ISO-NE: The Most Powerful and Unaccountable Utility in New England

Five Needed Reforms To Protect Consumers & Decarbonize The Grid

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September 8, 2023
FERC Authorized The Creation of ISO-NE To Reduce Federal Oversight

In The Span of 12 Months in 1999-2000, Congress & FERC Pushed Sweeping Deregulation of the Economy

• In December 1999, FERC Order 2000 encouraged the creation of ISOs/RTOs to “facilitate lighter handed regulation” and “reduce the need for Commission oversight and scrutiny.”
  • One month before Order 2000, Congress repealed New Deal era regulatory oversight of the financial system by votes of 90-8 in the U.S. Senate and 362-57 in the House.
  • Twelve months later, Congress gutted regulations over energy and other commodity markets at the behest of Enron, burying the Commodity Futures Modernization Act into a lame duck appropriations bill.

While the consensus among experts have since recognized that deregulating banking, insurance and commodities directly led to the 2008 financial crash and was a mistake, there has been no such reassessment of energy deregulation.
New England’s utilities agreed to turn over the management of their transmission lines to ISO-NE which, in turn, outsourced its policy-making and market-tweaking process to another private group, the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL). The utilities retain their ownership (and profits) from the transmission lines, ISO-NE simply controls the movement of electricity across those lines.

NEPOOL administers the stakeholder process where lobbyists representing the various market interests—power plants, transmission lines, Wall Street energy traders, end-users—meet to develop, deliberate and vote upon proposed market rule changes to send to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for approval, effectively establishing policy for the region.

Both the public and non-member journalists are banned from attending NEPOOL meetings where electricity market rule changes are developed and sent to FERC for approval.

Under the influence of incumbent fossil fuel and nuclear generators, transmission owners and Wall Street traders, the New England power system is less a market than a constantly changing, overly-complex administrative scheme designed to financially assist those entities that can afford a seat at the table.
If You’re Not At The Table, You’re On The Menu

NEPOOL’S VERSION OF DEMOCRACY: WEIGHTED SECTOR VOTING—DILUTES THE VOICE OF END-USERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

- End-Use/Public Interest 16.7%
- Power Plant Owners 16.7%
- Municipal 16.7%
- Transmission 16.7%
- Renewable/Demand Response 16.7%
- Wall Street/Oil Company Traders 16.7%
The World’s Biggest Oil Companies, Wall Street Banks & Financial Commodity Traders All Have Prominent Voting Rights To Decide on New England’s Energy Future

Companies With Voting Rights Over New England’s Future Include:

Oil giants BP & Shell.


Global commodity traders Mercuria, Trafigura & Vitol.

Hedge fund Castleton Commodities.
In April 2023, NEPOOL and ISO-NE jointly asked FERC to give between $274-$812 million over 2 years to fossil fuel power plants (docket ER23-1588). FERC approved in August 2023.

April 7, 2023

VIA ELECTRONIC FILING

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose
Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20426

Re: Revisions to ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff to Update the Inventoried Energy Program, Docket No. ER23-_____000

Dear Secretary Bose:

Pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), ISO New England Inc. (the “ISO”), joined by the New England Power Pool (“NEPOOL”) Participants Committee (together, the “Filing Parties”), hereby submits revisions to the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (“Tariff”). As more fully described in Sections III and IV of this transmittal letter, the proposed Tariff revisions amend Appendix K to Market Rule 1 of the Tariff to update certain parameters within the Inventoried Energy Program (“IEP Updates”). The IEP Updates are supported by testimony of Mr. Craig...
V. STAKEHOLDER PROCESS

The IEP Updates were considered through the complete NEPOOL Participant Processes and supported by the Participants Committee. At various meetings in late 2022 and early 2023, the NEPOOL Markets Committee considered the IEP Updates. The Markets Committee reviewed and provided input at its meetings on October 12, 2022, November 9, 2022, December 7, 2022, and January 12, 2023. At its February 8, 2023 meeting, the Markets Committee considered a Participant-sponsored amendment to the ISO’s proposal, which was not supported. NEPOOL has indicated that it will file supplemental comments describing the amendment and the voting outcome.

The individual Sector votes the Markets Committee meeting were as follows: Generation Sector (16.7% in favor, 0% opposed, 2 abstention); Transmission Sector (16.7% in favor, 0% opposed, 0 abstentions); Supplier Sector (15.03% in favor, 1.67% opposed, 4 abstentions); Publicly Owned Entity Sector (16.7% in favor, 0% opposed, 25 abstentions); Alternative Resources Sector (16.5% in favor, 0% opposed, 2 abstentions); and End User Sector (0% in favor, 16.7% opposed, 1 abstention).

The following Participants opposed: Brookfield Renewable Trading & Marketing; Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel; Harvard Dedicated Energy Limited; Maine Public Advocate Office; Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office; New Hampshire Office of Consumer Advocate; PowerOptions, Inc.; and

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67 IEP Order at PP 32, 57-58.
68 Id.
69 NEPOOL has indicated that it will file supplemental comments describing the amendment and the voting outcome.
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71 The following Participants opposed: Brookfield Renewable Trading & Marketing; Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel; Harvard Dedicated Energy Limited; Maine Public Advocate Office; Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office; New Hampshire Office of Consumer Advocate; PowerOptions, Inc.; and
NEPOOL’s 2023 Budget is $7.2 million—with $4.35 million of that paid to corporate law firm Day Pitney.

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Certain current and former NEPOOL officers that played a role in supporting efforts to ban journalists from becoming NEPOOL participants earn outside income selling “intelligence” about NEPOOL proceedings, creating financial conflicts of interest.

For example, NEPOOL’s lone expert witness, Robert Stein, states in his testimony:

*Over the more than 20 years that I have been an independent consultant I have advised numerous clients on New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) developments and represented their interests at NEPOOL meetings. I supply them with a confidential compilation of information from those stakeholder meetings tailored to their individual business interests, giving them confidential analyses of issues of interest and insight on how their business interests could be affected by proposals by ISO New England Inc. (ISO-NE) and other stakeholders. I also discuss issues of importance as they arise and counsel clients on ways to address specific issues.*

Mr. Stein admits that his business for the last 20 years has been, in part, selling “confidential” access to information from “stakeholder meetings” to “counsel clients on ways to address specific issues” that arise from the NEPOOL debates. Despite serving as an expert witness to promote ensuring that a free press cannot cover NEPOOL meetings, Mr. Stein fails to disclose his current list of clients in NEPOOL.
In August 2018 NEPOOL Voted to Ban Journalists From Becoming Members (Docket ER18-2208)

In January 2019 FERC stopped NEPOOL from banning journalists from membership, but punted on whether NEPOOL could block the public from attending its meetings to a separate Docket, EL18-196.

“NEPOOL rules prohibiting press and public attendance at NEPOOL meetings do not directly affect” just and reasonable rates, and therefore the Commission lacks jurisdiction to order NEPOOL to open its deliberations to the public. “NEPOOL’s policies prohibiting press and public attendance at and reporting on NEPOOL stakeholder meetings are further removed from jurisdictional rates than the board selection practices at issue in CAISO” and so FERC dismissed challenges to allow the public and journalists to attend. (RTO Insider LLC v. New England Power Pool Participants Committee, Docket No. EL18-196, Issued April 10, 2019, at 48 and 50)
In April 2019 FERC Ruled That It Cannot Prevent NEPOOL From Banning Public Participation

Request for Rehearing of Public Citizen • May 10, 2019 • Docket No. EL18-196-

1. The Commission erected a false distinction between the impact on rates of RTO stakeholder membership rules and RTO procedures barring non-members such as the general public and journalists. The Commission determined that while membership rules impact rates because it determines who is eligible to vote, it claims that press or public attendance at meetings does not impact votes and, therefore, cannot impact rates. But according to NEPOOL’s own expert witness, allowing non-members such as the general public and journalists to simply witness and publicly report on NEPOOL’s deliberations of electric rates would alter NEPOOL member behavior. Any variable impacting voting member’s behavior in deliberations of or votes upon proposed electric rates impacts rates. Therefore, FERC has clear regulatory authority over any rules prohibiting non-members from witnessing and reporting on RTO stakeholder proceedings.

2. FERC’s assumption that attendance of NEPOOL meetings by non-members of the general public would be passive is incorrect, and undervalues the contributions non-member attendance would have on rates. Other RTOs such as PJM allow non-members of the public to actively participate in stakeholder meetings, including granting non-member individuals the right to speak and ask questions. Active participation by non-members of the general public during the stakeholder process could alter outcomes of the debate and voting, and therefore allowing the general public would impact rates.

3. Banning the public from the NEPOOL stakeholder process impacts rates because it denies the public equal access to important, non-public details about the development of NEPOOL’s rate filings, placing non-members at a distinct disadvantage relative to members when it comes time to intervene and participate in the relevant FERC proceeding.

The Commission reveals in its April 10 Order that it believes it has created RTO stakeholder Frankenstein: entities that it administratively fashioned, bestowing with numerous, important electric-rate making and influencing authorities, but which the Commission now concludes are somehow beyond its regulatory reach. FERC assigned sweeping authorities to the private RTOs and their stakeholder processes as the central component of the Commission’s effort to ensure its market-based rate experiment would result in just and reasonable rates. For the Commission now to claim that it cannot regulate the very organizations it created could serve as a cautionary epilogue to Mary Shelley’s seminal novel: FERC no longer contains the Frankenstein it made. Such a position has dire consequences not just for household consumers, but for the future of just and reasonable rates within FERC’s RTO experiment.
ISO-NE, NEPOOL & FERC Actions Attack Renewables & Raise Prices By Hundreds of Millions of Dollars

- Competitive Auctions With Sponsored Policy Resources (CASPR) – ISO-NE successfully pushed this radical capacity market overhaul in 2018, claiming that New England states were so successful in requiring new renewable deployment that the clean energy mandates were making renewables too inexpensive and were unfairly lowering energy prices—and so CASPR forced renewables to bid at artificially high prices to allow more expensive natural gas and nuclear units to clear the auction.
- ISO-NE pushed for “winter security” subsidies to justify bigger payments to natural gas power plant owners.
- ISO-NE botched the 2019 capacity auction by preventing Vineyard Wind’s offshore resources from bidding. As an offshore, federal-jurisdictional wind farm, it was ineligible to qualify as a Renewable Technology Resource to submit an offer below the new CASPR MOPR. But FERC qualified RTRs to bid 6 days before the auction. But ISO-NE rules stipulate you must have qualified long before 6 days. But FERC refuses to grant the waiver necessary for you to compete. The failure to include Vineyard’s cheap offshore wind resources increased the cost to ratepayers $270 million.
Statement of
Commissioner Cheryl A. LaFleur and Commissioner Richard Glick

Date: February 4, 2019

We are disappointed that the Commission failed to act on Vineyard Wind LLC’s requests for a waiver and emergency motion in advance of ISO-New England’s forward capacity auction. We recognize that the Commission can move forward only when it has a majority of votes for a particular action. Nevertheless, by failing to act, the Commission has introduced significant uncertainty into this auction. All parties, including New England’s states, consumers, and
In March 2018, FERC voted 3-2 to approve New England’s controversial CASPR plan.

NEPOOL stakeholders pushed the plan claiming that renewable energy is unfairly subsidized and is making electricity too cheap in New England for natural gas and nuclear power plants to compete. So CASPR forces renewables to submit higher auction bids, allowing fossil fuel and nuclear power plants to clear the auction and get paid.

It turns out that markets are not incentivizing all these renewable energy capacity additions—government policy is. This makes the entities controlling the markets upset.

FERC’s reliance on ill-defined investor confidence established a new universal income plan for uneconomic power generators.
5. Use of a Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) was originally intended “to prevent the exercise of buyer-side market power.” [Commissioner Glick dissent, at page 1]. Contorting application of a MOPR to force inexpensive renewable energy capacity to submit higher-priced bids is not just and reasonable. There has been no clear, evidentiary hearing-based finding in this docket demonstrating that a) renewable energy capacity deployed as part of state mandates are unfairly subsidized; b) lower capacity prices resulting from low-priced, technologically advanced renewable energy in any way harms system reliability, or threatens rates to become unjust and unreasonable; or c) renewable energy capacity deployed as the result of state policies constitutes some sort of buyer-side market power requiring a MOPR.

6. We must remember that entire premise of electricity restructuring was that harnessing the power of the “markets” would deliver efficiencies that would result in lower prices to consumers. That was the explicit political promise made to consumers. It is inconceivable that now the Commission appears to take the position that economic efficiencies of some new power generation technologies deliver prices that are too low, and artificial markets must be created to increase wholesale prices, in order to be fair to inefficient, competing resources. But that is not just and reasonable. And the Commission has failed to provide evidence that the state policies encouraging the widespread deployment of inexpensive renewable energy has resulted in that new capacity being artificially subsidized.

7. The Commission’s Order fails to define the term “investor confidence,” a key variable upon which the Commission relies to justify the approval of ISO-NE’s capacity market re-write.
FERC approves ISO-NE plan to end MOPR in 2025 while accepting some renewables in capacity auctions
ISO-NE has proposed a "winter reliability" rate design that would require New England ratepayers to pay $148 million a year to certain coal, natural gas, oil and nuclear power plant owners that provide on-site fuel storage during three winter months. This absurd proposal was roundly rejected by stakeholders in ISO-NE, as the ill-conceived plan provides as much empirical evidence that it will improve reliability as exists to prove the Easter Bunny is real. Absent an evidentiary hearing where such facts could be procured, FERC must reject the proposal as unjust and unreasonable. New Englanders already pay the highest electric rates in the contiguous lower-48 states, and simply cannot afford yet another ISO-NE "market" design that amounts to: “let’s throw a whole lot more money at certain generators and see if that works.”
ISO-NE Has Compliance Problems

- On September 30, 2022, FERC forced ISO-NE to pay a $500,000 penalty for falsifying information and blocking access for the independent market monitor that allowed the 675 MW fossil fuel fired Salam Harbor power plant to improperly nab $100 million in capacity payments (Docket No. IN18-8).
New England Ratepayers Pay For ISO-NE’s Extravagant Spending

- ISO-NE charges ratepayers across New England \textbf{$200\text{ million a year}$} to fund its operations.
- Gordon van Welie’s \textbf{2020 financial compensation ($2.5 million)}—paid by New England ratepayers—exceeded the combined salaries of all six New England Governors ($1 million).
- ISO-NE has \textbf{troubling conflict of interests}:
  - ISO-NE ratepayers paid $562,000/year for “software consulting” to GRT Inc, which is owned in part by Victor Litvinov, who was closely related to then-ISO-NE Chief Technologist Eugene Litvinov.
  - ISO-NE’s general counsel Maria Gulluni (paid $910,000/year) is directly related to ISO-NE’s Principal Data Architect Ralph Slate (paid $175k/year).
  - Catherine Simonelli, paid $150k/year, is related to long-time ISO-NE executive John Simonelli.
- ISO-NE’s \textbf{640 employees} are paid by ratepayers an average annual compensation of $183,000.
- The board of directors are paid as much as \textbf{$150,000/year} to work 10 hours a week. The 10-member board features one person of color, and no one who is directly accountable to New England ratepayers or dedicated to climate action.
ISO-NE Lobbyists Paid By Ratepayers

• DC lobbying firm Owen Evans Ingols $120,000/year to lobby Congress, with a senior George W. Bush White House official (Adam Ingols) on ISO-NE’s retainer.

• Connecticut: ISO-NE spent $250,000 lobbying in 2021-22, paying Craig Leroy & Dallas Dodge of Roy & Leroy Government Relations $60,000/year to influence state government.

• Massachusetts: Paid the corporate lobbying firm Karol Group Inc $45,000 in 2022.

• New Hampshire: retains Jodi E. Grimbilas & Adam J. Schmidt of J Grimbilas Strategic Solutions LLC.

• Vermont: Patricia Komline & Gabrielle Malina of Downs Rachlin Martin are on retainer.

• ISO-NE reports no active lobbying in Maine or Rhode Island.
Reforms Needed To Protect Consumers & The Climate

1. Petition FERC for a Notice of Inquiry into Order 719, which was the 2008 order establishing bare-bones governance requirements for ISOs. A revamped Order 719 could require ISO-NE to:
   • All meetings open to free public participation.
   • Establish a board of directors for both NEPOOL and ISO-NE that are directly accountable to the people of New England.
   • Subject both ISO-NE and NEPOOL to the federal Freedom of Information Act.
   • Adjust weighted sector voting ratios to more realistically reflect true stakeholder involvement in energy markets. End users, environmental justice and climate advocates should encompass half of the voting shares.
   • Limit excessive ISO executive pay.


3. Coordinate sign-on letters of mayors/city councils; state elected representatives; and members of Congress demanding that ISO-NE and NEPOOL open all meetings to free public attendance, with opportunities for public comment at all meetings.
Urge FERC To Conduct a Notice of Inquiry of Order 719

• FERC hasn’t examined RTO governance and responsiveness to customers since the 2008 Order.

• The intent of Order 719 was “to improve the operation of organized wholesale electric markets in the areas of . . . the responsiveness of RTOs to their customers and other stakeholders, and ultimately to the consumers who benefit from and pay for electricity services.”

• Public Citizen believes governance, transparency and public access standards should be uniform across all RTOs.

• A Notice of Inquiry is an opportunity to revisit RTO governance and public participation requirements.
“the Commission will require that RTOs and ISOs continue over time to consider customer and other stakeholder needs as the architecture or market environment of the RTO or ISO changes. This criterion is necessary to ensure that responsiveness continues into the future.” Order 719, At 509.

"we find that RTOs and ISOs must provide an avenue for customers and other stakeholders to present their views on RTO and ISO decision-making, and to have those views considered.” Order 719, At 503.
ISO-NE Must Improve Public Data Transparency

Ari Peskoe
@AriPeskoe

Why doesn't ISO-NE disclose which power plants failed to perform? ISO-NE says non-disclosure "ensures market participants provide the ISO with accurate and timely information regarding their resources without concern the information will be shared with their competitors."

John Raymond Hanger @johnrhanger · Jan 9

Penalties totaling $39 million will be assessed by ISO-NE to power plants with total capacity of 2,150 MWs for not operating on December 24th. Plants had a duty to operate in return for capacity payments. They also lost revenues by not running. providencejournal.com/story/news/202... via @projo

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