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Introduction
    Although defendant American Airlines ("AA") has made a number of legal argu ments in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, it is first important to note an extremely significant omission from AA's response. AA has made a deliberate decision not to submit any Statement of Genuine Issues pursuant to Rule 108(h), contesting the validity of Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts ("PSMF"). Accordingly, every one of the facts stated in PSMF must be deemed true, Twist v. Meese, 854 F.2d 1421, 1424-1425 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Tarpley v. Greene, 684 F.2d 1, 6-7 and n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and summary judgment should be granted if, on those facts, plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    Thus, it is now established for summary judgment purposes that operations areas at many airports consist mainly of nonwork areas, PSMF 11-15, that AA allows a wealth of communications in operations areas unrelated to the union, PSMF 16-31, while dis criminatorily forbidding union-related expression of plaintiffs and other employees, PSMF 32-49, 52-74, that disruptive communications unrelated to the union were routinely al lowed in operations areas while non-disruptive communications about union matters were forbidden, PSMF 74, that pro-CBA speakers were allowed to campaign while anti-CBA campaigners were being excluded, PSMF 69, 88, and that there is no admissible evidence showing either a threat to safety, or indeed disruption, from allowing union-related com munications. PSMF 40, 44, 47, 53, 75-80, 84, 89. Given these undisputed facts, the re maining legal questions are whether the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") permits AA's conduct and, if not, whether the Court is powerless to provide plaintiffs the relief they seek.
    AA makes three basic arguments in opposition to summary judgment ("AA SJ Opp."), to which this memorandum responds. Part A, infra at pages 2 to 9, rebuts AA's argument that the Court does not have jurisdiction, either because the only remedy is the grievance procedure, or because plaintiffs lack standing to sue. Part B, infra 9 to 14, shows that the RLA forbids discrimination, interference, and coercion even if, as we assume for the purpose of our motion for summary judgment, AA was not motivated by anti-union animus. Finally, at 14-18, we address miscellaneous evidentiary points made by AA in its memorandum.

A.    The Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

     1.    The Plaintiffs' Claims Need Not Be Resolved by the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure.

    AA argues that, because a union has been certified to represent them in collective bargaining, plaintiffs cannot pursue their statutory claims in this Court, but rather may pursue them only through the grievance procedure. To the extent that AA rests on TWA v. IFFA, 489 U.S. 426 (1989), and ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988), its argument has been thoroughly rebutted by Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to AA's Motion for Summary Judgment ("P SJ Opp."). There we showed both that it is only in self-help cases (where the parties have been released from mediation and union has begun a strike or the employer has locked out the employees) that the Court required "super-animus" (that is, conduct seeking to destroy the union or evade the collective bar gaining process) P SJ Opp. 13-20, and that, under Eastern, the merits of a statutory claim may be decided in court even though there is an arbitrable claim under the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). Id. 20-23, 28-30.
    AA contends that several of the cases that plaintiffs cited as allowing post-certi fication suits under section 2, Third and Fourth ("Third/Fourth"), were ones in which the grievance procedure was unavailable, either because the employees were probationary, or because there was a question of the fairness of union representation in the grievance procedure. AA SJ Opp. 3. As made clear in P SJ Opp., plaintiffs do question the ade quacy of the grievance procedure as one basis for jurisdiction here; but the more important point is that AA's distinctions will not wash and that its cases do not support its argument. In Conrad v. Delta Airlines, 494 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1974), the employee could not grieve the alleged lack of just cause for his dismissal because he was probationary, but the court seemed to assume that alleged dismissal for union activity was grievable. In requiring a hearing on the statutory discrimination claim, the court not only did not question the fairness of the union's representation, but explicitly held that the union did not violate its duty of fair representation. And in Fennessy v. Southwest Airlines, 91 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 1996), the court did not say (or even hint) that the union improperly represented the discharged employee. The union did represent him in a grievance alleging discharge without just cause, but the court held that it is unnecessary to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims because adjustment boards do not have jurisdiction of such claims. Moreover, as in those cases, plaintiffs here sought to communicate dissident messages (even though one plaintiff sits on the union's board), and one of their arguments is that their right to attack union leaders and their decisions should not depend on the union's representation of their interests regarding those rights in the grievance process.
    AA also argues that this case may only be decided in arbitration because the RLA "mandates the use of the adjustment board procedure for the resolution of 'minor dis putes,'" AA SJ Opp. 8, in contradistinction to the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") under which "arbitration of disputes is neither mandatory or exclusive." Id. 9. The first problem with this argument is that it is inapposite to the facts of this case: this is not a minor dispute. Here, plaintiffs rely solely on their statutory rights, not at all on any contractual rights. In characterizing what plaintiffs are supposed to arbitrate, AA consistently refers to "these issues" and to "the underlying dispute," id. 1, 4, and omits any reference to plaintiffs' statutory claims which are not cognizable by the grievance procedure. P SJ Opp. 29-30. This fundamental distinction between minor disputes and statutory claims was the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994); accord, Felter v. Southern Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326, 327 n.3 (1959) (because case did not involve "interpretation or application of the collective agreement, but rather only . . . its validity under the statute, the case is not one in which resort to the grievance and Adjustment Board machinery . . . was required"); ALPA v. Northwest Airlines, 627 F.2d 272, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[RLA]'s arbitral provisions do not demand that such pure statutory, noncontractual claims be sent to arbitration. . . . It is doubtful that a [RLA] arbitrator has any authority to consider such independent statutory claims"). In addition, Hawaiian Airlines rejected the proposition that the RLA's express requirement of arbitration gives the RLA greater force than the NLRA in subjecting otherwise independent statutory claims to arbitration. 114 S. Ct. at 2249 n.9. After all, arbitration is very strongly encouraged by the NLRA as well. See 29 U.S.C. § 173(d); Steelworkers Trilogy, 363 U.S. 564, 574, 593 (1960).

     2.    Plaintiffs Have Standing to Sue.
    AA contends, SJ Opp. 9-13, that plaintiffs lack standing to sue in this case, either about the rules applicable to pilots generally, and even about AA actions against them per sonally, on the theory that the certification of the APA as their collective bargaining representative allegedly transferred to the APA all of their statutory rights under the RLA. Although AA voiced no objection when the Court urged it to attempt to negotiate with plaintiffs during the mediation at the courthouse under the Court's supervision, AA now contends that it cannot even talk to plaintiffs' counsel about the disposition of this litigation, because that would offend the RLA. As we now explain, however, plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims in this case, and AA's arguments lack merit.
    Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims for two separate reasons. First, they have attested that they desire to communicate about union affairs in operations by posting, leaving and personally handing out leaflets, as well as by speaking to their fellow pilots, Verified Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 11, 17; Cutter Second Affidavit, ¶ 2; Hunnibell Second Affidavit, ¶ 5; Held First Affidavit, ¶¶ 7, 9, 11, and AA has admitted that it has barred each of the plaintiffs (among 9000 other pilots) from engaging in that activity. PSMF ¶ 79. Because plaintiffs travel from airport to airport in the course of their jobs, and are otherwise entitled to enter American's operations areas when off-duty, they have standing to complain about the enforcement of AA's ban on union-related communication in every airport in AA's system, if only insofar as the ban operates directly on themselves.
    Second, plaintiffs have averred that they attempted to amplify their own communica tion abilities by disseminating leaflets to other pilots for posting, leaving, and distribution, and they have shown how in-person distribution increases the effectiveness of their written communications. E.g., Cutter First Affidavit, ¶¶ 6-12; Hunnibell First Affidavit, ¶ 9; Hunnibell Second Affidavit, ¶¶ 8-9. Just as, for example, a book publisher may sue to invalidate state laws that prohibit others from selling its books, Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), see also Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (publisher could sue over law denying author compensation for writing its book), plaintiffs have standing to sue over a denial of other employees' rights to receive and redistribute their materials, which both defeats their ability to associate with those members, and makes it harder for them to communicate with the entire employee electorate. See, e.g., Secretary of State v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-959 (1984) (charitable fundraiser may sue to invalidate state law restricting charities); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (doctors could sue over unconstitutional limit on right of patients to be reimbursed by Medicare); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (candidates may sue over violation of rights of voters); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1928) (private school may sue to invalidate state law allowing parents to send children only to public school).
    In this regard, the individual plaintiffs sue to protect their own legal rights. To be sure, if AA is enjoined from continuing to enforce certain rules or practices, the litigation may have the effect of benefiting other AA employees. But that is no different from other kinds of employment-related cases in which individual plaintiffs may sue to invalidate employer rules or practices based, in part, on their effect on all employees. E.g., Connec ticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Craig v. Alabama State University, 804 F.2d 682, 686 (11th Cir. 1986); Lasso v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Co., 741 F.2d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1984).See footnote 1
    AA's objection to plaintiffs' standing rests on the proposition that only a certified union can complain about violations of members' individual statutory rights. If AA's argument is correct, not a single one of the many RLA cases cited in plaintiffs' various summary judgment memoranda, in which members have been permitted to sue over such matters as retaliatory discharge, denial of the right to wear union insignia, or improper diversions of work, was properly decided -- each should have been dismissed on standing grounds. Indeed, employee claims under other federal laws, such as the civil rights laws, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 642 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1980), or state claims such as retaliatory discharge, e.g., Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994), should all have been dismissed for lack of standing.
    Given the inconsistency between its standing defense and settled law concerning the rights of unionized employees to sue to vindicate individual statutory rights, it is not at all surprising that AA has been unable to find a single case that endorses its theory. The only case that AA even identifies as addressing the standing issue, AA SJ Opp. 10, citing Renneissen v. American Airlines, 990 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1993), does not support its argu ment. Those plaintiffs challenged on a variety of statutory grounds a provision in the AA/APA CBA, negotiated ten years earlier, that protected the pay scales of then current pilots by allowing a lower scale (the "B" scale) for new hires. The court did not dismiss for lack of standing. It only held that plaintiffs had no cause of action because it is a union's function to decide what compensation to negotiate for various members, including different pay for different groups; that the two payscales actually represented a bargaining victory ten years before; and that absent a showing that the union had breached its DFR, lower-paid employees could not complain about pay differentials favoring more senior workers. Id. 990 F.2d at 924-925.
    Renneissen actually supports plaintiffs' standing argument here, because, by reach ing the question whether the plaintiffs could state a cause of action, the court implicitly held that a handful of B-scale pilots did have standing to sue, even though they were challenging a rule with union-wide impact. Moreover, unlike the employer practices and rules challenged here, the two separate pay scales were contained in the CBA, and did not relate directly to the exercise of the right to join or assist the organization of the union. Here, AA has directly forbidden members from talking or otherwise communicating about the union, and at most AA can argue that the APA has not negotiated any different rule; nothing it has done has even the implicit consent of the union, not to speak of being contained in the CBA.See footnote 2 Thus, Renneissen provides no support for American on standing or on the merits.

B.    Claims Under RLA Section 2, Third and Fourth, Do Not Necessarily Depend on the Existence of Anti-Union Animus.

    AA also argues, SJ Opp. 5, based on a dictum in ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988), that no claim can be brought based on Third/Fourth without a showing that the employer's action was motivated by anti-union animus. The argument is misplaced. In Eastern, plaintiff unions brought suit to block a furlough of pilots serving certain routes which Eastern was abandoning. After rejecting the lower court's reason for ruling in part for the plaintiffs, the court considered as an alternate ground for affirmance the district court's apparent finding that the furloughs had been motivated by anti-union animus. In the course of rejecting that finding, the court had to decide the proper standard to apply to decide the employer's motive, and it was in the course of adopting the Board's Wright Line "but-for" standard that the Court used the language from which AA draws so much solace here: RLA "rights to unionize are adequately protected so long as management is limited to taking only measures that it would have taken in the absence of any anti-union animus." 863 F.2d at 902. But the Court was not considering theories of violation that did not involve animus, as this case does, and so this language does not bar cases, such as this one, that involve flat bans on union-related communication in the workplace.See footnote 3
    Moreover, a number of courts have awarded relief on RLA claims analogous to un fair labor practice charges that would be resolved under NLRA section 8(a)(1), on the principles of Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), without any need for a showing of anti-union animus. See, e.g., Scott v. American Airlines, 488 F. Supp. 415, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Adams v. Federal Express, 470 F. Supp. 1356, 1363 (W.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1981). Indeed, dictum in Adams applies the Republic Aviation principle on solicitation during working hours to the RLA. 470 F. Supp. at 1368.
    AA argues, SJ Opp. 7, that this analogy is not apt because section 8(a)(1) is not in fact analogous to RLA Third/Fourth. But its reasoning in this regard is deeply flawed. As plaintiffs have previously explained, the cases rejecting analogies between Third/ Fourth and section 8(a)(1) did so where the RLA claim was based on the "other concerted activities" language of NLRA section 7. P SJ Opp. 8. Here, plaintiffs seek to protect their right to engage in union-related activity -- which is expressly protected by Third/ Fourth -- and they rely on an analogy between the NLRA and RLA provisions' protection against employer "interference" with such activity.
    Although AA argues that the courts have also rejected analogies between Third/ Fourth and "the NLRA's protection of specific forms of union-related activity," SJ Opp. at 7, citing Johnson v. Express One Int'l, 944 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1991) and Pacific Fruit Express v. Union Pacific, 826 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1987), its citations do not support this proposition. Express One did not involve union-related activity at all -- the plaintiff there urged the court to apply by analogy an NLRB decision applying the Board's Weingarten doctrine to representation by non-union representatives. The court refused to do so because this extension depended on the "other concerted activity" language in the NLRA case. Even so, the court stated that RLA and NLRA are generally congruent, and that, therefore, for the most part NLRA analogies about union-related activity would be used in construing the RLA. 944 F.2d at 251. Pacific Fruit did not involve a claim under Third/Fourth at all -- plaintiff there claimed under RLA section 2, First, which was said to be analogous to NLRA sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d), and LMRA section 204(a)(1).
    AA also suggests that courts do not allow "per se" theories under the RLA. AA SJ Opp. 5, citing Machinists v. Alaska Airlines, 813 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir. 1987). Although the plaintiffs in Alaska Airlines apparently characterized their claims about the use of scabs during a strike, and the job rights they were given vis-a-vis returning strikers, as stating a "per se" violation of the RLA, the court made no mention of the "per se" nature of the claims in determining their validity. The court simply applied a standard similar to TWA v. IFFA, 489 U.S. 426 (1989), in this case which, like TWA v. IFFA, involved employer action during the self-help phase.
    One of the two claims advanced in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment -- that, by analogy to the NLRA's rule against interference with union activity, AA may not restrict union-related in-person communication in nonwork areas and nonwork times -- is a "per se" claim in the sense that it requires neither a showing of discrimination nor a showing of anti-union motive. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law 132-133 (1976); see also Cooper Thermometer, 154 NLRB 502 n.2 (1965). Nonetheless, AA was entitled to prove that it had legitimate business reasons for prohibiting such communication. Whether out of hubris or because it recognizes that its references to business justifications will not stand up to scrutiny, AA has deliberately chosen not to present admissible evidence to sup port such a defense. Summary judgment should therefore be granted for plaintiffs on this theory.
    AA's final argument against drawing analogies to the NLRA is that the Supreme Court did not, in Republic Aviation, actually construe the NLRA to create a presumption in favor of allowing union-related communication in nonwork areas of the workplace. Rather, according to AA's argument, Republic Aviation merely allowed the NLRB, in the exercise of its expertise, to apply the NLRA in that manner. AA concludes that, because there is no comparably expert body to construe the RLA, there is no basis for applying Republic Aviation principles in the RLA context. Instead, the development of protections for union activity should be left to negotiation and adjudication by the adjustment boards. AA SJ Opp. at 7-8.
    There are several difficulties with this argument as well. First, insofar as AA's argument would leave the plaintiffs at the mercy of the adjustment boards, we have already demonstrated that these boards have no authority over statutory claims -- they exist only to resolve "grievances" which involve claims under negotiated agreements. Thus, AA's alternate remedy amounts to none at all.
    Second, although the Supreme Court in Republic Aviation emphasized the expertise of the NLRB and approved adoption of the presumption allowing solicitation during non- work time, the basic Republic Aviation rule governing employee communication in nonwork areas and times has been repeated by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts without this qualification. E.g., Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). Thus, it has become a standing principle of the federal common law of labor relations that "the place of work is a place uniquely appropriate for dissemination of views concerning the bargaining representative and the various options open to employees, [s]o long as the distribution is by employees to employees and so long as the in-plant solicitation is on non-working time." NLRB v. Magnavox Corp., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974). Thus, even if the rule had its origins in the NLRB's expertise, it has far more status now.
    As for AA's point that the RLA lacks a comparably expert public tribunal like the NLRB, the point actually cuts against its position. It is precisely because the NLRA, which governs the vast majority of the private sector workforce, empowers the NLRB as the main federal agency for the explication of the legal principles of labor relations, that courts confronted with novel questions under the RLA have routinely turned to NLRB cases, and the federal court decisions reviewing them, in construing comparable provisions in the RLA. The Court should draw similar analogies here, rejecting AA's claim that ownership of a leasehold interest in its operations areas entitles it to promulgate and en force its absolute bar on union-related communications.

C.    Under Applicable Principles, the Undisputed Facts in Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts and Other Moving Papers Entitle Plaintiffs to Summary Judgment.

    In the last few pages of its brief, at 13-18, AA attempts to raise questions about the factual sufficiency of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The first answer to AA's minor quibbles is that, as we indicated at the outset of this memorandum, AA's failure to submit a Statement of Genuine Issues as required by Local Rule 108(h) is fatal to any questions that it may now wish to raise about the factual assertions in Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts. Each paragraph of that statement must be taken as true.
    Nor are the criticisms in AA's memorandum well-founded. On the issue of disrup tion, AA quotes out-of-context several statements by plaintiffs or other individuals in contemporaneous e-mails, attempting to show that plaintiffs "were pursuing disruption as an intentional tactic in their effort to block the ratification . . .." AA SJ Opp. 15. We have shown the flaws in AA's citation of e-mails from plaintiff Hunnibell, urging pilots to obtain direct evidence of AA's discriminatory policies, and from pilot Rossetti, making a joking reference to Hare Krishnas. P SJ Opp. at 44-45.
    AA now adds two more wholly inconsequential items. It cites an e-mail message from plaintiff Held, after Chief Pilot Kudwa had physically assaulted him in operations, urging pilots to get out into operations and communicate with their fellow employees and that "everything else, legal, financial, chief pilots, it's all secondary." AA SJ Opp. 15. Apparently AA wants to Court to assume that Held was urging pilots to break the law and ignore orders in campaigning against ratification. Reviewing the entire e-mail and taking the statement in context, however, it is perfectly apparent that, at this point -- having received express permission from Chief Pilot Ewell to campaign in operations -- Held was urging his fellow advocates to spare no expense and to concentrate on campaigning, not on possible legal claims against Kudwa based on his assault, or based on past actions by chief pilots restricting communication.
    Second, AA urges the Court not to credit plaintiff Dudley's affidavit stating that he was "calm, courteous and non-confrontational" because the leaflet he was giving out used the following phrases: "Let's be bad"; "ready to kick some ass and come back for more"; and "Grow some gonads." Again, the Court should look at the leaflet, which does not express opinions about what should happen in operations. The point of the leaflet is that the pilots should not be afraid of a strike despite the risks entailed. Whether or not the leaflet uses language that we would expect in a courtroom or elsewhere, there is no inconsistency between giving out such a leaflet and behaving oneself while giving it out. Moreover, even if the Court does not credit Dudley's affidavit, there are several other affidavits stating the same thing. Thus, AA's smattering of e-mails does not create any genuine issue of material fact.
    Plaintiffs stand by their assertion that displeasure on the part of some employees is no justification for shutting down the rights of free speech for all. P SJ Mem. at 34-35. AA takes issue with this precedent, AA SJ Opp. 16, but that legal issue is irrelevant on this record. After all, AA has deliberately chosen not to adduce any admissible evidence that there was disruption, either by Dudley or anybody else. It has produced no affidavits from persons who saw Dudley, claiming that he (or any other pilot) behaved in any manner other than as he (and others) aver. There is no genuine issue regarding the absence of disruption; AA's objection to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment thus falls for this reason alone. And, more fundamentally, such evidence would not suffice to justify de priving 9,000 other pilots of their right to communicate based on alleged misbehavior by one individual.
    On the discrimination issue, AA acknowledges plaintiffs' "extensive proof" regar ding the wide variety of non-work communications that AA allows in operations, AA SJ Opp. 16, but argues that discrimination has not been shown because, supposedly, none of plaintiffs' proofs involve communications by off-duty employees. Id. 17. This distinction is factually incorrect. In fact, many of the non-work communications cited in plaintiffs' papers were by off-duty employees -- we give several examples in the footnote.See footnote 4
    Nor is the point well-taken legally. When an employer permits a variety of non- employees to enter its premises to engage in communications with its employees about non-work matters, it may be discriminatory -- and thus a violation of section 8(a)(1) -- for the employer to exclude even non-employee solicitors and distributors representing a union. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956); NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S 226, 230 (1949). In such a case, union representatives who are not employees must be allowed to enter the employer's premises to communicate with employees even without the normally-required evidence that the union has no alternate means of communication with the employees. Id. But under the rules of Republic Avia tion and Stoddard-Quirk, employees' rights of communication are superior to the rights of non-employees. Thus, when an employer routinely allows non-employee solicitations on its premises, as AA now concedes it does, restriction of employee communications about the union is discriminatory and thus unlawful. Davis Supermarkets v. NLRB, 2 F.3d 1162, 1177-1178 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (employer discriminated by barring on-premises picketing by employees while allowing non-employee representatives of approved organ ization to enter to communicate); NLRB v. Honeywell, 722 F.2d 405, 407 (8th Cir. 1983), enf'g 262 NLRB 1402 (1982) (upholding finding of discrimination, court emphasizes communications by organizations approved by employer); American Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 132, 136 (8th Cir. 1979) (employer discriminated by allowing non- employee groups to distribute and solicit, but not employees). For this reason alone, plain tiffs' motion for summary judgment should be granted.

    In summary, then, AA's objections to summary judgment should be rejected because they would leave plaintiffs without any effective remedy to protect their right of free speech about union matters on which the company and union leadership are aligned. As dissenters within their union, they cannot depend on the union, and should not have to rely on the union, to enforce their statutory rights through either the grievance procedure or negotiations, and they have standing to assert their own statutory rights. Moreover, they are entitled to prevent both interference with union activity in nonwork areas and times, and employer discrimination against union-related speech -- not to speak of against speech on one side of an intra-union issue -- even if the employer is not motivated to do so by anti-union animus. The undisputed facts establish that AA did just that, and that it had no legitimate business justification for its actions, and hence violated plaintiffs' rights under the RLA.

    Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on liability should be granted.

                        Respectfully submitted,

                        Paul Alan Levy (DC Bar 946400)
                        Colette G. Matzzie (DC Bar 451230)

                         Public Citizen Litigation Group
                         1600 20th Street, N.W.
                         Washington, D.C. 20009
                         (202) 588-1000

                        Attorneys for Plaintiffs
February 3, 1998

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