In the mid-1990s, supporters of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) sold the deals to U.S. farmers and ranchers as the new path to economic success – hyping the agreements’ prospects for increasing exports. U.S. food exports have increased, but not nearly as much as food imports. In 2013, the total volume of U.S. food exports stood just 0.5 percent higher than in 1995, the year that the WTO took effect. In contrast, imports of food into the United States in 2013 towered 115 percent above the 1995 level that marked the dawn of the WTO era.

Meanwhile, several widely publicized but short-lived “surges in U.S. food exports” under NAFTA and the WTO represented spikes in international prices. That is to say that such export “surges” reflected increased world market prices, not major increases in the volume of U.S. exports. The value of U.S. food exports has closely tracked international food prices, which became highly volatile after implementation of the WTO. Though the historically high food prices since 2007 have inflated export values, export volumes have remained comparably subdued, as indicated in the graph above. In 2013, for example, the international food price index of the Food and Agriculture Organization stood 86 percent above the median price level seen in 2004. While this high price pushed the value of U.S. food exports 98 percent above the 2004 level, the volume of U.S. food exports remained a mere 8 percent above the 2004 level.

Gauging the track record of U.S. food trade without the distortion of short-term price spikes requires an analysis of the volume, not just the value, of U.S. exports and imports. Measured by volume, imports of food into the United States have risen more steadily and to a greater degree than U.S. food exports under NAFTA and the WTO, as shown in the graph on the following page.
In 2013, the volume of U.S. food exports was only 0.5 percent higher than in 1995, the year the WTO took effect. In contrast, U.S. food imports in 2013 were 115 percent higher than in 1995. The much greater rise in imports over exports is even more notable given the historically high international food prices since 2007, which would be expected to dampen the volume of U.S. food imports. Without this price effect, the volume of U.S. food imports would likely be even higher today.

**Family Farmers Hit Hardest**

Smaller-scale U.S. family farms have been hardest hit by the import influx caused by deals like NAFTA and the WTO. About 170,000 small U.S. family farms have gone under since NAFTA and the WTO took effect, a 21 percent decrease in the total number. After the WTO required elimination of various U.S. price support and supply management policies, small farmers were also hard-pressed to survive the increasing year-to-year volatility in prices paid for commodities, making investment and planning more difficult than before the WTO.

**Food and Agricultural Trade Becomes Chaotic under NAFTA/WTO, Yielding Historic Deficits**

The United States has experienced wide swings in food and agricultural trade under the WTO. In 2005, the United States became a net food importer for the first time since the U.S. Department of Agriculture started reporting data in 1967. Trade deficits have become the norm, meanwhile, for U.S. agriculture under NAFTA, as indicated in the adjacent graph. The average annual U.S. trade deficit in agricultural goods with Canada and Mexico in the five years before NAFTA nearly tripled (a 174 percent increase) in the five years after the deal took effect. Since then, high imports and lackluster exports have continued to wrack U.S. family farmers with deficit surges. The average annual U.S. agricultural deficit with Canada and Mexico under NAFTA’s first two decades reached $975 million, almost three times the pre-NAFTA level.
Key Exports Remain Stagnant under NAFTA while Imports Soar

Some U.S. farming sectors have suffered not only a flood of imports under NAFTA, but have also seen very little gains on the export side, even with the post-2006 spikes in international prices, despite promises to the contrary. As the adjacent graph shows, small gains in U.S. beef and live cattle exports have been swamped by high imports throughout the NAFTA era. As another example, while total U.S. vegetable imports from Canada and Mexico have nearly quadrupled (a 275 percent increase) under NAFTA, U.S. vegetable exports to NAFTA partners have remained relatively flat (a 76 percent increase). The U.S. vegetable deficit with Canada and Mexico has soared to $4.2 billion, nearly 10 times the pre-NAFTA level, as the graph below indicates.

U.S. corn is, however, an exception – U.S. corn exports to Mexico in the three years after NAFTA soared 377 percent above the level in the three years before the deal. In 2013, the United States exported 26 times as much corn to Mexico as before NAFTA. But when the flood of U.S. corn in Mexico caused corn prices to plummet 66 percent for Mexican farmers, 2.5 million farmers and agricultural workers in Mexico lost their livelihoods, many of whom resorted to migration. In NAFTA’s first seven years, the annual number of people emigrating from Mexico to the United States more than doubled.

U.S. Meat Exports Go Bad under the Korea FTA

Despite the record of failed promises under NAFTA and the WTO, the same claims about booming exports were made to push the U.S. “free trade” agreement (FTA) with Korea in 2011. The Obama administration promised that U.S. exports of meat would rise particularly swiftly under the Korea FTA, thanks to the deal’s tariff reductions on beef, pork and poultry. For example, in a factsheet used to promote the FTA, the White House claimed: “Tariff eliminations on Korea’s existing 40 percent tariff will further boost beef exports, saving an estimated $1,300 per ton of beef imported to Korea – savings that would total $90 million annually for U.S. beef producers at current sales levels.”
Ironically, U.S. meat exports to Korea have plummeted faster than many other exports – export declines in some meat sectors were steeper than the overall 9 percent decrease in U.S. goods exports to Korea from the year before FTA implementation to the recently completed second year of the deal. (Meat imports have not been affected, since the United States does not import beef, pork or poultry from Korea.) In contrast to the administration’s promise, U.S. pork producers saw their exports to Korea crash by $171 million – a 39 percent decline – in the first two years of FTA implementation, in comparison to the year before the FTA took effect. Poultry producers have faced a 35 percent collapse of exports to Korea under the FTA – a $47 million reduction. U.S. beef exports to Korea have remained virtually unchanged under the FTA – the beef export level under the FTA’s second year was less than 1 percent above the level in the year prior to FTA implementation. (And when comparing total U.S. beef exports under the FTA’s first two years in comparison to total amount in the two years before the FTA, U.S. beef exports to Korea have fallen 10 percent.) All told, U.S. meat producers have lost a combined $215 million in beef, pork and poultry exports in just two years of the Korea FTA (from the year before the deal to the recently completed second year of FTA implementation), as indicated in the graph above. Some U.S. beef industry groups allege that the lackluster performance of U.S. beef exports to Korea under the FTA is due to an anomalous spike in exports that occurred in 2011 as Korea’s domestic beef supplies suffered from a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. The U.S. Meat Export Federation suggests that the end of the outbreak spelled a predictable “rebound” of Korea’s domestic beef production, resulting in an understandable downfall of U.S. exports. But the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, the drop in Korea’s domestic supply, and the associated 2011 spike in U.S. beef exports all occurred before the period in 2011 that we are examining. To assess U.S. export performance under the Korea FTA, we take data for the second (most recent) year of FTA implementation – starting with April 2013 – and compare to the corresponding months in the pre-FTA year – starting with April 2011. The U.S. beef export surge associated with Korea’s foot-and-mouth disease outbreak was already subsiding by April 2011, which is when the last case of foot-and-mouth disease was reported. For the remainder of 2011 (the portion that is relevant for comparison to the export performance under the FTA), Korean domestic production was actually higher – not lower – than normal, and U.S. exports were actually lower – not higher – than normal, as indicated in the graph on the following page, making the near-zero growth in U.S. beef exports under the FTA all the more concerning.
According to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) data, the downfall of Korean domestic beef production occurred in February 2011, when Korean slaughter of domestic cattle fell to half the level of February 2010. The corresponding spike in U.S. beef exports to Korea occurred in February and March, soaring to 207 and 263 percent of the levels seen in the corresponding months of 2010, respectively. Korea’s domestic slaughter levels returned to normal in March 2011, and actually rose above the 2010 levels in every remaining month of 2011 except one. In response, U.S. beef exports to Korea in the FTA-relevant portion of 2011 subsided to levels that, far from being anomalously high, were actually lower on average than the export levels of 2010.

The U.S. pork industry similarly blames the post-FTA downfall of U.S. pork exports to Korea on a foot-and-mouth disease-related surge in U.S. pork exports in 2011. But this narrow focus on foot-and-mouth disease ignores the broader growth trajectory of U.S. pork exports, a trajectory that should have continued under the FTA but did not, as shown in the graph below. In the 10 years before the financial crisis-spurred global downfall in exports in 2009, U.S. pork exports grew at an annual rate of 22 percent (using the FTA-relevant 12-month period). Starting from the 2010 level (the first post-crisis year) and applying this pre-crisis growth rate, U.S. pork exports under the FTA in 2013-2014 would be expected to surpass $550 million. Instead, they barely passed $270 million, 52 percent below the level that historical growth would predict. Had the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak not occurred, it is indeed possible that U.S. pork exports to Korea would not have been as high in 2011. But even if this is the case, it cannot explain why U.S. pork exports under the FTA have fallen significantly below the long-term growth trend.
Regarding U.S. poultry exports to Korea, USDA notes that Korean consumption of chicken hit record highs in 2011 as Koreans substituted beef and pork consumption (given the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak) with increased chicken consumption, driving a surge in poultry imports from the United States. Some industry groups may try to use this data to explain away the downfall in U.S. poultry exports to Korea under the FTA, framing the 2011 increase as an anomalous spike and the subsequent reduction since the FTA as an expected result of the end of the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak.

But while Korea’s poultry consumption and importation levels indeed increased in 2011, they increased to an even greater degree in 2010, when foot-and-mouth disease was not a significant factor in the poultry market. According to USDA’s own data, Korean poultry consumption rose 11 percent in 2010 compared to 8 percent in 2011, while Korea’s poultry imports from the United States climbed 86 percent in 2010 compared to 58 percent in 2011. As such, the 2011 increase in U.S. poultry exports to Korea, far from being an anomalous disease-related spike, seems to fit a larger growth trend. Indeed, USDA notes that the increase in Korea’s poultry imports in 2010 and 2011 has been “attributed to the growing number of chicken franchise chains since 2 to 3 years ago and the various chicken menu options for the young generation.” Such growth in demand for chicken would be expected to continue during the FTA period – indeed, USDA estimates that per capita chicken consumption in Korea rose in 2012 and again in 2013. Koreans have been eating more chicken, just not U.S. chicken. Such sustained growth in Korean poultry consumption indicates that the growth in U.S. poultry exports in 2011 cannot be simply dismissed as an anomaly and provides further reason to be disappointed in the dramatic drop in U.S. poultry exports to Korea since the FTA took effect.

**Food Safety Jeopardized**

Current U.S. food trade trends also pose serious risks to food safety, as our current trade agreements both increase imports and set limits on the safety standards and inspection rates for imported foods. WTO and NAFTA required the United States to replace its long-standing requirement that only meat and poultry meeting U.S. safety standards could be imported. Under this standard, only meat from plants specifically approved by USDA inspectors could be imported. But WTO and NAFTA – and the FTAs that followed – required the United States to accept meat and poultry from all facilities in a trade partner country if that country’s system was found to be “equivalent,” even if core aspects of U.S. food safety requirements, such as continuous inspection or the use of government (not company-paid) inspectors, were not met. USDA has found 49 nations’ meat and/or poultry safety systems to be equivalent. Equivalence determinations have allowed U.S. meat imports to persist even after infrequent USDA spot checks of a sample of a country’s processing plants have found major health threats.

The threat that WTO and FTA rules pose to domestic food safety standards is not hypothetical. For instance, China used the WTO to challenge a U.S. prohibition on imports of chicken from China. As required by the WTO and requested by China, USDA had initiated an equivalence determination on cooked chicken from China and was moving toward allowing its importation. Alarmed by the recent avian flu epidemic in China and the concerning findings of USDA’s on-site inspections of sanitary conditions at Chinese chicken processing facilities, Congress intervened and cut off funding for the equivalence determination. A 2010 WTO ruling declared that the U.S. ban violated China’s WTO rights. The Obama administration launched a successful campaign to pressure Congress to lift the funding ban, warning that failure to do so would result in WTO-authorized trade sanctions against the United States. In August 2013, USDA declared China’s system for processed poultry to be “equivalent,” opening the door to more U.S. imports and less U.S. vetting of processed chicken from China.
Even without the safety-eroding meat equivalence rule, the WTO and NAFTA-enabled flood of imports has jeopardized public health by overwhelming the ability of limited U.S. inspectors to ensure the safety of the food supply. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only physically inspects 1.8 percent of the food imports that it regulates (vegetables, fruit, seafood, grains, dairy, and animal feed) at the border.\(^3\) Imported seafood rates are even lower, with the FDA checking only 0.1 percent of imported seafood for drug residues.\(^6\) Only 8.5 percent of beef, pork, and chicken is physically inspected at the border by the USDA.\(^3\) Incidence of food borne illnesses such as *salmonella* and *vibrio* in the United States have increased since the WTO and NAFTA went into effect, despite repeated reforms to improve domestic safety standards.\(^3\) Among the most notorious NAFTA-related food borne illness outbreaks was the sickening of Michigan schoolchildren and teachers in 1997. A severe hepatitis-A outbreak related to strawberries imported from Mexico resulted in 163 children and teachers becoming ill, several seriously.\(^3\)

**The TPP: Gateway for Contaminated Fish?**

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping NAFTA-style deal now under secretive negotiation between the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim countries, could expand the WTO and NAFTA limits on what safety and inspection standards each country may require for imported foods. The TPP would not only extend the requirement that the United States accept imports of meat and other foods that do not meet domestic standards if the exporting country claims that their safety regime is “equivalent,” but also would allow foreign food industry firms to directly challenge U.S. safety standards at foreign tribunals, claiming that U.S. policies undermine new investor privileges that the TPP would establish.\(^4\)

Concerns about the TPP’s threat to imported food safety are particularly pronounced for seafood, given that the pact’s negotiating countries include major seafood exporters Malaysia and Vietnam. The FDA has found seafood from Vietnam to contain unusually high levels of drug residues and other contamination.\(^4\) Indeed, the FDA has placed 192 Vietnamese fisheries on a “red list” due to risk of *salmonella* contamination.\(^4\) Imported seafood, even without the TPP, is among the least regulated food imports. In a bipartisan May 2014 letter to U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, Congressmen Walter Jones, Steve Stockman, Rick Crawford and Mike McIntyre expressed concern over seafood safety under the TPP:

> *Vietnam is one of the world’s largest seafood exporters, but the Vietnamese seafood and aquaculture industry has repeatedly skirted international norms and standards. Exports to the United States have frequently contained illegal veterinary medicines, fungicides and other chemicals that pose significant risks to the health of U.S. consumers and Vietnam has refused to ensure that its exports meet U.S. food safety standards...No trade accord with Vietnam should come at the expense of American consumers or their businesses.* \(^4\)

**ENDNOTES**

Food price information in this paragraph and the accompanying graph comes from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “FAO Food Price Index,” May 6, 2014. Available at: http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/. Analysis of all available years of food price index data (from 1990 through 2013) shows that the median food price index occurred in 2004. In the graph, the food price index, export volumes and export values have been indexed to the 2004 level (which is equated to zero) such that the level in any given year can be read as the percentage above or below the 2004 level.


Average U.S. food imports over the last five years, measured by volume, were 65 percent above the average level in the five years after NAFTA, while average U.S. food exports were just 19 percent higher. These figures reflect the volume and inflation-adjusted value of U.S. food exports, defined as the following USDA Foreign Agricultural Service aggregations: dairy products, fruits & preparations, grains & feeds, livestock & meats, oilseeds & products, other horticultural products, planting seeds, poultry & products, sugar & tropical products, tree nuts & preparations, and vegetables & preparations. Foreign Agricultural Service, “Global Agricultural Trade System,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, accessed June 9, 2014. Available at: http://www.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx.


For this paragraph and the preceding two paragraphs, beef is defined as SITC 011; pork is defined as SITC 0122, 0161, and 0175; and poultry is defined as SITC 0123 and 0174. All beef, pork, and poultry export data, unless otherwise noted, reflects an inflation-adjusted comparison of the second year of Korea FTA implementation (April 2013 through March 2014) to the year before FTA implementation (April 2011 through March 2012). U.S. International Trade Commission, “Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb,” accessed May 6, 2014. Available at: http://dataweb.usitc.gov/.
Safety Requirements, 32 C.F.R. § 590.910 (States, 9 C.F.R. § 381.196 (the United States, 9 C.F.R. § 327.2 (from cows, swine, goats, sheep, or horses; poultry; or eggs.


U.S. beef exports in April 2011 remained 62 percent above the April 2010 level as they continued to subside from the February-March spike. From May through October (the period in which foot-and-mouth disease was not occurring in either 2010 or 2011), average monthly U.S. beef exports in 2011 were 10 percent lower than in 2010. Beef is defined as SITC 011 and is presented as inflation-adjusted values. U.S. International Trade Commission, “Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb,” accessed Apr. 16, 2013. Available at: http://dataweb.usitc.gov/.

The growth rate is determined using the compound annual growth rate method. “FTA relevant period” refers to the 12-month period that is comparable to the first year of FTA implementation: April of one year through March of the following year.


U.S. Meat Exports to Korea Decline Year-On-Year, Due To One-Off Factors,” Inside U.S. Trade, Jan. 24, 2013.

The growth rate is determined using the compound annual growth rate method. “FTA relevant period” refers to the 12-month period that is comparable to the first year of FTA implementation: April of one year through March of the following year.


USDA has deemed each of the 49 nations to have equivalent food safety systems for at least one of these products: meat from cows, swine, goats, sheep, or horses; poultry or eggs. See Eligibility of foreign countries for importation of products into the United States, 9 C.F.R. § 327.2 (2014); Eligibility of foreign countries for importation of poultry products into the United States, 9 C.F.R. § 381.196 (2014); Eligibility of foreign countries for importation of egg products into the United States, 9 C.F.R. § 590.910 (2014).

See Mary Bottari and Winifred DePalma, “The WTO Comes to Dinner: U.S. Implementation of Trade Rules Bypasses Food Safety Requirements,” Public Citizen report, July 2003. Available at:


