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8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA					
9	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO					
10	UNL	IMITEI	D JURISDICT	ION		
11	JOHN DOE 1, an individual, and JOHN DOE 2, an individual,	)	California Ca	ase No.		
12	Petitioners,	{		DUM OF POINTS AND IES IN SUPPORT OF PETITION		
13	VS.	}	TO QUASH 1987.2, 2029	SUBPOENA (C.C.P. §§ 1987.1, 9.600)		
14	MARIE GUNNING, an individual,	}	Date:	November 15, 2013		
15 16	Respondent.	_}	Time: Department: Judge:	9:00 a.m. 302 - DISCOVERY Hon. Marla J. Miller		
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19	IN THE CIRCUIT	COUR	T OF THE ST	ATE OF MAINE		
20	FOR THE	COUNT	ΓY OF CUMB	ERLAND		
21	MARIE GUNNING, an individual,	}	Maine Case 1	No. CV-13-359		
22	Plaintiff,	}				
23	VS.	}				
24	JOHN DOE,	{				
25	Defendant.					
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#### INTRODUCTION.

Plaintiff Marie Gunning (Gunning) is a local politician in the small town of Freeport, Maine. A Freeport hard copy and Internet parody, the Crow's Nest, published comments about her that she found offensive. In response, she filed a lawsuit in Maine against the owner of the website and the writer of the parodies. She subsequently served a subpoena on the company that hosted the website, Automattic, Inc. (Automattic), seeking the personally identifying information of the website owner and the writer.

Petitioners John Doe 1, the owner, and John Doe 2, the author, request that the subpoena to Automattic be quashed in its entirety. This Court should not allow Gunning's attempt to unmask the publisher and author of what is clearly constitutionally-protected parody. Gunning's attempt to chill free speech must be strictly scrutinized. Gunning must show, inter alia, that she has legitimate claims and that information she seeks is necessary to her pursuit of such claims. She will not be able to do so. This petition should be granted and petitioners should be awarded the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in making this petition.

#### I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

#### A. Plaintiff Marie Gunning.

Marie Gunning, the plaintiff in the underlying action filed in the State of Maine, alleges that she has "from time to time, participated as a private citizen in the local politics of the Town of Freeport [Maine] and occasionally attends meetings of the Town Council," and that she "participate[s] in the local politics of the Town." (Petitioners' Request for Judicial Notice (RJN), Exhibit A, ¶¶ 10-11; see Declaration of John Doe 2 (Doe 2 Decl.), ¶ 4.) Gunning was an unsuccessful candidate in 2011 for Town Council in Freeport, a town with approximately 8,000 inhabitants. (Doe 2 Decl., ¶ 3.) Indeed, Gunning even addressed the Town Council about the depictions of her in the Crow's Nest. (RJN, Exhibit A, ¶¶ 17, 29, 42.)

#### B. Petitioner John Doe 1.

John Doe 1 (Doe 1) is an individual who owns the URL for the Crow's Nest website, but did not write any of the content that appears on the site. (Declaration of John Doe 1 (Doe 1

Decl.), ¶¶ 1-4.) Doe 1 contracts with the witness, Automattic, Inc. to host the website on its servers. (Doe 1 Decl.,  $\P$  2.) Doe 1 is purportedly a defendant in the underlying action in that it alleges that the unnamed defendants therein are "the publishers" of the allegedly offensive content. (RJN, Exhibit A,  $\P$  3.)

#### C. Petitioner John Doe 2 and The Crow's Nest.

Petitioner John Doe 2 (Doe 2) is the author of the content on the Crow's Nest website. (Doe 2 Decl.,  $\P$  6.) The Crow's Nest has appeared periodically in Freeport over the past 25 years. (*Id.* at  $\P$  7.) The Crow's Nest is clearly parody and even specifically identifies itself as such in its masthead -- "a parody look at the news" -- for those to whom it is not apparent. (RJN, Exhibit A, exhibits attached thereto.) Doe 2 is purportedly a defendant in the underlying action in that it alleges that the unnamed defendants therein are the "contributing writers" of the allegedly offensive content. (RJN, Exhibit A,  $\P$  3.)

#### D. Gunning v. Doe and the Subject Subpoena.

Gunning filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court for the State of Maine in August 2013, purportedly alleging causes of action for libel, false light invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (RJN, Exhibit A.) Each of Gunning's purported causes of action is based exclusively on content published in the Crow's Nest. (RJN, Exhibit A, ¶¶ 12-15, 18-28, 30-35, 38-41, 45-48, 52-55, 59-62, 64-66, 68-69.) The subject subpoena requests that Automattic provide "All names you have associated with <a href="http://freeportcrowsnest.com/">http://freeportcrowsnest.com/</a> (including but not limited to the owner, anyone who has made a payment toward hosting the site, anyone who has contributed content to the specific posts identified . . . below)," "all email addresses associated with anyone covered [by the previous request] (including but not limited to the owner, anyone who has contributed content to the specific posts identified . . . below)," the "IP address from which the <a href="http://freeportcrowsnest.com/">http://freeportcrowsnest.com/</a> was created," and the "IP address and user-agent for" specific posts. (Clifford Decl., Exhibit B, Exhibit A to the Maine Subpoena.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Gunning has filed her Complaint against "one or more Defendants collectively referred to herein as 'John Doe'." (RJN, Exhibit A.) Because there is more than one such person, petitioners herein refer to themselves as John Doe 1 and John Doe 2.

# II. THIS COURT SHOULD QUASH THE SUBPOENA TO AUTOMATTIC BECAUSE IT INTRUDES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SPEAK ANONYMOUSLY.

#### A. This Court Has the Authority to Quash the Subpoena to Automattic.

Code of Civil Procedure<sup>2</sup> section 2029.500 provides that the laws of California governing discovery requests shall apply to discovery to be conducted in California for use in an out of state action. Section 2029.600 provides that if a dispute relating to discovery to be conducted in California in an out-of-state case, a request to quash or modify a subpoena, or for other relief may be filed in the county in which discovery is to be conducted. Section 1987.1, subdivision (a), provides that if "a subpoena requires . . . the production of . . . documents," a court upon motion reasonably made, or on its own motion, "may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders." Section 1987.1, subdivision (b), provides that a witness, or a consumer described in section 1985.3, or a person whose personally identifying information is sought in connection with an underlying action involving that person's exercise of free speech rights, may make a motion pursuant to section 1987.1. (§ 1987.1, subds. (b)(3) and (5); see also *Rittenhouse v. Superior Court* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1584, 1587, 1591.)

#### 1. Petitioner John Doe 1 is a Consumer Described in Section 1985.3.

Section 1985.3, subdivision (a)(2), provides that a "consumer" is "any individual, partnership of five or fewer persons, association, or trust which has transacted business with, or has used the services of, the witness . . ." Doe 1 has transacted business with and used the services of the witness, Automattic, to host the Crow's Nest website on which the allegedly wrongful comments were posted. (Doe 1 Decl.,  $\P$  2.)

2. The Personally Identifying Information of Petitioners Is Sought in Connection with an Underlying Lawsuit Arising From Their Exercise of Free Speech Rights.

The publication and creation of the Crow's Nest website are clearly exercises of free speech in that the website is commentary on current events and politics in the form of parodies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Subsequent statutory section references herein are to this Code unless otherwise indicated.

Civil Code section 1798.79.8, subdivision (b) defines personally identifying information to include names and addresses, email addresses and Internet protocol addresses or host names. Here, Gunning requests that Automattic produce such information of the owner, publisher and writer of the Crow's Nest, as discussed above. Gunning's subpoena clearly requests personally identifying information of petitioners involving petitioners' exercise of free speech rights.

#### B. The First Amendment Protects the Right to Speak Anonymously.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that there is a First Amendment right to speak anonymously and remain anonymous. (*Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation* (1995) 525 U.S. 182, 197-200 (*Buckley*); *McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission* (1995) 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (*McIntyre*).) *McIntyre*, supra, at pp. 341-42, states:

The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible. Whatever the motivation may be, at least in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry. Accordingly, an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.

This right of anonymous free speech also applies to speech on the Internet. "Internet speech and publications are fully protected by the First Amendment." (*DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 900; see *Reno v. ACLU* (1997) 521 U.S. 844, 870.) The Internet "constitutes a vast platform from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience of millions . . . Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Webpages . . . the same individual can become a pamphleteer." (*Reno v. ACLU, supra*, at p. 870.) As in any other public forum, censorship on the Internet is stringently limited. (*Ibid*.)

Because the First Amendment protects anonymous speech, efforts to pierce such anonymity are subject to a qualified privilege and courts "must be vigilant . . . [and] guard against undue hindrances to . . . the exchange of ideas." (*Buckley, supra,* 525 U.S. at p. 192.) Here, Gunning seeks to identify individuals who have lampooned her involvement in local politics. She does so not because she has legitimate claims, but to suppress her critics.

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# C. The Court Should Require Gunning to Demonstrate a Valid Claim Relating to the Speakers' Comments and Balance Her Purported Need for the Information with the Speakers' Constitutional Rights.

#### 1. The Identities of Anonymous Speakers Must Be Protected.

When the identities of anonymous speakers are sought, "[c]ourts carefully balance the 'compelling' public need to disclose against the confidentiality interests to withhold, giving great weight to fundamental privacy rights." (*Rancho Publications v. Superior Court* (1999) 68

Cal.App.4th 1538, 1549 (*Rancho Publications*) [subpoena seeking names of non-party anonymous authors of "advertorials"].) A court order to compel production of individuals' identities in a situation that would threaten the exercise of fundamental rights "is subject to the closest scrutiny." (*NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson* (1958) 357 U.S. 449, 461.) This is because "[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes [an] irreparable injury." (*Elrod v. Burns* (1976) 427 U.S. 347, 373.) "Anonymity, once lost, cannot be regained." (*Rancho Publications, supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1541.)

Further, despite codified discovery procedures, "there is a non-statutory qualified immunity, grounded in the free speech and privacy provisions of the United States and California Constitutions, that limits what courts can compel through civil discovery." (*Rancho Publications, supra*, at p. 1547 [denying disclosure of the true identities of anonymous speakers because plaintiffs' purported interest in the information was outweighed by the right to speak anonymously].)

When a plaintiff seeks to discover the personally identifying information of an anonymous Internet speaker, courts must weigh the interests of the plaintiff against that of the right to anonymity. Courts apply a two part test, first requiring the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of legitimate claims and second, a showing that the harm caused to a plaintiff by protecting the anonymity of the speaker outweighs the harm to the speakers' First Amendment rights. (*Highfields Capital Management L.P. v. Doe* (2004) 385 F.Supp.2d 969, 974-976 (*Highfields*).)

First:

the plaintiff must adduce competent evidence -- and the evidence plaintiff adduces must address all of the inferences of fact that plaintiff would need to prove in order to prevail under at least one of the causes of action plaintiff asserts. . . . The court may not enforce the subpoena if, under plaintiff's showing, any essential fact or finding lacks the requisite evidentiary support.

(*Id.* at pp. 975-976.) Plaintiffs must make a showing of the legitimacy of their purported claims to "ensure [] that the plaintiff is not merely seeking to harass or embarrass the speaker or stifle legitimate criticism." (*Krinsky v. Doe* (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1171.)

If the plaintiff satisfies the first prong, "the court [must] assess and compare the magnitude of the harms that would be caused to competing interests by a ruling in favor of plaintiff and by a ruling in favor of defendant." (*Id.* at p. 976.) The court must also consider "whether a discovery request is likely to result in chilling protected activity" of other speakers as well. (See *Highfields*, *supra*, 385 F.Supp.2d at pp. 980-981 [enforcing subpoena requiring disclosure of identities of anonymous speakers can have a chilling effect on other speakers].)

Here, Gunning's attempt to discover the identities of persons who criticized her with regard to her active involvement in the politics of a very small town should be strictly scrutinized. Gunning should be required to establish a legitimate need for the information and that disclosure of the information will not chill free speech.

#### 2. Gunning Will Not Be Able to Show that She Has Viable Claims.

As just discussed, this Court must consider whether Gunning has viable claims, because, if not, Gunning does not have any legitimate need for the information she seeks. (See § 1987.2, subdivision (b).) Gunning has no such claims against petitioners for the reasons discussed below, among others.

## a. Gunning Will Not Be Able to Show that She Has Viable Claims Against John Doe 1.

Doe 1 is simply the owner of the Crow's Nest website and cannot be held liable for comments posted on the website by third parties because of the immunity granted pursuant to 47 U.S.C. section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). Section 230 of the CDA provides, inter alia, that providers of an interactive computer service are immune from civil

liability for publishing third party content on the Internet. (See *Barrett v. Rosenthal* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 39-40.) Section 230(f)(2) broadly defines "interactive computer service" as "any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server. . . ." Websites are interactive computer services under section 230. (*Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC* (9th Cir. 2008) 521 F.3d 1157, 1162.) John Doe 1 did not create any of the content on Crow's Nest and has been sued for simply owning the website upon which the allegedly wrongful content was posted. Therefore, Doe 1 cannot be liable to Gunning for any of the wrongs alleged in the Complaint. Doe 1's personally identifying information should not be disclosed to Gunning.

## b. Gunning Will Not Be Able to Show that She Has Viable Claims Against John Doe 2.

Not only does The Crow's Nest specifically identify itself as "a parody look at the news," the context in which the allegedly wrongful comments were posted clearly shows that no reasonable person could understand them to be anything but parody. (RJN, Exhibit A, exhibits attached thereto.) For example, the Crow's Nest, inter alia, uses images of characters in the Wizard of Oz, Flash Gordon, Muppet and other movies, and characters from cartoons and the like, to parody local politicians. (See RJN, Exhibit A, Exhibits 1-3, 5-11, 14-16.)

Parody is a form of speech squarely protected by the First Amendment. It cannot be actionable because it does not convey a provably false assertion of fact. The California Supreme Court, in protecting a parody, emphasized that the requirement that a defamation plaintiff demonstrate an actual falsehood "is grounded in the First Amendment itself." (*Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 254, 259 (*Baker*).) As the United States Supreme Court explained, holding that a Hustler Magazine parody ad was protected expression under the First Amendment:

At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern. . . . The First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a "false" idea. . . . Freedoms of expression require "breathing space."

(Hustler v. Falwell (1998) 485 U.S. 46, 50, 52.)

Our courts have recognized this fundamental satirical attribute of parody and have held

accordingly that such speech is protected by the First Amendment.

In *Baker*, *supra*, 42 Cal.3d at p. 258, the producer of a television documentary on sex education sued a reviewer, who stated in a television program review:

My impression is that [the producer] . . . told his writer/producer . . . "We've got a hot potato here – let's pour on titillating innuendo and as much bare flesh as we can get away with. Viewers will eat it up!"

The California Supreme Court held that this parody was not actionable because a reasonable listener or reader would understand that the purported quotation was a statement of opinion, rather than fact. (*Id.* at pp. 261-62, 269.)

In San Francisco Bay Guardian v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 655, 657, a landlord sued the Bay Guardian newspaper for publishing a fake letter, purportedly written by the plaintiff landlord, which said:

I don't understand why Vince Bielski is so upset about electroshock therapy. I find that my tenants who have undergone this treatment are much more cooperative.

Even though the plaintiff found five people to declare under oath that they did not recognize the letter as parody, the court nonetheless concluded that "the average reader, as a matter of law, would recognize that the letter was a . . . parody and not actually written by [plaintiff]." (*Id.* at p. 659.) Therefore, the court held, "the letter does not defame [plaintiff] by false attribution or presentation of false facts." (*Id.* at p. 661.)<sup>3</sup>

Gunning will not be able to establish that she has legitimate claims because the allegedly wrongful statements upon which she bases her claims are clearly protected by the First Amendment. Her witch hunt should not be permitted to proceed.

### III. GUNNING SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY PETITIONERS' FEES AND EXPENSES IN MAKING THIS PETITION.

Here, the subject subpoena requests personally identifying information from an Internet

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Although Gunning is clearly a public figure given that she was a candidate for elective office and has been involved in local politics (*Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton* (1989) 491 U.S. 657, 686-687), First Amendment protection of parody is not limited to suits by public figures. (See, e.g., *Couch v. San Juan Unified School District* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1494-96, 1503-04 [high school campus security officer could not recover for publication of a parody].)

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service provider or a provider of an interactive computer service, for use in an action pending in another state, which action arises from petitioners' exercise of free speech rights on the Internet. Gunning will not be able to make a prima facie showing of a cause of action. Therefore, should this petition be granted, Section 1987.2 provides that an award of attorneys' fees and costs to petitioners is mandatory.

CONCLUSION.

The subject subpoena seeks the identities of persons who have been critical of her and her political positions on the Crow's Nest parody website. Parody is by definition not factual and no objectively reasonable reader of the Crow's Nest would take as fact the statements about which Gunning complains. The Crow's Nest is clearly protected by the First Amendment, as are the persons who publish and write it.

This Court must strictly scrutinize Gunning's request for the personally identifying information of the persons associated with the Crow's Nest. Gunning will not be able to establish that she has a legitimate need for the requested information. This petition should be granted and the subpoena should be quashed. Petitioners should also be found to be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs related to this motion, in an amount to be proven.

DATED: October 18, 2013

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