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  Leading Nuke Watchdogs: New US Nuclear Security Plan May Harm, Not Help SecurityFOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: September 30, 2004 WASHINGTON, DC – A group of the nation’s leading nuclear watchdog organizations today issued strong, united criticisms of a new nuclear security plan being implemented this month at U.S. nuclear power plants. The groups, Project on Government Oversight, Union of Concerned Scientists, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Public Citizen, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, and Service Employees International Union, have been the chief whistleblowers on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s misguided new plan to use the private security firm Wackenhut to train and manage the adversary teams that simulate “force-on-force” terrorist attacks against nuclear plants that already are guarded by Wackenhut’s own personnel. Clear Conflict of Interest “Wackenhut is now in charge of testing itself and its competitors,” said Stephen Lerner of SEIU, America’s largest security officers union. “It is a clear conflict of interest.” David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists explained why a scenario in which Wackenhut tests itself could easily be manipulated. “It would be easy for the mock attackers to “throw” an exercise and let the security guards win. An attacker can easily fake a misstep or fail to promptly take cover when encountering a security guard without the NRC’s observers knowing what happened.” Wackenhut Caught Cheating on Tests The conflict of interest is even more concerning given the numerous security problems documented at multiple Wackenhut-guarded nuclear facilities in the U.S. over the last several years. Earlier this year, Wackenhut was caught cheating on a force-on-force drill at a U.S. Government nuclear weapons facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. “We have seen over and over Wackenhut's tendency to retaliate against whistleblowers,” said Danielle Brian of the Project on Government Oversight. “POGO has interviewed over 200 security guards at nuclear power plants and the vast majority of those with real concerns about a lack of security work for Wackenhut. Excessive, forced overtime, low pay, and high turnover continue to describe the conditions that Wackenhut security officers face on the job.” The publicly documented security problems at Wackenhut-guarded nuclear sites are detailed in the SEIU report, titled “Homeland Insecurity: How the Wackenhut Corporation is Compromising America’s Nuclear Security.” The report is available online at www.EyeonWackenhut.com. Wackenhut provides security officers for 31 of the nation’s 64 nuclear power plants. Wackenhut is the largest supplier of private security officers to U.S. nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons sites. NRC’s Information Black-Out Policy Compounding the concerns about Wackenhut and the conflict of interest, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission revealed on August 4, 2004 a new policy that will prevent the public from learning the results of the nuclear security tests that Wackenhut is now performing, even shielding the results from Freedom of Information Act requests. Commenting on the troubling new policy, Brendan Hoffman of Public Citizen said, “NRC's information blackout ultimately makes us less safe. This new level of secrecy will enable the NRC to simply hide security problems with no accountability. It is possible to talk about nuclear security issues and concerns without revealing classified information. Public involvement in security has a track record of improving security, not jeopardizing it.” Paul Gunter of the Nuclear Information Resource Service added, “The public information black out is compounded by the controversy that NRC is more interested in protecting the nuclear industry’s bottom line on security than requiring plant operators to meet the real cost of defending nuclear power stations from terrorism.” Recommended Solutions Navin Nayak of the U.S. Public Interest Research Group summed up the groups’ recommendations for how to address their concerns. He said, “The first step is to ensure that the attacking force is a disinterested party, wholly independent of the entity guarding the facility. This is the easiest way of assuring the public that the tests are independent and rigorous. Second, there are several options available to the NRC in terms of who will undertake the attacks, including federalizing the program; using military personnel to test the facilities – as has been done in the past; contracting with private security companies that are independent of the force guarding the plants; or combinations of these. Finally, given its track record, Wackenhut should not be used for any security function at nuclear plants—either attacking the plants or guarding the plants; Wackenhut’s problems have not been isolated incidents, but are part of a pervasive corporate culture.” The groups highlighted that the NRC already has the authority under current law to establish a more credible scenario. “The NRC has the authority to choose the attacking force and back-charge the industry for the cost. NRC’s hands are not tied by a lack of funds or a lack of authority,” added Nayak. On September 14, the same week that Wackenhut’s adversary teams began performing the force-on-force tests, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and both Republican and Democratic lawmakers raised similar concerns to those of the groups at a hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, chaired by Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.). ### more resources
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