large pick-up trucks with dual wheels comparable in size to these vans. Given the rising number of deaths and injuries associated with the vans, the economic cost for the manufacturers is minimal and the ethical obligation is clear.

2. Until this problem is fixed, consumers who are injured and organizations that own these vehicles must turn to the courts to force manufacturers to address the multiple defects in 15-passenger vans. If the problem is fixed, lawsuits can be prevented.

Federal regulators have indicated that they may not be inclined to act on the problem in a timely fashion, despite the obvious implications of the agency’s research. Although NHTSA’s Research Note of April 2001 starkly identifies the high likelihood of rollover of these vehicles when they are loaded with five up to the 15 passengers for which they are sold and advertised, NHTSA Administrator Jeffrey Runge told The New York Times on August 24, 2002, "This is not a defect issue. It’s a behavior issue with drivers and passengers." In contrast, NHTSA's Note concluded that:

...the decrease in stability under the fully loaded condition correlates to an increase in the rollover risk of approximately 40 percent. Also, sudden vehicle maneuvers could increase the propensity to roll over. Computer simulation predictions illustrated the adverse affects that fully loading a fifteen-passenger van can have on its handling properties (sudden transition from understeer to oversteer) and rollover propensity.

The concerns described by the agency cannot be remedied by improved driver skills, particularly given the fact that federal and state law allows any licensed driver to be at the wheel with no requirements for a commercial driver’s license. NHTSA obstinately has refused for 15 years to require a recall for the discrete numbers of vehicles with a high propensity to rollover or to issue a rollover prevention standard. If NHTSA continues to forsake its duty to require these vehicles to be recalled and to require a real remedy, then consumers and owners must use the courts to seek their remedies to push the manufacturers towards a re-design.

3. The safety gap between 15-passenger vans and other vehicles must be closed. As recommended by the NTSB, NHTSA should dynamically test these vehicles, include them in their research programs (from which they are now excluded), apply new rollover consumer information rules (now in progress) to these vehicles, publicize the existing Static Stability Factor information and its Research Note findings concerning 15-passenger vans, and issue a minimum
rollover prevention standard to halt the unnecessary carnage from rollover crashes, which account for a full one-third of all occupant fatalities annually.

4. **NHTSA should send a warning package to all owners of these vehicles**, alerting them to its Research Note conclusions about the dangers associated with these vehicles. Although a Consumer Advisory is better than nothing, the public must be advised directly of this urgent problem or more consumers will die from a lack of decent information about the risks. The safety precautions recommended by GuideOne Insurance, and modified by Public Citizen, are listed below. These recommendations are more thoughtful than the NHTSA recommendations, and should be fully considered by the agency.

* **Screen all drivers**, requiring that drivers obtain a commercial driver’s license;
* **Remove the rear seat** of the vans to reduce loading behind the vehicle’s rear axle;
* **Limit the capacity to 10 persons including the driver**, which dramatically reduces the risk of rollover;
* **Load forward seats first at all times**;
* **Communicate with passengers, parents and other parties** about the high risks;
* **Do not tow anything behind the vehicle or load the roof**;
* **Conduct a full safety inspection of the vehicle, including all tires**, pre- and post-trip;
* **Include safety items on board**, such as a fire extinguisher, first aid kit and cellular phone (which should not be used during driving);
* **Require all passengers and the driver to wear proper safety restraints** any time the vehicle is in motion;
* **Give the fullest consideration to other, safer transportation options**.

5. **Insurers, in addition to GuideOne, should immediately get involved** by raising policy rates for these vehicles, issuing alerts to owners warning of the dangers associated with the vehicles, and by bringing pressure on the auto industry to fix this problem by design, including a dual wheel retro-fit.

**B. Safety Actions for Vehicles Capable of Carrying 10 or More Passengers**

1. **Manufacturers must act responsibly.** They must either fix these vehicles or remove them from the highways. These rolling time-bombs must be redesigned to address the rollover issue and to include state-of-the-art crash protection safety devices (including separate steel cage body, special flooring, collision-resistant seats, roof crush and door lock requirements, etc.). These items should be standard equipment on all vehicles, rather than options for the wealthy.

2. **NHTSA must staunch the bleeding immediately.** This can be accomplished by prohibiting further sale of these vehicles until they are redesigned by redefining through regulation the "type" of vehicles that can carry 10 or more passengers. NHTSA has the authority to define the safety rules applicable by "type" of vehicle and should act right away.
2. NHTSA must close the safety gap afflicting these vehicles by requiring compliance with updated and improved crash protection standards and by creating 
mandatory safety standards for rollover resistance that cover these death traps. As a baby step, NHTSA should apply all existing safety standards, including existing large and small school bus crash protection standards, as applicable, to any vehicles carrying 10 or more passengers. Then NHTSA should bring these vehicles into this century and dramatically improve rollover survival rates for all vehicles by upgrading crashworthiness standards like those for roof crush, door lock and non-pretensioned belts, as well as other standards that are out-of-date and inadequate. NHTSA should also issue new standards for side impact head protection air bags and laminated window glazing to improve vehicle crashworthiness.

3. Instead of NHTSA merely passing out "safe driving habits" information to the public, NHTSA and the NTSB should ask the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to immediately amend current rules to require a commercial driver’s license for any driver of a vehicle carrying 10 or more passengers, rather than applying these requirements only to drivers of vehicles with 16 or more passengers.

Only with these important steps will these vehicles be made adequately safe for the transportation of groups of school children, the elderly, infants and students. Ford, General Motors and DaimlerChrysler have an obligation to ensure that these communities do not suffer from horrible crashes that inflict deadly injuries. Users of these vehicles must be warned of the risk. The 15-passenger vans currently on the highway must be made better by the installation of dual wheels and the egregious safety design of this dangerous vehicle must ultimately be fixed.
Appendix A

Marketing of 15-Passenger Van Encourages Over-Loading of the Vehicle
15-Passenger Seating

Bring on the crowds — Express Passenger Van offers seating for 15 passengers and extra room for cargo on 3500 Extended Wheelbase models.
## Appendix B

### Appendix B: Applicability of FMVSS to Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles (MPVs), 15-Passenger Vans (15-P), Small School Buses (SSB)\(^1\) and Large School Buses (LSB)\(^2\)

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1 School Bus with a GVWR ≤ 10,000 lbs  
2 School Bus with a GVWR >10,000 lbs  
3 49 CFR § 571.105, S5.5 requires that each vehicle with a GVWR greater than 10,000 lbs be equipped with an antilock brake system that controls the wheels of at least one front and one rear axle.
### Public Citizen Report on 15-Passenger Van Safety

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<td>&quot;Child Restraint Anchorages Systems&quot;</td>
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* 49 CFR § 571.220, S4.(b) requires each emergency exit of the vehicle be capable of opening both during and following the application of force. Roof exits excluded.
### Public Citizen Report on 15-Passenger Van Safety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Postcrash Standards</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>MPV</th>
<th>15-P</th>
<th>SSB</th>
<th>LSB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| "Fuel System Integrity"  
(Front, rear and lateral barrier test) | 301 | ✓   | ✓   | ✓   | ✓   |
| "Flammability of Interior Materials" | 302 | ✓   | ✓   | ✓   | ✓   |
| "Fuel System Integrity of Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles" | 303 | ✓   | ✓   | ✓   | ✓   |
| "Compressed Natural Gas Fuel Container Integrity" | 304 | ✓   | ✓   | ✓   | ✓   |

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5 49 CFR § 571.301 S6.5 requires that large school buses be able to withstand a moving contoured barrier crash test at any point and angle.
Appendix C

LIGHT TRUCK STRATEGY REVIEW
Nantucket Extended Length Van/Bus

Background and Present Situation

- Ford, Chevrolet, and Dodge all offer short and long wheelbase van and bus models.
  - Long wheelbase models (77% of Ford sales) provide 9-1/2 feet of cargo space and 12 passenger seating capacity.
- Only Dodge offers an extended (rear overhang) version of its long wheelbase model, the Maxi Van/Bus.
  - Provides 11 feet of clear cargo space and 15 passenger seating capacity.
  - Dominates certain market segments, such as carpet installation and airport limousine service.
  - Accounts for about 20% of Dodge production.
- The 1975 Nantucket program includes short (124") and long (138") wheelbase van and bus models, but does not provide an extended model, except for the 158" cutaway.

Product Alternatives

- Two alternative configurations were studied:
  - A bustleback (18" longer rear overhang) version, fully competitive with Dodge's Maxi, providing 11 feet of cargo length and 15 passenger capacity.
  - A van/bus version of the 158" wheelbase cutaway providing 12 feet of cargo space and 15 passenger seating with luggage space.
- Annual volume projected at 25,000 and 31,000 units (including 6,000 and 12,000 incremental units) for the bustleback and cutaway derivatives, respectively.
- Preliminary product investment estimated at $12 million for the bustleback and $19 million for the cutaway derivative.
- Profits for the bustleback alternative are projected at about $5 million annually, a 40% after tax return on investment versus $9 million profits and 50% return for the cutaway derivative.
- The 158" cutaway derivative was selected as the preferred alternative since it is a superior product and is more profitable.
- Engineering resource priorities, however, require that this program be deferred to 1977, in order to implement the "MUST" programs (Club Cab, Bronco replacement, motor home chassis, and tandem rear axle Nantucket cutaway).
- To minimize future downtime and investment, $0.9 million was approved by Mr. Jannes for AAD to proceed with the necessary provisions in the base Ohio Truck Plant for later introduction of extended models based on the 158" cutaway.

Planned Action

3rd Q/74 - Program approval (1977 model).
In order to meet the requirements of FMVSS 208 for model year 1976, the seat assemblies must have provisions for adding an occupant sensing switch in the 1976 models and pedestal provisions for adding a switch that will sense when the seat is positively locked in the forward position for 1976 models. Also a sensing switch will be added to the lap belt retractor on 1976 models. The seat will be structured internally to comply with the requirements of FMVSS 201 and 202.

The seat trim will be super-soft Corinthian grain vinyl with either argyle cloth or super-soft Corinthian grain vinyl inserts. The all vinyl Captain’s Chair will be available on all models. However, the argyle cloth inserts will be restricted to Chateau models. The seat trim will be color-keyed to the interior and will be available in all colors except gray.

158" WB Cutaway

A 158" wheelbase cutaway has been approved as an added starter and will require:

- Increased capacity dual wheels - the riveted construction dual wheels must be rerated from 2050# to 2100# capacity.
- Rear suspension - an additional spring of 3300 lbs. capacity is required and is incremental to the base program.
- Rear axle - the axle will be of unique tread for the dual wheels.
- 351 or 460 CID engine with automatic transmission and power steering.

The vehicle will retain the 4200 lb. front axle and 7400 lb. rear axle from the base E-350. The load center of the load area will be defined to prevent overloading of the axles and provide a reasonable weight distribution for acceptable handling.

Sidemounted Auxiliary A/C-Heater

An auxiliary A/C (and/or auxiliary heater) system will be packaged between the L.H. "B" pillar and the first vertical body side strainer. This sidewall system will direct conditioned air rearward through a duct located just below the L.H. beltline and extending back to approximately the "C" of rear axle.

A switch to allow separate operation of the auxiliary unit blower will be packaged on the right side of the main unit control. Function of the auxiliary will be modulated by the main unit control.

High Capacity Heater

A new high capacity heater will be released. Heater core size will be 6x10x2" (replacing the base 6x6x2" core). The heater core case and seal will be larger than the base heater to accommodate the larger core. Identification of the heater as a "High Output" unit will be incorporated on the surface of the heater assembly.
Appendix D

Stability Test Footage for 15-Passenger Vans
With Single and Dual Rear Wheels

The video consists of two sets of stability test footage.

SET I

Testing

* 1996 E350 Ford Club Wagon
* 4-Door Extended Passenger XL
* V8 engine, Rear Wheel Drive
* Testing performed by Safety Engineering & Forensic Analysis, Inc.
* 3941 E. Chandler Blvd. – Phoenix, AZ
* Nov. 28, 29 and Dec. 7, 2000

Test Vehicle

* Wheelbase: 138 inches
* Overall length: 211.8 inches
* Overall track width: 79.3 inches
* Overall curb height: 80.7 inches
* Curb weight: 4040 lbs.
* GVWR: 9001-10000 Class H
* Hydraulic Brake System
* VIN # 1FBJS31H5THA55008
* Tires P225/75R15

Equipment

* Outrigger system
* Video tape recorders

Test Sequences

Part I: Tests 1-6
Reverse steers with single and dual rear wheels
Part II: Tests 7-15

J-turns with single and dual rear wheels

1. regular reverse steer 47 mph 180/180 simulated load of 10 w/outriggers
2. dual reverse steer 50 mph 180/300 simulated load of 10 w/outriggers
3. regular reverse steer 45 mph 180/180 simulated load of 10 w/outriggers
4. regular reverse steer 45 mph 180/180 simulated load of 10 w/outriggers
5. regular reverse steer 45 mph 180/180 simulated load of 10 w/outriggers
6. regular reverse steer 47 mph 180/180 simulated load of 10 w/outriggers
7. regular j-turn 50 mph 120 simulated load of 10 w/outriggers
8. dual j-turn 50 mph 120 simulated load of 10 w/outriggers
9. dual j-turn 45 mph 210 simulated load of 10 w/outriggers
10. regular j-turn 45 mph 200 GVW w/outriggers
11. regular j-turn 45 mph 200 GVW w/outriggers
12. regular j-turn 45 mph 200 GVW w/outriggers
13. regular j-turn 45 mph 200 GVW w/outriggers
14. regular j-turn 45 mph 200 GVW w/outriggers
15. regular j-turn 45 mph 200 GVW w/outriggers

Test Results

* In J-turn maneuvers with single rear wheels, in virtually all loading conditions, tendency to oversteer with wheel lift in some tests.
* With dual rear wheels, remained stable under all test conditions.

SET II

Limit Response Testing

* 1992 GMC Rally STX Van
* Automotive Testing, Inc.
* Nov. 27, 28 and Dec. 7, 2000
* Raceway Park – Englishtown, NJ

Test Vehicle

* Wheelbase: 146 inches
* Track Width: 68.6 inches
* Curb Height: 82 inches
* VIN: 2GJGG39K5N4502523
* Accident Loading Condition (10 passengers)
* Tires: LT225/75R16 Michelin and LT 245/75R16 Firestone
Equipment

* Humphrey Accelerometer
* Data System
* Heitz Sprint I Programmable Steering Machine
* Outrigger System
* Video Tape Recorders

Test Sequence

Part I

* J-Turns with Single Rear Wheels

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<th>Single</th>
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</tr>
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<td>j-turn</td>
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* J-Turns with Dual Rear Wheels

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Part II

* Reverse Steers with Single Rear Wheels

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</table>

**Test Results**

* With single rear wheels at .65 lateral acceleration, unstable oversteer.
* With dual rear wheels, van remains stable in all tests.
Endnotes


3 Id.


5 Safety recommendation letter from National Transportation Safety Board to William Clay Ford, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Office, Ford Motor Company and Mr. G. Richard Wagoner, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, General Motors Corporation, Nov. 1, 2002, H-02-29.


9 Unless a vehicle has a gross vehicle weight rating above of 26,001 pounds or is designed to transport 16 or more passengers including the driver, a commercial driver’s license is not required under federal law. See 49 CFR § 383.5.


17 Asher, Mark, “Van Use Takes Turn for Worse; Spate of Crashes Has College Officials Rethinking Travel Plans,” The Washington Post, Mar. 2, 2000, at D03.


22 As of June 2002, DaimlerChrysler, which manufactured two of the vehicles listed below, stopped making 15-passenger vans. Safety recommendation letter from National Transportation Safety Board to William Clay Ford, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Office, Ford Motor Company and Mr. G. Richard Wagoner, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, General Motors Corporation, Nov. 1, 2002, H-02-29.
The three categories are: 1) bus, which is any vehicle configured to carry 16 or more passengers; 2) small school buses, which is a school bus less than 10,000 lbs. gross vehicle weight; 3) large school bus, which is a bus weighing 10,001 lbs. or more in gross vehicle weight. Another legal category for buses was proposed in a rulemaking published by NHTSA on November 5, 2002, to be defined as a “multifunction school activity bus.” These buses would meet school bus standards, except for the flashing lights and pedestrian-protection projecting stop sign arm. It is anticipated these vehicles would be used by childcare facilities for extracurricular activities and coordinated transportation systems, perhaps in lieu of 15-passenger vans. See 67 F.R. 67373, 67376.

These are required by the following federal standards: FMVSS 220: School Bus Rollover Protection. This standard establishes performance requirements for school bus rollover protection. Its purpose is to reduce the number of deaths and the severity of injuries that result from failure of the school bus body structure to withstand forces encountered in rollover crashes, see 49 CFR § 571.220; FMVSS 221: School Bus Body Joint Strength. This standard establishes requirements for the strength of the body panel joints in school bus bodies. Its purpose is to reduce deaths and injuries resulting from the structural collapse of school bus bodies during crashes, See 49 CFR § 571.221.

FMVSS 222: School Bus Seating and Crash Protection. This standard establishes occupant protection requirements for school bus passenger seating and restraining barriers. Its purpose is to reduce the number of deaths and the severity of injuries that result from the impact of school bus occupants against structures within the vehicle.
during crashes and sudden driving maneuvers, See 49 CFR § 571.222.

47 See id.

48 Specialty bus is the industry term for the small buses that are commonly used as shuttle or tour buses. No Federal standard provides definition for a specialty bus or motor coach. Id. at 2.

49 See Appendix A: “Applicability of FMVSS to Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles (MPVs), 15-Passenger Vans (15-P), Small School Buses (SSB) and Large School Buses (LSB).”

50 “Multipurpose Passenger Vehicle (MPV) means a motor vehicle with motive power, except a low-speed vehicle or trailer, designed to carry 10 persons or less which is constructed either on a truck chassis or with special features for occasional off-road operation.” See 49 CFR § 571.3.

51 See 49 CFR § 571.201.


53 See 49 CFR § 571.206.

54 See 49 CFR § 571.214.

55 See 49 CFR § 571.216.

56 See 49 CFR § 575.105.

57 But even this apparent safety advantage may not be as significant as it may appear, as the NTSB stated in its 1989 study Crashworthiness of Small Poststandard School Buses, “Unrestrained passengers on a school bus are less likely to be ejected than occupants of passenger cars because they are not seated next to a door, windows are usually partitioned, seatbacks are usually closer and higher, and passengers are farther from the windshield.” NTSB/SS-89/02.


59 Id. at 75-76.

60 Id. at 80.

61 Testimony of Ford Engineer Kenneth Snodgrass on April 12, 1999, at 11.

62 Id.

63 Id. at 12.

64 Id. at 99.

65 Id. at 89.

66 Id. at 92.

67 Id. at 137-39.

68 Id. at 39.

69 Ford internal document from 1972 (On file with C. Tab Turner).

70 Testimony of Ford engineer Kenneth Snodgrass on April 14, 1997, at 59.

71 Id. at 106.

72 Id. at 92.

73 Id. at 100.

74 Id. at 102.

75 Id. at 109.

76 Id. at 109.

77 Id. at 112.

78 Id. at 114.


80 Id.
